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Part I: Early Life and Education 
 
Session 1, Tape 1, Side A 
 
NORBERG:  We are in the offices of Professor Peter J. Denning talk about his activities in his 
professional field (computer science), and also to consider some of his volunteer activities in the 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).   
Peter, I’d like to get some general information from you.  I’d like you do discuss, in a 
brief form, anyway, your family, your parents, maybe even your grandparents if that’s relevant to 
influences on you, and your early education before you went to MIT.   
 
DENNING:  Let me start with the family.  I come from a family with five children.  I’m the 
oldest of five.  I have three sisters and one brother.  My parents came from the New York City 
area.  When they first were married, they lived in Queens, and I was born in Queens in 1942.  I 
was number one child, and then in 1943 came my first sister, in 1944 my brother, in 1945 my 
second sister.  My third sister arrived in 1953.  By 1945, we had outgrown the Queens 
brownstone.  My parents moved us to Darien, Connecticut, where they bought a very nice house 
on three and a half acres of land.  We moved to the country, at least that’s what it seemed like to 
me away from the city.  I grew up with my brother and sisters -- and some chickens, ducks, and a 
few animals. 
 
NORBERG:  What did your father do? 
 
DENNING:  My father was a lawyer in the entertainment industry.  When I first became aware 
of where he worked, he was working for RCA.  He transitioned from RCA to NBC and then to 
Universal Studios in a New York City office.  Eventually (1963) Universal moved him to 
California where he was vice president in charge of the legal department.  Every day he rushed 
down to the Darien train station for a commuter train at 7:00 a.m. down into New York, which 
we simply called “the city”.  He came home about 7:00 p.m. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s a long day. 
 
DENNING:  He said it wasn’t bad because he used the time to read the newspapers, articles, and 
papers important to him.  Mother remained at home managing the household of four kids (five 
after 1953).  I attended Darien public schools through 8th grade.  For high school I went to the 
all-men’s Fairfield College Prep, which was a short train commute to Fairfield, Connecticut.  My 
parents felt I would get a better education in the hands of the Jesuits than in the Darien schools.  
We were all Catholics, and they desired to put their kids into Catholic schools.  Then for college, 
I went to Manhattan College in New York City. 
 
NORBERG:  Can we stop there for just a moment, please?  What was the curriculum like at 
Fairfield Prep? 
 
DENNING:  Everyone warned me that Fairfield Prep would be far more demanding than Darien 
schools.  Their demands began with an entrance exam, which I studied hard for and, thankfully 
aced, and they promised three hours of homework every night.  (I remember that the last 
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entrance exam question had to do with the length of the diagonal of a square; since I had finished 
all the other questions, I used my time to apply the square root calculating algorithm I had 
learned from a book to get the diagonal to four decimal places.  I was very proud of myself.  I’m 
sure no other student was paying so much attention to that darn square root, and I’m sure that the 
teachers who graded it would have been satisfied with one digit after the decimal point.)  As for 
homework, I was used to an hour or less homework a night.  I was a pretty smart kid, so I didn’t 
have to work that hard to keep up with the homework demands of middle school.  Fairfield Prep 
wasn’t kidding about three hours of homework every night -- a lot of reading and writing.  After 
supper, I’d go upstairs to my room around 7:00pm and worked until close to 10:00pm.  Prep 
burned into me a lifelong habit of working in the evenings. 
 
NORBERG:  What subjects did you study? 
 
DENNING:  We had many.  They included Literature, History, Social Studies, English 
composition, Theology, German, Latin, Greek, Physics, Chemistry, and Math.  It was a well 
rounded curriculum.   I particularly liked the Math. 
 
NORBERG:  What was so important about the Math? 
 
DENNING:  My math teacher was a big supporter of my emerging career in science. 
 
NORBERG:  Was he a Jesuit? 
 
DENNING:  No, he was a layman.  His name was Ralph Money.  When he saw that I was better 
at Math than most of the other guys, he told me to move ahead at my own pace and not the 
slower pace of the class.  I completed the math book in a few weeks and he started me on the 
book for the more advanced math class.  In that one sophomore semester I completed two and a 
half semesters of math under his watchful eye.  Mr. Money strongly encouraged me to join the 
science club, which he advised after hours; I’ll come back to that. 
Money and others also encouraged me to pursue my writing talent by writing for the 
school magazine (the Berkman Review).  I was particularly active with that as a senior, writing a 
series of serious and whimsical articles.  I wrote some science fiction articles: I was an avid 
science fiction reader at the time. 
 
NORBERG:  Did your siblings also go to similar schools or the same school? 
 
DENNING:  Well, a few towns further up the rail line from Fairfield, was Milford, in which 
there was a Catholic girls school called Lauralton Hall.  Both my sisters went there.  We all 
became train commuters like my father.  In my freshman year (1956) I went down to the Darien 
station with my father; he took the train to New York, and I took the opposite train to New 
Haven.  The next year my first sister joined the routine.  There was a bunch of about 25 Fairfield 
Prep boys on that train.  Although we all wore suits and ties, we raised enough hell that the 
conductors celebrated when they left us in Fairfield.  There was also a bunch of girls commuting 
to Lauralton, and naturally we taunted them a lot.   I didn’t pay much attention to the girls in my 
freshman year, but when my sister joined the next year, she started introducing me to them. 




NORBERG:  It sounds like you liked Fairfield Prep. 
 
DENNING:  Indeed that is so.  I have many unpleasant memories of Darien middle school.  I’m 
sure my experiences were pretty typical, but at the time they seemed unique to me.  As I said, I 
was very good at academics.  I was just absolutely awful at competitive sports.  Sports were the 
big deal for 14-year-olds.  I remember the following scene vividly.  We’d go for a physical Ed 
period to play baseball, football, soccer, or basketball.  The two best guys would be the captains, 
and they would alternate taking kids on to their teams.  Without exception I was the last one 
chosen.  One captain explained to me, “We pick the best ones first, and if we had a chance we 
wouldn’t pick you at all.”  Ouch.  I was the runt compared to the other boys … my final spurt of 
growth was 3 inches at age 18.  I was too small for useful physical contact, and I had an eye 
defect called amblyopia.  I could not read from one eye or perceive depth.  Consequently I could 
not catch balls very well.   I was like Charlie Brown’s sister Lucy in the outfield.   I’d put my 
hand out for the ball and it would whiz right by me.  I could see why no one wanted me to be on 
the receiving end for flying balls. 
The only part of phys. ed. that I did well with was personal gymnastics.  I had a lot of 
natural strength for my size and could do the pushups, pullups, ab crunches, rope climbs, fence 
jumps, and other feats better than most of the others.  The short gymnastics season, which 
happened during the dead of winter, was the only satisfying part of phys. ed. for me. 
In this context, I felt like I was a misfit in the social structure of the school.  The one 
thing I could really do well -- the academics -- was worth little in that social environment.  I had 
brief moments of glory when they handed out report cards at mid term and final -- I was the guy 
with straight A’s.  Many others came to see my report card just to see what one looked like with 
all A’s.  Many of them looked just to see what an A looked like, as they had none on their cards.  
The next day we were back to business as usual when it came time to choose up teams.  I 
remember many conversations with my mother about this situation.  She said, “That’s the way 
the boys are down there.  You have other gifts they don’t have.  You have to develop your gifts.” 
 
NORBERG:  A wise piece of advice. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  But it was hard to take at that time.  The situation changed dramatically when 
I got to Fairfield Prep.  I started finding other boys who were interested in science and math, as 
was I.  In middle school I enjoyed going down to the library and getting math books -- puzzles, 
problem-solving methods, and odds-and-ends of interesting math facts.  But that was a solitary 
activity.  In Prep, I had others to talk to about these things, and I was in a social structure that 
valued academic performance. 
Here’s an example of a math fact that intrigued me.  When I was 12 or so I found a math 
book that described a famous problem called Buffon’s Needle.  You take a piece of paper, and 
you draw parallel lines whose spacing is the length of a needle borrowed from your Mother’s 
sewing box.  You spin the needle and drop it in a random position on the paper.  You count up 
the fraction of times the needle touches a line.  According to the book the ratio converges to half 
of Pi.  I did the experiment and, sure enough, it converged every time to half of Pi.  It wasn’t 
until graduate school when I finally learned what made Buffon’s Needle work.  When talking 
about this problem with the math students at Fairfield, I found many other examples of how Pi 
shows up in nature, often in mysterious ways. 
 




DENNING:  Yes.  At a much earlier age, maybe 7 or 8, I developed an interest in astronomy.  
My interest grew over the years.  I also became interested in botany and was an expert on 
wildflowers when I was in Boy Scout camps during the summers.  I had scrapbooks full of news 
clippings about astronomy and botany, and even a book full of pressed flowers and four-leaf 
clovers.  Around age 13 I got my father to buy me an old camera, which I mounted on a tripod 
and opened up for six hours during the night to record star tracks.  I got some amazing star 
pictures from that camera.  One night at 2am, when groping through a field to retrieve my 
camera and its precious photo, I tripped over a skunk and started screaming.  Fortunately, he just 
ran away.  Astronomy has its perils.  In an astronomy project for Boy Scouts, I made star charts 
predicting the path of the Moon and Mars for a week in advance -- and I was surprised by how 
well I did.  One summer I built a telescope from a stovepipe with lenses that I purchased for $5 
locally.  Through that telescope I saw the rings of Saturn and the moons of Jupiter.   Wow! 
I must have been obsessive about astronomy.  When I was 12, the other kids on the 
school bus regularly called out when I got on board, “Here comes Astronomy!” 
 
NORBERG:  Oh, they can be cruel!  Do you remember any of your reading at that time?  I ask 
because you seem to remember in great detail some of the interests you had at the time. 
 
DENNING:  I remember being interested in Popular Mechanics and Popular Science.  I 
frequently tried the little experiments they recommended, such as making a hygrometer from one 
of my sister’s long hairs.  By age 14, well before Fairfield Prep, I discovered Popular 
Electronics magazine, which was such a gold mine of intriguing experiments that I gave up on 
astronomy and moved into electronics.  I remember reading Scientific American a lot because 
they looked into ideas more than experiments.  I read a lot of math and electronics books I found 
in the library.  I especially liked the books of puzzles.  I also loved science fiction stories, more 
than other novels and stories.  So those are the kind of things I used to tend to read. 
 
NORBERG:  What sort of influence did your parents have on all of this?  Was your mother 
interested in the botany?  Was your father interested in astronomy?  There’s a stereotype for you. 
 
DENNING:  My father wanted to encourage me to develop my talents even though they were 
different from his.  He was a lawyer in the corporate world, working with movie stars and 
celebrities behind the scenes.  He himself didn’t like all the socializing and partying, so he stayed 
in the background.  He was not sure what world I was going to go into, it wasn’t law but 
probably science and engineering.  He encouraged me constantly to go to the best schools I could 
to develop as much as possible.  He found the money to send me to Fairfield Prep because I’d 
already demonstrated that I was good at academics.  He wanted to put me into an atmosphere 
where I’d be challenged and be forced to excel in the academic world.  He wanted me always to 
challenge myself and always to try to go beyond wherever I was.  His only push was for me to 
develop the talents I had been given. 
 
NORBERG:  What led to the decision to go to Manhattan College? 
 
DENNING:  As I approached senior year at Fairfield, the question of college began to loom.  My 
father was encouraging me to apply at MIT.  But I had developed a great concern for my 
spiritual health and worried that the secular atmosphere at MIT would not be good for me.  That 
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was a Jesuit influence.  So I focused my search on Catholic colleges.  Since my interest in 
electronics and computers was drawing me to electrical engineering, I sought Catholic 
Engineering schools.  The two best ones were Marquette and Manhattan.  I chose Manhattan 
because it was closer to home territory.  My father was disappointed.  He wanted me to try for 
MIT.  But he understood.  So I did go to Manhattan College.  And later, when I went to graduate 
school, I made it up to him and went to MIT. 
 
NORBERG:  What about mathematics? 
 
DENNING:  For me the math went into the background and building computers to the 
foreground.  Seeing things work and performing experiments on them was more satisfying than 
working out equations.  I loved taking math classes as long as they supported the science and 
engineering I was studying. 
 
NORBERG:  Let’s not go to graduate school yet.  Let me ask you about the program at 
Manhattan College.  You have described the rigorous curriculum at Fairfield Prep; was the 
program at Manhattan College just as foresighted in terms of preparing young people for the 
world they were going to walk into?  The Catholic influence caused you to, as you just said a few 
moments ago, to build your spiritual capabilities.  At the same time, you’re building your social 
and intellectual activities.  I’m curious as to how the program was. 
 
DENNING:  The curriculum at Manhattan College was every bit as demanding as the curriculum 
at Fairfield.  My study habits -- three hours a night -- served me well at Manhattan.  It was no 
problem for me to come back to my room after dinner and study until midnight.  I did this all 
through Manhattan College. 
 
NORBERG:  You lived on campus? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  My family lived in Darien.  The Manhattan campus was in the city.  I had no 
interest in trying to commute that every day.  In 1963 the whole family moved to California 
when Universal transferred my father to Universal Studios.  I stayed behind on the East Coast.  It 
was good to be used to the dorms, because I was able to continue on without interruption. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you have any particular faculty members interested in your work in 
mathematics, or theology for all of that? 
 
DENNING:  Let’s start earlier, in grade school.  In grade school, I can recall only one teacher 
who took an interest in my work.  His name was Mr. Sheldon, and he taught art.  He thought I 
had some talent at art and encouraged me in his art class to develop the talent.  He was 
particularly fond of my chalk pictures of images of the moon stimulated by an artist at the time 
named Chesley Bonestell. 
 
NORBERG:  Bonestell did all the NASA paintings later on. 
 
DENNING:  Bonestell was an inspiration for me to try my hand at Moon or Saturn landscapes.  
Mine were never anywhere near his level of quality, but Mr. Sheldon seemed to like them.  And I 
remember one day succeeding in drawing a very good-looking, lifelike pencil sketch of one of 
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the girls in the class.  I had a crush on her, but she was a grade ahead and she had no interest in a 
kid a grade behind her.  Mr. Sheldon said, “Why that’s Pat!  It looks exactly like her.  That’s 
very good.  You should continue to do this.”  I tried more portraiture and even some oil painting 
because of Sheldon’s encouragement.  But I could never get my art to a level of quality that 
caught people’s attention. 
In my Freshman year at college, I had classes in mechanical drawing, which they 
required of every engineer.  There my art found an outlet!  I was quite good at it.  Perhaps that 
was because engineering drawing is very precise and is blessed with numerous tools.  Although 
many of the tools have been automated, the skill of engineering drawing still serves me today 
when I prepare diagrams for articles and class presentations. 
I’ve also engaged with some “wish art”.  I can be a wicked punster and was drawn early 
on to the visual puns of Gary Larson.  I frequently have inspirations of Larson cartoons.  Since I 
don’t draw cartoon characters well, I just describe the panels in words and let my listeners see 
the cartoon in their own minds.  My wife (Dorothy) says some of these are as good as the real 
Larson.  She wishes I would draw the pictures or team up with someone who can. 
 
NORBERG:  Many of the cartoons today, though, don’t have much talent, it seems to me, in the 
drawing aspect. 
 
DENNING:  I know.  Dorothy says that good pictures can’t overcome bad gags, and good gags 
need minimal art.  She likes my gags and gags on my art. 
 
NORBERG:  What about high school.  Did you have any faculty members at Fairfield Prep who 
were particularly interested in what you were doing?  Or you followed them because you were 
interested in what they were doing? 
 
DENNING:  At Fairfield Prep, I already mentioned my math teacher, Ralph Money.  He did 
more than help me learn a lot of math beyond the course.  He was particularly instrumental in 
getting me involved in the Science Club, where I built computers that won major prizes at the 
science fairs.  As an aside, when I tell my “Mr. Money” stories to friends, some of them think I 
am referring to an imaginary icon standing for money.  So my statement “Mr. Money got me into 
science” sounds to them like “I went into science for the money” or “a rich uncle bribed people 
to get me in.”  One person told me, “I was not interested in Mr. Money, I was interested in Mr. 
Peace Corps.”  Mr. Money was such a punster, he undoubtedly would love this alternate 
interpretation. 
But I digress.  I was always a punster, as far back as I can remember.  I had a reputation 
in the Boy Scouts as “one-in-twenty” -- meaning that one in twenty of my attempted jokes 
actually got people to laugh.  Mr. Money, the math teacher, was a real punster and a kindred 
spirit.  His success rate may have been one in twenty as well, but that one was worth its weight in 
gold. 
Here’s an example of Mr. Money’s humor.  He started telling the class that when we 
finally get to algebra we’ll learn how to solve the Breakfast Problem.  He wouldn’t say what that 
problem was for several weeks.  Finally, one day he said that we are now beginning algebra.  He 
wrote the equation “y = mx+b” on the board and said we could solve it for “x”.  He then stood 
back with a big grin and said, “This is the Breakfast Problem.”  We all looked blank faced and 
baffled by his statement.  He continued grinning and said, “Don’t you get it?  m and x for 
breakfast?”  He was booed out of the room. 
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Another time he suspected one of the guys in the back of the room was trying to cheat on 
tests.  During a test he slipped out of the room and quietly entered the back of the room by a rear 
door.  He stood behind the student and held up a light bulb in his hand.  Suddenly, the bulb lit 
up!  Money said, “Here let me shine a little light on what you’re doing.”  The kid turned bright 
red and never tried to cheat again.  Oh, the light bulb he got from a magic store -- it had a little 
battery inside, activated by touching the base contacts to a metal finger ring. 
 
NORBERG:  You mentioned earlier that Mr. Money accelerated your pace in the math class.  
Did you actually go to class any more? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, I went to class.  My job was to read the book in class, as far ahead of him as 
possible.  I didn’t have to hand in the regular homework.  He did give me an occasional 
advanced problem to solve.  When I got done with the book, he had me start on the book used in 
the next year’s math classes.  He got me up to the calculus by the end of his class, and that’s 
where my accelerated learning ended.  The next year we had a different math teacher; he did not 
suggest I try to move ahead of the class. 
More important than the math, Mr. Money got me to join the Science Club, of which he 
was the moderator.  I quickly found that Mr. Money’s science club was going to be a lot of work.  
He wanted everybody in the Science Club to do a project for the Science Fair.  In Sophomore 
September, he had us work up ideas for Science Fair projects.  He critiqued the ideas and then by 
November insisted we all get to work on the projects so that they would be ready by the 
following March. 
Remember that by the end of eighth grade in middle school, I had become deeply 
interested in radio and electronics; I’d been doing electronics projects from Popular Electronics 
magazine and even hanging out with a few ham radio-type guys.  (I never got into ham radio 
myself.)  Mr. Money noticed my interest in electronics and fascination with computers, and he 
challenged me to build a computer for the science fair.  After accepting the challenge I started 
looking for opportunities to obtain components useful in computers.  Someone -- maybe it was 
Radio Shack -- was offering a special deal on surplus relays from a Navy submarine, for the 
amazing price of one dollar for a group of five.  I sent them $10 dollars so that I could stock up 
on 50 relays, which I thought would be a good start for a computer.  I had no idea how I would 
use them; I just knew from my readings that some computers were made of relays.  When the 
relays arrived, I learned that each group of 5 was hermetically sealed inside a heavy steel 
container.  You could have sunk the ship, and these relays would still work.  The hermetic seal 
was not mentioned in the ad.  I spent two weeks with a hacksaw, and many blades, trying to open 
those cases up and retrieve the relays.  But I wound up with a trove of 50 relays for my 
computer.  I created a plan to build a simple computer that would add columns of numbers and 
used those relays to represent the digits of the numbers.  It was a clunky thing with columns of 
lamps to indicate the answers to the sums.  I took it to the science fair in 1958.  When I came in 
the morning of the second day of the fair, I discovered a blue ribbon attached to my computer.  I 
had won first prize! 
Mr. Money was ecstatic.  He had helped the judging process by walking around in the 
crowds talking up about the interesting computer in one of the aisles.  When the judges came by 
I’m sure they were impressed with the size of the crowd who were visiting the computer!  At 
least one of the other boys got a prize and Mr. Money was really proud of his science club. 
As we were winding down the exhibit, a couple of the judges came by to congratulate 
me.  One of them asked what I would do next year.  I blurted out that I would build another 
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computer that would solve linear algebraic equations.  He said that would be impressive if I 
could do it.  I left the 1958 science fair with the goal of my project for the 1959 science fair. 
The linear equation solver was a much bigger challenge than I expected.  I spent much of 
the year working out the designs, looking for parts, adapting the design to the parts I could 
obtain, building, and testing.  The first challenge was to decide on an architecture and obtain the 
parts. 
For some years I had been covetous of a pinball machine our neighbor, Mr. Leach, had in 
his basement.  He had acquired it as junk from a bar for $25 and was saving it to build a 
controller for his Lionel train set.  I saw a way to use the stepping relays from the pinball 
machine to store the numbers manipulated by my linear equation solver.  So I said to Mr. Leach, 
“Wouldn’t it be cool if I could do something with a pinball machine and keep it from going to 
rust in your basement?”  He said, “No, I need that pinball machine.”  I pressed him and he told 
me of his dream to use it to control his Lionel trains.  He said that there was one part of his 
design that he’d been stuck on for several years.  There was a single rail section through a tunnel 
and trains could approach at either end.   He wanted an interlock system that would stop a train if 
another were already in the tunnel.  He was unable to come up with a design of the interlock that 
would prevent collisions inside that tunnel.  “I don’t know how to do it,” he said, “But I’m still 
trying.” 
Finally, one day, when I’d badgered him enough, he said, “I’ll tell you what.  If you can 
find a solution to that tunnel problem, you can have the damn machine.”  [Laughs]  Well, I 
couldn’t pass up that opportunity!  I buried myself in my room for three weeks poring over 
drawings of relays and track sensors.  I finally found an interlock design that seemed to work.  I 
handed it to Mr. Leach, feeling very proud of myself.  I was surprised when his face blanched.  
He did not seem at all happy that I was claiming a solution.  He said, “Well, obviously I’m going 
to have to study it to see if I can convince myself it works.”  So he took it, and I didn’t hear from 
him for a long time, maybe it was three or four weeks.  At that age, four weeks was an eternity. 
When I couldn’t stand the suspense, I asked my father if he knew what Mr. Leach had 
concluded from examining my plans.  My father talked to Mr. Leach and reported simply, “He 
says you solved the problem.  The pinball machine is yours.”  Some years later, my father told 
me that Mr. Leach said “I didn’t think anyone could solve that problem.  That darn kid of yours 
solved it, and now I’m out a good pinball machine.  But I gave my world.  Keep your eye on 
your son and make sure he builds that computer.  On the other hand, now that the problem is 
solved, I no longer have an interest in trying to build the interlock.  My own son has outgrown 
his interest in the Lionel trains.” 
My computer had an input panel with four dials A, B, C, and D, corresponding to the 
coefficients of a linear equation AX+B = CX+D.   As you twisted the dials, the numbers E = A-C 
and F = B-D were stored in stepping relays, and leaving the machine with the simpler equation 
EX+F=0.  When you pushed the “solve” button, a clock motor rotated another relay, subtracting 
E from F until F was 0.  The number of rotations was stored in X and displayed on an output 
screen to the user.  A simple enough plan and I had enough pinball relays to implement it. 
 
NORBERG: No flip- flops? 
 
DENNING: No, I represented numbers directly in base 10.   That’s what the pinball stepping 
relays were good for.  No need to represent numbers in binary and store the bits in flip-flops. 
 




DENNING:  Unfortunately, this simple design became complicated because the real world of 
relays did not abide by the nice on-off rules of logic.  I thought that something simple like 
resetting a stepping relay was as simple as pulsing its reset solenoid.  Noooo.  The pulse was 
automatically generated when the stepping relay entered its 10 position.  As soon as the relay 
started to move back to the 0 position, the current to the reset solenoid stopped, and the relay 
came to rest at a random intermediate position.  I was forced to design interlock circuits that 
came on when reset was generated and stayed on until the relay actually physically reached the 0 
position.   I kept encountering problems of this kind and spent a lot of time designing around 
them. 
When I got done in February 1959, the computer was a Rube Goldberg contraption 
whose design was uniquely tailored around the pinball machine parts.  The pinball machine had a 
scorekeeping relay -- it had a huge wheel with numbers stencil-punched through around the 
edge; the current score was illuminated by a lamp.  I adapted that relay by projecting its answer 
on to a small tracing-paper screen (an early graphical user interface).  I used a clock motor (the 
only available cheap motor) to power the subtraction unit.  The problem with the clock motor 
was that it was slow, taking about 30 seconds per subtraction.  Thus the time for the machine to 
stop was proportional to its answer.  At the last minute I discovered another timing problem (like 
that stepping relay) and grabbed an old delay circuit from a Popular Electronics project to add 
enough delay to solve the problem.  My computer was a hybrid of relays and a vacuum tube! 
 
NORBERG:  That sounds like a lot of sweat and work.  And you remember an amazing amount 
of detail about it. 
 
DENNING:  There’s a funny footnote ending to the story about the pinball machine.  Many 
years later, after I became a computer scientist, I learned that Mr. Leach’s tunnel problem was an 
example of what computer scientists call a “critical section” of a program.  All the solutions for 
the critical section problem -- to keep more than one computer from executing inside the critical 
section at the same time -- relied on some method of distinguishing simultaneous signals.  Lionel 
train sets had no such methods.  Consequently there had to be an error in my design.  
Fortunately, the subtle way this might happen escaped both Mr. Leach’s and my eyes.  Had he 
kept the pinball machine and built my circuit, he would have had a train wreck inside that tunnel 
sooner or later.  I’m glad neither of us knew any computer science, or my science fair project 
would never have happened. 
 
NORBERG:  I never thought about these things when I was playing with pinball machines in 
arcades!   How did the computer do at the science fair? 
 
Session 1, Tape 1, Side B 
 
DENNING:  It was amazing.  Mr. Money did his usual thing of running around telling everyone 
to go visit the computer over there in another aisle.  My computer attracted huge crowds 
continuously.  It zapped and sparked and clacked just like a pinball machine.  Those stepping 
relay solenoids make a loud noise each time they step.  The rotating relay with the clock motor 
sparked a lot with bright flashes and ozone smells.  It would take several minutes to solve one 
equation, but it was dramatic.  People loved the idea of pushing the button, watching it clank and 
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spark and wheeze, and then see the answer on the dim little screen.  This machine was self-
marketing! 
When I came in on the second morning, I discovered that the computer had won not only 
first prize, but the Grand Award of the entire fair.  I shared the honor of the fair’s best exhibit 
with one other guy.  We both got to show our exhibits at the New England Science Fair at Brown 
University in Providence, Rhode Island, a month or so later, and a free trip to the GE 
Schenectady research lab. 
As we were winding down, one of the judges came by to congratulate me.  He asked, “So 
what do you have up your sleeve for next year?   A quadratic equation solver?”  I thought that 
was a great idea.  I also thought I would see his quadratic solver and up him one notch to a cubic 
equation solver.  I left the science fair with the objective of my project for the 1960 fair, my 
senior year. 
 
NORBERG:  How many exhibits were at the science fair?  How many students participated? 
 
DENNING:  I would guess around 300.  The fair was for all of southern Connecticut.  The New 
England fair was for the winners of regional fairs; maybe 50 exhibits there. 
 
NORBERG:  Was the next year another intense design year? 
 
DENNING:  Mr. Money was so proud of me that he appointed me president of the science club 
for my senior year.  I was really proud of that. 
The cubic computer was a big challenge.  Very few cubic equations have integer 
solutions.  I needed a computer that could input real numbers.  I decided I could do that by using 
potentiometers instead of digital dials for the inputs.  I also realized I could not solve equations 
with imaginary numbers as their roots.  So I prepared a list of sample equations with all real 
roots to help my users keep me out of trouble. 
After puzzling with this a long time, I arrived at the concept that the front panel would 
have four potentiometer knobs A, B, C, and D, representing the coefficients of the cubic equation 
AX3 + BX2 + CX + D = 0.  These values would be represented internally by the amplitudes of 
sine waves.  Negative numbers were represented by shifting the phase of the sine wave 180°, 
which you could easily do with a single triode tube.  A fifth potentiometer knob would enter a 
value for X.  A set of vacuum tube circuits mixed, multiplied, and added the signals, evaluating 
the expression above and showing its value as a voltage on an output voltmeter.  To solve an 
equation, the user would slowly rotate the X dial looking for X values that made the voltmeter 
read 0.  Those values of X would be the roots of the equation. 
I spent much time during senior year trying to get this new contraption to work.  The 
circuits for multiplying and adding were imprecise.  The negative values did not completely 
cancel the corresponding positive values.  I got it to work well enough to take to the 1960 
science fair. 
 
NORBERG:  How did that go? 
 
DENNING: Not as well as I had hoped or expected.  Mr. Money had left Fairfield for another 
school and was no longer wandering the science fair drumming up business for his boys.  My 
machine was completely quiet and did not spark, clank, sputter, or wheeze.  I had no posters 
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displaying the principles of operation.  All I had was my story of the previous two computers and 
how I had one-upped the quadratic challenge.  Hardly anyone came to look. 
The next morning I came in to discover a Second Prize ribbon on my precious invention.   
The judges had not been as impressed with my cubic solver as they were with a guy who had a 
binary counter two aisles over.  I concluded that they did not understand what I had done. 
 
NORBERG:  They didn’t understand it? 
 
DENNING:  They didn’t understand what I had done or what I saw as the value of it.  That’s 
when I began to learn about marketing.  I had done nothing to bring the computer to the attention 
of anyone.  No posters, no signs, no tokens, not even a good speech.  Mr. Money was no longer 
there as the behind-the-scenes marketer.  I genuinely believed that the ability to solve cubic 
equations with a computer would grab people and impress them.  The guy with the binary 
counter marketed his work well even though his technology was not original.  I learned an 
important lesson from that.  Now I tell my students and colleagues, “Good ideas don’t sell 
themselves.  You’ve got to sell on them.”  In fact, bad ideas often sell themselves. 
I had blown it because I had not paid attention to marketing my computer and having 
people understand what it was doing.  It never occurred to me at any time during the project year 
that people might not see the value of what I was building.  When I saw my second place ribbon, 
I found a few of the judges and asked, “Well, now that the heat of the judging is over with, come 
back here and please let me tell you what this project is about.”  They clearly did not realize what 
was there.  I had done a very poor job of communicating it.  They said, “Well, we can’t do 
anything now.  But you have clearly done something very sophisticated.  We just didn’t get it.  
You need to learn something from this, about how you communicate your science and your 
engineering.” 
You can see from all this that when I graduated Fairfield Prep I was deeply interested in 
electronic computers.  I was interested in them from three different perspectives -- math, 
experimental science, and engineering.  I did not learn until later that most computer scientists 
tend to be good at only one of these three perspectives.  The ability to do all three positioned me 
later in my career to deal broadly with the computing field. 
 
 
Attendance at Manhattan College 
 
NORBERG:  Now, when you went into college, there would be no incentives from science fairs 
and science clubs, right?  Colleges don’t tend to do such things. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I would agree. 
 
NORBERG:  So how did you market yourself when you got into college? 
 
DENNING:  Hmm.  The college electrical engineering curriculum is, like most engineering 
curricula, very prescribed.  Manhattan’s EE curriculum was oriented to teach us how to be good 
practicing engineers.  In our first year, we studied circuits and fundamental principles like Ohm’s 
Law and Kirchoff’s Laws.  Second year, we went to basic vacuum tube electronics and lab work.  
Third year we learned to design common small systems like radio transmitters and receivers, 
amplifiers, filters, and oscillators.  It wasn’t until senior year that they got to anything even 
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remotely resembling a computer circuit, and that was mostly in the form of analog system 
simulators.  The closest thing they had to digital computers was a new course on transistors, a 
brand new technology at the time.  In my last semester, one of the teachers helped Manhattan 
obtain a discarded LGP-30 drum computer and we wrote a single Fortran program for it to 
calculate the electric field in a waveguide. 
Through my first three years there, I pleaded with my teachers: “I’m really interested in 
computers.  I’d like to study computation, computer circuits, anything you’ve got.”  They’d say, 
“Well, we don’t even have computer courses.”  It wasn’t until 1964 when they finally got that 
LGP-30 computer on campus.  I could see why my father wanted me to go to MIT for college.  
MIT was a leader in computers. We got the LGP-30 as a hand-me-down, I’m sure of it.  
Whoever gave it to Manhattan College had gone on to some more powerful computers by that 
time. 
I realized as a freshman that my hands would be full of EE and that I would not get near a 
computer until senior year, if that soon.  So I learned how to do good lab work, build all sorts of 
basic circuits, find the load line of an Armstrong oscillator, figure out the capacitance and 
inductance needed for an oscillator, build a superorsheterodyne radio, design a band pass filter, 
and many other practical EE things. 
So I did no big science-type projects in college.  I kept my head down and studied hard.  
The first two years of college I was in the ROTC, and spent a lot of time with that.  I dropped out 
of ROTC at the end of two years because the Air Force would not guarantee me the opportunity 
to get into grad school. 
 
NORBERG:  Just for completeness, did you take courses like general physics, general chemistry, 
and so on, at Manhattan? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, yes.  It was a fully accredited EE curriculum.  I remember chemistry and 
physics as very good courses.  I might have had a basic biology course.  All these courses had 
excellent labs.  We had excellent courses in humanities, math, writing, and philosophy.  I was 
particularly interested in linguistic philosophy and studied the work of Wittgenstein, Russell, 
Moore, and a few others.  Many years later I returned to this philosophy in my research with 
human actions supported by computers.  And, of course, we had a theology-ethics course every 
semester. 
I did very well in that atmosphere.  In addition to my academics, I spent a lot of time on ROTC 
in the first two years, and in the Manhattan College Players as a stage technician in the second 
two.  I had my first serious romance as a freshman and sophomore until she dumped me.  Big 
ouch.  I spent a lot of weekend time dating when I wasn’t studying. 
 
NORBERG:  When you were coming up to the end of your time at Manhattan and thinking 
about what you were going to do next, did you consider at that time only MIT?  Or did you think 
of other engineering-related schools? 
 
DENNING:  Before I can answer that, I should mention how my summer jobs influenced me.  
When I was in high school, the only summer job I could find was caddying on the local golf 
course.  I did that in the summers following my junior and senior years.  Caddying was great 
physical training  --  I walked 10 miles a day carrying two golf bags 6 days a week.  But it was 
not want I wanted to do in life. 
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For the next summer (1961) I landed a job as a short order cook in a Howard Johnson 
restaurant.  It paid better than caddying, but the hours were worse -- 4pm till 1am six days a 
week.  When I got the job the manager told me I had one week to learn it or get booted out.  
Fortunately, I was a quick learner and soon became one of their best chefs.  I continued to work 
there on many weekends during the sophomore school year.  Before I started that job, I spent two 
weeks in a special civil engineering camp hosted by Manhattan College in upstate NY.  I learned 
a lot there about collecting and handling data. 
In my college sophomore summer, things got better.   I found a job at a civil engineering 
company that was building the basement of the CBS building at 53rd Street and 6th Avenue in 
the city.  My Manhattan College civil engineering camp enabled me to get this job.  I commuted 
to the city with my father.  Mainly I did go-fer tasks for the professional civil engineers, and 
occasionally did a round of measuring.  I remember one morning that summer coming into the 
construction trailer and learning that Marilyn Monroe had committed suicide. 
Then the next summer (1963), I had a job at Bell Labs.  I finally got a summer job in 
electrical engineering. 
 
NORBERG:  Doing what at Bell Labs? 
 
DENNING:  It was with the group that was designing the speakerphones.  I worked on voice-
activated circuits that automatically switched the direction of signal propagation depending on 
who was talking.  I did a lot of experiments on the prototype circuits and helped them improve 
the sensitivity and remove the clipping sounds that happened as the circuit switched. 
The summer after graduation (1964), I got a job at IBM in Poughkeepsie, working on the 
complex crossbar switches that connected the IBM mainframe to tape storage units. 
 
NORBERG:  So this would be blue-collar work, basically, rather than working on design or 
working under the tutelage of a person who was a professional? 
 
DENNING:  I guess so.  I was treated as a summer intern.  I helped them design, wire up, and 
test the switching boxes.  Those boxes were the size of refrigerators.  They had to switch 
hundreds of time a minute and remain spark-free and reliable for years.  Traditional 
electromagnetic coil relays could not meet these requirements.  Instead, they used reed relays -- 
two metal prongs inside a tube filled with inert gas that closed when you turned on a magnetic 
field.  Toward the end of the summer I designed a test circuit that plugged on to the back plane 
and helped the engineer identify proper terminal pairs to wire together.  My boss loved it and we 
filed an invention disclosure to the IBM corporate patent office.   It was a productive summer 
and I was beginning to feel like a creative engineer. 
During my senior year (prior to the IBM summer), I was engaged to be married.  To raise 
money for the engagement ring I got a part time job driving school busses in very early morning 
and later afternoon at the Riverdale School near the Manhattan campus.  It only paid about $35 a 
week, but that added up after a while.  We married at the end of the summer of 1964 after 
completing at IBM and before heading off to MIT for graduate school. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  Pretty busy time.  Did you have other interests at Manhattan College? 
 
DENNING:  In my junior year I became very interested in linguistic philosophy.  I took a course 
in that subject.  It was an advanced, elective course for philosophy majors.  I was interested 
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because I was fascinated with the way paradoxes arise in language and I wondered how they 
might be avoided.   I was also interested in what makes automatic language translation by 
computer so difficult.  I had to talk my way into that class, because I hadn’t had all the 
prerequisites.   It was a small class, maybe eight people -- seven philosophers and one, lone 
engineer.  I wrote a term paper on automatic language translation.  The teacher thought it too 
technical and not enough philosophical, and I got a B in the course.   That was my only B at 
Manhattan.  While I was disappointed by the B, I didn’t feel badly about it because linguistic 
philosophy was, and still is, so fascinating to me. 
For the past decade that old interest has taken the form of research in language-action 
philosophy, a branch of linguistic philosophy concerned with how people make binding 




Graduate School at MIT 
 
NORBERG:  Tell me more about how you decided to go to MIT. 
 
DENNING:  I remember struggling with that decision for many months.  I talked to almost all 
the EE faculty about the possibilities for graduate school, collecting loads of opinions.  I 
narrowed my choices to MIT and NYU.  I rejected seeking a Catholic graduate school because I 
wanted to follow my father’s advice and get into the highest ranked school possible.  The main 
attraction of NYU was that my future wife’s family lived in New York City and they favored 
that option. 
The strong weight of opinion among the Manhattan EE faculty was that it would too 
risky for me at MIT.  They said that the orientation of the Manhattan curriculum is for practicing 
engineers; we had a lot of hands-on work and addressed practical problems.  They said MIT is 
very principle-oriented and I would have to relearn all my EE.  They also noted my interest in a 
PhD and said that no Manhattan engineer ever passed the MIT qualifying exam.  They thought 
NYU would be much better for me. 
Somewhere deep inside, I did not want to hear this.  I wanted someone to tell me that I 
could make it through MIT.  Just when I most needed it, this voice appeared.  It came from the 
dean of engineering, a wonderful man named Robert Weil.  He sensed my deep desire to go to 
MIT and openly disagreed with his faculty.  He said, “I think you can do it.  You’ll sweat blood 
and live in anxiety for a while.  But I think you can do it.”  That’s what I wanted to hear!  I took 
the MIT offer.  Sadly, he was killed in an auto accident before I graduated from MIT. 
 
NORBERG:  What was the application process like?  The usual forms that you fill out and attach 
a picture to it and so on? 
 
DENNING:  I think it was pretty routine.  I filled out many forms, wrote a little essay, got my 
transcripts, got letters of reference (including one from Dean Weil!), and sent the whole package 
to MIT.  I also applied for an NSF fellowship, which would be good at any US university.  I got 
one of those, and it helped me get into MIT. 
 




DENNING:  No.  I was sold by MIT’s reputation.  I wanted to go there regardless of what it 
looked like physically.  As you might expect, my father was well pleased.  He always wanted me 
to go to MIT.  He said, “At last you’ll get there. 
 
NORBERG:  What did you find MIT’s program like?  Speaking now deliberately of computer 
science. 
 
DENNING:  MIT’s EE department there was heavily into computers.  They’d done a lot of 
pioneering work in computers.  From day one, I became immersed in conversations about how 
computers work and what they would be doing five years from now.  They assigned me Jack 
Dennis as academic advisor.  He was a perfect fit for me.  He soon sent me down to his lab to 
learn how to use an experimental time-sharing system he had designed and built.  After four 
years off computers during college, I found myself in hog’s heaven, immersed in one of the 
world’s first time-sharing systems. 
 
NORBERG:  Was it the CTSS (Project MAC compatible time sharing system)? 
 
DENNING:  No.  It was built on a PDP-1 computer and was a lab prototype predecessor of 
CTSS.  CTSS was the production time-sharing system that I used for daily work.  Jack Dennis’s 
system was open for experimentation.  A lot of the experience with Dennis’s system influenced 
the design of the CTSS, which in turn influenced the design of the Multics. 
Even as I became immersed in learning new computing systems, I got immersed in the 
discussions among graduate students about the upcoming qualifying exam, which would be held 
late in my second semester.  The faculty said that the exam had one question based on each of 
the department’s core EE courses.  I decided to take all eight even though many overlapped with 
my undergraduate Manhattan EE work.  That was an incredibly wise decision.  In that one year I 
completely relearned all my basic EE.  I acquired a principles-based perspective that 
complemented my pragmatic perspective from Manhattan.  I knew EE far better than if I had had 
either the MIT or the Manhattan perspective alone.  I would not have been properly prepared for 
the qualifying exam without those courses. 
In addition to the core courses, I had to take several others to fulfill the basic 
requirements of the masters degree.  I wound up with a daily schedule every bit as intense as at 
Manhattan or Fairfield.  Off to MIT at 8am, home again about 7pm, study after supper until 
midnight. 
 
NORBERG:  Was your wife in a PhD program at the time? 
 
DENNING:  No.  She was not interested in a PhD or even a master’s degree.  She got a job as a 
librarian in the city of Cambridge.  Between her income and my NSF stipend, we were able to 
make ends meet and get through graduate school. 
On a warm day in May 1965 was PhD Qualifying Day -- the day of reckoning.  Was I 
well prepared?  Could I cross the gap from Manhattan to MIT?  The exam room was a large, dim 
gymnasium with many rows of well-separated desks.  A total of 60 students took the exam, and 
it was common knowledge that 10 would pass.  I was a nervous wreck from all my anxiety 
around this exam. 
 




DENNING: I messed up.  I simply froze on a question that I really knew the answer to.  That put 
me in a funk that reduced the clarity of my answers to other questions.  I left that room deeply 
disappointed with myself and with a sense of foreboding about the outcome. 
When they posted the list, I found myself ranked about 50th of 60.  Not even close to 
passing.  My advisor (Jack Dennis) was surprised.  He thought my recently completed master’s 
thesis was very high quality and could not understand the contrast between that and my exam 
performance.  He said, “What the hell happened to you?  I was expecting a lot better.”  Then he 
said, “At MIT we give you two chances.  The next one is coming in October.  That is your final 
chance to get into the PhD program.  Don’t let me down.” 
It took me about a week to pull myself out of my funk about this outcome.  This was not 
the end of my career.  I had to pull myself up and keep going.  I kept telling myself, “In the exam 
room, keep thinking.  Ask yourself questions.  Ask more questions.  Don’t stop asking questions.  
Keep moving forward.”  I was less of a nervous wreck at the time of the second exam.   I 
followed my advice and did much better.  This time I ranked about 12th.  That was not an 
automatic pass, but it earned me an oral exam with my committee.  They put me through a 
grueling oral.  I stumbled in a couple of places but recovered.  At the end of the oral, Jack Dennis 
told the committee, “I’ll take him under my wing.  I like him.”  I learned later that there is 
nothing unusual about my situation.  Even if you do well in the exam, you still need an advisor 
who says he wants you.  That was Jack.  I felt like I squeaked through the whole process, but I 
did make it.  Then I remembered Robert Weil’s words and rejoiced.  
 
NORBERG:  Yes, but you squeaked through among the “big boys”. 
 
DENNING:  And, man, it took a lot of perseverance. 
 
NORBERG:  Now, you have referred to MIT’s electrical engineering department.  I thought MIT 
had the first computer science department. 
 
DENNING:  No.  MIT never had a computer science department.  After my time there, they 
changed the name from EE to EECS.  CS was never a separate department at MIT.  The first 
computer science departments were formed at Purdue and Stanford in 1962. 
 
NORBERG:  What was the ambiance like in Project MAC?  You came with an NSF fellowship, 
so you were an unsupported member of Project MAC? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  The NSF fellowship went for two years.  After that I was supported as a 
research assistant in Project MAC. 
 
NORBERG:  I think Project MAC was only a year old when you got there in 1964. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  Project MAC was building CTSS and was about to deploy it in the MIT 
research environment.  Although I was not a programmer for anything in CTSS, Jack Dennis had 
me doing a lot of programming work on his PDP-1 time-sharing system.  All the PDP-1 
programming was in assembler language.  My previous brief encounter with programming at 
Manhattan on the LGP-30 was in assembly language as well.  It IBM I did a little assembly 
programming and took a short course in Fortran programming.  Those previous encounters were 
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toy projects compared to what Jack gave me on the PDP-1.  He had me building programs that 
did interesting computations and, in some cases, were shared with other users of the system.  I 
remember spending a lot of time preparing punch paper tapes for the PDP-1 on a Flexowriter 
machine.  Paper tape was the only method to input code and data on that machine.  The machine 
made its output either to paper tape or to print.  Do you remember the Flexowriter?  It was a 
teletype machine that could read and punch paper tape. 
 
NORBERG:  I know about it.  I never used one. 
 
DENNING:  Jack’s system gave me a problem for my master’s thesis.  It swapped programs 
from a large rotating drum to the main (core) memory.  Its performance depended heavily on the 
efficiency of swapping.  For my master’s thesis I did a simulation study of disk performance.  
We had a hypothesis that if we reordered the disk request queue to “shortest seek time first” it 
would perform significantly faster than “first in first out”.  The simulations confirmed that this 
was so, and that the mathematical expressions I worked out for efficiency were close to reality. 
It’s interesting that I built and ran the simulator on the CTSS using a simulation language 
designed by officemate Allan Scherr.  Scherr’s simulation language was a front end to the 
popular MAD language from University of Michigan; it was an offshoot of Algol.  I had to 
endure some long, sweaty debugging sessions with my simulator because it didn’t work those 
few times we tried it.  It had weird bugs such as a random number generator that occasionally 
returned a zero when its spec called for non-zero.  It was also subject to time dependent bugs that 
we since called “races”.  But I got the simulator running and provided a lot of useful data for the 
CTSS designers to use in their disk schedulers. 
 
NORBERG:  You mentioned a new name, Allan Scherr, did you say? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  Al was super good with systems.  His PhD thesis was about how a simple 
queueing model, the machine repairman, predicted the response time of CTSS with amazing 
accuracy.  Scherr had to instrument CTSS to gather data across a variety of configurations in 
order to validate his model.  He was not only a superb operating system kernel architect, but a 
wizard at kernel programming.  His PhD thesis became very famous and opened the door for 
research that made queueing models a central tool in the design of large computer systems. 
 
NORBERG:  Who else was there? 
 
DENNING:  My thesis committee was Jack Dennis (chair), Jerry Saltzer, Bob Fano, and 
Fernando Corbato.  In retrospect it was a dream team. 
 
NORBERG:  Sure was.  I’ve interviewed two of them. 
 
DENNING:  I think my master’s committee was Jack Dennis and Dick Kain. 
 
NORBERG:  Dick Kain, before he went to Minnesota? 
 
DENNING:  With all the courses and project work, I was studying all the time.  My wife didn’t 




NORBERG:  I did the same thing, so I can’t criticize you for that.  What contact did you have 
with DARPA people? 
 
DENNING:  None until I got to MIT.  Project MAC was well funded by DARPA.  There was a 
constant stream of visitors from Washington.  I met many who were thinking about the 
beginnings of the ARPANET -- most notably J C R Licklider, Bob Taylor, Larry Roberts, and 
Bob Kahn. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you have any contact with the people at Lincoln Lab? 
 
DENNING:  Not much.   I think Jack Dennis may have started his time-sharing system project at 
Lincoln Labs on their TX-1 computer. 
 
NORBERG:  What other kinds of activities were going on there?  For example, Berkeley had 
general clubs for the physics people who would read papers in current journals, then come in 
before the group and some faculty who were there and give a report on what was in it.  Graduate 
students could see how faculty would begin to stretch the ideas and gradually learn to do this for 
themselves.  Did you belong to any MIT clubs of this kind?  Did you belong to any professional 
societies at the time?  Did you attend any meetings?  This is all while you were a graduate 
student, not after. 
 
DENNING:  MIT had a popular colloquium series, which was always mind-expanding.  The 
graduate students and faculty often met informally in the conference rooms.  There were no clubs 
to enhance the experience -- it was already good. 
I joined ACM in 1965 as a student member, just after getting my masters degree.  I think 
I joined IEEE a year or two earlier while still at Manhattan.  I remember that the IEEE was 
newly created from a merger between IRE (institute for radio engineers) and IEE (Institute for 
electrical engineers). 
In October 1967, Jack Dennis and his friend in telecommunications, Walter Kosinski, co-
organized a symposium called The Symposium on Operating System Principles, in Gatlinburg, 
Tennessee.  Walter had graduated from Fairfield Prep some years before me.  Jack wanted me to 
submit my working set paper to that conference.  My paper was among those chosen for a special 
issue of the Communications of ACM.  While a student I wrote a paper on using a virtual 
terminal to model a set of real terminals for a time-sharing system, and I wrote a paper on the 
causes and prevention of thrashing.  Both were submitted while I was a student and published 
shortly after I graduated.  We can come back to the discussion of these papers later. 
At these conferences I met a number of the people involved in ACM and got involved 
with SICTIME (special interest committee on time sharing).  I became the newsletter editor for 
SICTIME. 
As you can see, I was involved with publishing and ACM leadership from an “early age”. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s good.  But I don’t think I asked my question very well.  While you were a 
member of Dennis’ group, you were interacting with other faculty and other graduate students 
who were associated with him.  How did information get diffused within the group?  Jack 
Dennis’s time sharing system was one of 12 time-sharing system projects at the time.  MIT also 
had CTSS and Whirlwind.  I’m trying to find out how you were associated with these, whether 
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peripheral or directly.  And what was the consequence of that in terms of your own development 
as a computer scientist? 
 
DENNING:  I had no direct contact with the Whirlwind Project.  I was indirectly connected 
because Jack had contact with Whirlwind.  Jack was trying to push state of the art; time-sharing 
at that time was brand new.  It was not perfected at all.  There were a lot of skeptics who didn’t 
think that it could be made to work.  I was among those who believed in time-sharing.  I believed 
that many of the skeptics’ complaints were around performance issues, such as keeping response 
time within a preset limit or avoiding instabilities like thrashing.  I set out to find ways to run 
these systems at optimal performance and avoid instabilities.  My association with Project MAC 
gave me a front row seat with the designers and architects, so that my work was always focused 
on questions of known value and had the opportunity to influence the design of both CTSS and 
Multics. 
 
NORBERG:  Who were some of the skeptics at MIT?  I’ve only talked to the people who were 
quite positive. 
 
DENNING:  Of course, most of the people there were believers.  I got a lot from my interactions 
with Dick Kain, who was a professional skeptic.  He was a skeptic about everything.  He was 
open to being persuaded, but he was generally a tough sell.  He thought that a lot of the claims 
about time-sharing were speculative; we should continue the experiments but not get too 
committed to the idea that time-sharing would work.  Dick thought that many of the visionary 
ideas of Licklider and Fano -- for example, a computer utility, a worldwide network, a graphical 
interface -- were grandiose speculations.  Licklider said, “Of course they’re speculations!”  But 
they’re the kind of speculations that made people want to do it.  Dick said, “There’s no science 
yet to support that this stuff would work.”  And Licklider would say, “That’s the point!  We’re 
trying to do that science.” 
But there were other skeptics in the computing center.  From their perspective, the main 
work of the computer was processing many “batch” jobs.  Computer systems were designed for a 
flow of batch jobs.  The time-sharing schedulers would give priority to young and short jobs, 
crowding out the batch work.  The computing center skeptics did not want to give up the 
capacity to process real computational jobs in favor of a speculative clientele and workload.  You 
might say they were committed to a certain way of doing things, and they knew that their 
machines were fully occupied with overnight computational jobs.  They said, “Let those time-
sharing guys do it on their own machine.” 
 
NORBERG:  Wasn’t there any thought given to getting another computing machine for batch 
processing? 
 
DENNING:  There was never any real danger that machines for large computations would go 
away.  The skeptics just didn’t think that the short interactive jobs and large computational jobs 
could co-exist in a single environment. 
That was one of the reasons for the CTSS.  The designers of CTSS wanted to design a 
system that would accommodate both a computational and a time-sharing workload 
simultaneously, to the satisfaction of both sets of customers.  That’s what CTSS stood for: 
Compatible Time Sharing System.  Jack Dennis’ timesharing system was purely a timesharing 
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system; no batch.  The IBM “big iron” on campus was purely large computations; no time-
sharing.  Could CTSS do both? 
Shortly after coming to MIT, I learned that Bob Fano had in 1961 chaired a committee 
called the Long-Range Planning Committee for MIT.  One of their big recommendations was 
that MIT should acquire a one-million word core memory.  They speculated a lot about the kinds 
of computations that the MIT computing center could carry out if the computers had such a large 
core memory.   They thought that the scientific value was very high and wanted MIT to do it.  
Unfortunately, the price tag was as big as the memory: a million dollars.  A million dollars in 
1961 is equivalent to around 16 million today.  As much as MIT people liked the idea in 
principle, they didn’t have the money for it and they couldn’t get donors and friends like IBM to 
come up with it.  So that never got off the ground.  They never got the million-word memory, or 
at least not in 1961.  This led the big thinkers at MIT to another question: is it possible to build a 
future CTSS with an affordable amount of memory powering a virtual memory that could 
accommodate those large computations?  That question was one of the seeds of Multics and was 
at the heart of my thesis research. 
 
 
Part II: Early Research and Teaching 
 
Session 1, Tape 2, Side A 
 
NORBERG:  Were the scientific computation people and graphics people part of Project MAC? 
 
DENNING:  No, but they were neighbors and fed big ideas into the group thinking about the 
design of computer systems.  The scientific computation people were a lot of the large-scale 
users; they wanted computing power, a reliable programming environment, and data analysis 
tools as they worked to advance science.  The AI (artificial intelligence) people were thinking 
about how to build intelligent machines.  Ivan Sutherland, who was doing his graphics at Lincoln 
Labs, was interested in intelligent interfaces that let users manipulate on-screen objects.   Ivan 
came down frequently to talk about it.  Doug Ross, a member of Project MAC, was very keen on 
graphical user interfaces and kept challenging the Multics designers to include them. 
 
NORBERG:  So many interesting people and ideas, wherever you turn.  That’s what’s so 
amazing about MIT in that time period. 
 
DENNING:  There were economists at MIT who were doing large-scale computation and 
engineers doing large-scale system modeling.  Bob Kahn was there from BBN teaching coding 
theory around 1967.  Later he got involved in the ARPANET project, for which BBN was a 
major contractor, building the IMPs (interface message processors). 
 
NORBERG: How did you see yourself fitting into this group? 
 
DENNING:  I have to say that for at least the first couple of years there, I felt like a misfit.  I felt 
like a novice skier who’s coming down the black marked trail at some breakneck speed, always 
feeling that at any moment I’m going to crash and break every bone in my body.  And somehow 
managing against all hope or expectation to maintain my balance and not fall over.  That’s what 
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it felt like.  The worst of it was around the qualifying exams.  It was unpleasant.  It was an 
identity crisis.  I’d invested a year and a quarter here already, studied as hard as anybody could 
possibly study, and I couldn’t pass the qualifying exam.  At that moment I didn’t know what to 
do with my life, because I had defined myself in terms of being a future faculty member.  If I 
can’t pass the qualifying exam, who am I?  I had to wait for six or eight months until the next 
round, and was an anxious wreck during that time. 
 
NORBERG:  So you weren’t thinking about fitting in.  You were just thinking about surviving. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  My mind was seized up with thoughts like, “Can I stay here?  Will they throw 
me out?  My advisor thought I was better than this.  Can I get his confidence back?” 
 
NORBERG:  You got past that successfully and began to bloom.  Can we go back to the ACM-
sponsored Gatlinburg meeting?  That was your first “public appearance”.  Who else was there?  
Was it a big meeting?  Or was it just a research group? 
 
DENNING:  It was billed as “Principles of Operating Systems”.  That was a bold title for the 
time, asserting that operating systems were not just ad hoc programs built to get the real work of 
computation done, but they relied on deep scientific principles for their reliability, stability, and 
efficiency.  Jack Dennis, one of the two organizers, was himself deeply interested in this topic.  I 
remember taking a seminar with him, where we read the best research papers on operating 
systems.  From those papers I could see the possibility of a scientific basis of operating systems.  
Jack thought operating systems were a key technology for a computer utility.  Everything the 
computer utility was going to be able to do had to be implemented by the operating system.  So 
to him, they were kind of one and the same: computer utility equals this advanced operating 
system.  If we could succeed in building it, we’d get huge payoffs of the type that Licklider had 
dreamt about and others have amplified.  This was the big thing we all wanted to be part of.  We 
could contribute to the design of a world-changing technology. 
Walter Kosinski was the other organizer of the Gatlinburg meeting.  Walter, who was 
also a graduate of Fairfield Prep several years before me, has since passed away.  He was the 
founder of ACM SIGCOMM (special interest group on data communication).  He and Jack 
believed that future operating systems had to merge networking principles with operating 
systems principles to attain a true computer utility.  The two of them believed that it would be a 
big contribution to call together the people who were discovering and articulating the principles, 
drill deeper into the principles, and call wider attention to them.  Some of the areas that had 
principles were virtual memory, process concurrency, scheduling, network flow and congestion, 
packet switching, naming, and protection. 
I had discovered the working-set idea about six months before Jack told me about the 
symposium and invited me to speak about the idea there.  The conference itself was not very 
large, maybe 30-40 people.  It was held down in a nice little resort in Gatlinburg, Tennessee.  
The presentation that most stuck in my mind was by Edsger Dijkstra.  He was on the agenda to 
talk about the THE multiprogramming system, which was organized on the principles of 
abstraction and levels.  However, he spent most of his presentation discussing deadlocks, which 
he called the deadly embrace, an image of two grizzly bears locked and immobilized in combat.  
He invented an analogy about cooking stew and pudding in a kitchen with a single burner and 
beater.  He showed precisely why deadlock was possible.  He showed that it would be inherently 
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hard to detect because it was possible for the system to enter an “unsafe state” from which 
deadlock was certain but had not yet occurred.  His was a principles-packed half-hour. 
When a couple of years later I told the story of Dijkstra’s insights to my colleague Ed 
Coffman at Princeton, Ed said that Dijkstra had defined a classic moment in computer science 
and we should preserve the story in our book on operating systems theory. 
Les Belady talked about his experiments with virtual storage systems at IBM Yorktown.  
They had discovered that almost any sort of variation in the size of the space allocated to a job in 
the multiprogrammed memory would increase processing efficiency.  Belady had a clever proof 
based on the concave up shape of the relevant performance curve.   I told him that I thought that, 
if the variation perfectly tracked the working set, the system would give near optimal 
performance. 
Larry Roberts and Donald Davies both spoke about the plans for the future packet-
switched data network, the ARPANET. 
Let’s look at the Proceedings of that conference, I still have a copy.  We can see who 
spoke and what they spoke about.  [Takes Proceedings from bookshelf.] 
 
NORBERG:  Was the LINC mentioned?  Was there any paper on the LINC, which was being 
done at Lincoln Laboratory?  I don’t want you to look it up.  I want you to try to remember. 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember LINC.  Ah, here is another famous speaker, Brian Randell, 
talking about what he and his colleagues had learned about dynamic storage allocation at IBM 
Yorktown. 
 
NORBERG:  Is that the year he was on leave, then, from Newcastle? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t know if he was on leave.  He went to Newcastle a couple of years after that. 
OK, here in these Proceedings is Jack Dennis talking about virtual memory in Multics.  
Here’s Edsger Dijkstra talking about the THE system’s levels principle.  Here’s Butler Lampson 
talking about scheduling.  And Bob Graham talking about protection and security.  And here is 
the early ARPANET crowd … 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  That’s what I was looking for.  When I saw that Gatlinburg, Tennessee, 
proceedings in your materials, I thought: well, now that’s the meeting for DARPA introducing 
the ARPANET.  Larry Roberts presented his architectural plan, as you just said.  Larry said that 
it wasn’t received very well -- I think that was a polite way to put it. 
 
DENNING:  The warmth of the reception I don’t remember. 
 
NORBERG:  [Laughs] The network wasn’t received very well because people like Minsky 
thought that the network required more time-sharing, which would leave less computing power 
for those, such as AI researchers, who needed so much more than the average.  Minsky told me 
he was very resistant at the time. 
 
DENNING:  That’s the same argument that was going on at MIT between the champions of 




NORBERG:  So I was interested, then, to see what your reaction would be to it, whether you 
were oblivious to it or knew about it.  I see that you did know about it. 
 
DENNING:  Yes. 
 
 
The Working Set Model 
 
NORBERG:  Can we then go back to the working set model?  What was the purpose of this 
investigation?  I want you to try to think of the context now rather than your published papers on 
the subject.  As we all know, scientific published papers usually are reconstructed after the fact. 
 
DENNING:  Sure.  As I said before, my Master’s thesis was on disk storage systems.  The 
objective there was to figure out how to maximize the performance of those systems.  The 
performance of secondary storage had become a major issue in virtual memory systems, in 
which a single page fault could stop the CPU for 100,000 instruction times.  Too many page 
faults bombarding excessively show disk devices would kill virtual memory.  Multiprogramming 
multiplied CPU efficiency but also placed unprecedented loads on the secondary storage system.  
The design of storage systems turned out to be a big deal. 
You can see in the Proceedings of the Symposia on Operating System Principles, that the 
first five papers were concerned with storage systems.  We didn’t start moving away from that 
concern for a good ten years.  It took that long before we had really gotten our arms around the 
problems and understood how to deal with them in very large shared systems.  Jack Dennis and 
his colleagues correctly read the tea leaves in thinking that we really needed to learn a lot about 
storage systems.  In selecting disk storage for my Master’s thesis, I started at the bottom rung of 
the ladder of difficulty.  What is the best way to order the requests in a disk queue for fastest 
throughput?  Al Scherr said to me, “I can help you with the simulator.  In fact, you can test out 
my new simulation language.”  There was plenty of help as I approached my Master’s thesis. 
 
NORBERG:  How did this build on the earlier optimization techniques that were developed for 
drums? 
 
DENNING:  Disk systems were the next level of difficulty up from drums.  Both used rotating 
media.  The disk had to deal with arm positioning delay as well as rotational delay.  There were 
so many random variables -- arm movement, rotational delay, number of waiting requests, length 
of each request -- that analysts had begun using statistical methods to analyze and predict 
performance. 
Statistical methods were an innovation in understanding how long it takes a computer 
system to get a job done.  The standard computer science approach was to analyze an algorithm 
for its number of steps as a function of the size of its input.  We could get a good approximation 
of a program’s running time from the formulas these analyses produced. 
All these methods were formulated for closed computations -- computations that come to 
a definite end with an answer.  Time-sharing was introducing open computation -- computations 
that can run forever.  A time-sharing system was visualized as a community; although people 
come and go, the system itself keeps going.  The algorithms analysis methods offered little or no 
insight in the running time of computations in open systems. 
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A worse problem is that, in a time-sharing system, a job can be delayed by actions of 
other jobs independent of you.  For example, as a programmer you might be able to control the 
number of page faults issued by your job, but you could not control the response time of the disk 
system to a page fault.  That depends on how many other people are in the system along with you 
demanding service from the disk.  Nothing in algorithms analysis lets you estimate how the 
demands of other people in the system affect the running time of your job. 
This is why statistical performance modeling becomes so important.  Statistical methods, 
especially queueing theory, can be used to assess how long work takes to flow through a system 
given all the random demands of the individuals using the system. 
Al Scherr had shown me that the incredibly simple Machine Repairman Model was 
extraordinarily powerful because it gave very accurate predictions of response time.  With the 
help of the model, it was possible to design the capacity of the system to guarantee response 
time.  That was a whole new idea.  That was the notion growing up in my thinking.  We would 
find statistical models that allowed us to predict and size systems and adapt dynamically to 
whatever is going on.  What a recipe for a long term win! 
 
NORBERG:  For virtual memory, is an example statistic of the time a page has been resident in 
the main memory? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, but we are getting a bit ahead of ourselves.  Here I am in 1965, conditioned by 
Al Scherr and other purveyors of queueing models, ready to look at storage management as a 
queueing problem. 
The first thing I started to look for was a way to minimize the page faults generated by a 
program.  Too many page faults would kill response time and poison virtual memory. 
The initial attraction of virtual memory, which was first put on line in the Atlas computer 
at University of Manchester in 1959, was its automation of the movement of data items and code 
segments up and down the memory hierarchy.  That movement placed a huge burden on 
programmers, who had to figure out good strategies for moving their data around in the 
hierarchy.  David Sayre’s group at IBM Yorktown had estimated that programmer productivity 
would rise by a factor of 2 or 3 with virtual memory.  This was quite a significant improvement 
in productivity and made virtual memory incredibly attractive.  The big computer companies 
wanted to put virtual memory into their operating systems.  It was a major selling point to users. 
However, the people who built virtual memory systems started running into all sorts of 
performance issues.  The designers quickly learned that the replacement policy was a key factor 
in performance.  That policy is used to select a page from main memory that must be moved out 
(and returned to secondary memory) to make way for the page coming in at a page fault.  Every 
replaced page was likely to return in the future.  The optimal strategy would be to replace the 
page that would be unused for the longest time.  Unfortunately, there was no way to know which 
page that was because we could not see the future.  So we had to design replacement policies 
based on information we could measure.  Should we follow a first-in-first-out strategy?  Least 
recently used?  Least frequently used?  Random choice? 
Experimental studies were showing no consistent winner in the replacement policy 
sweepstakes.  The best replacement policy for a program seemed to depend intimately on what 
that program was doing.  The one thing that was consistent across all programs, according to 
extensive studies by Les Belady at IBM, was that pages used in the immediate past were the 
most likely to be reused in the immediate future.  Les and I started to call that “locality”.  It 
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seemed that if we could understand locality, we could specify superior page replacement policies 
that worked well for all programs in the system. 
 
NORBERG:  What about MIT?   How did all this influence the thinking at MIT? 
 
DENNING:  Jack Dennis and others were tracking all this closely.  They were concerned about 
specifying virtual memory for Multics.  They were impressed with what the team at IBM 
Yorktown -- which included Bob Nelson, David Sayre, and Les Belady -- was learning from 
their extensive studies of page replacement performance using address traces. 
As I said, I was deeply impressed with Les Belady’s 1966 paper in the IBM Systems 
Journal about the performance of paging logarithms.  That became a classic paper.  As a 
graduate student I read that paper many times trying to make sense about what Belady was 
saying about locality, and trying to reconcile his findings with the experience of others.  How 
come there were so many contradictory conclusions out there?  How come Atlas got a good 
response to their loop-detecting replacement algorithm, but others got bad results?  How come 
some people say LRU works and many others say it does not work?  How come somebody 
reports at Gatlinburg that the performance of the virtual memory is extremely sensitive to the 
order in which the linker loads modules into address space?  Why is that? 
The skeptics clearly had the upper hand.  I jumped into this mess with a student’s 
curiosity.  I just tried to read everything I could about page replacement and become an expert on 
that whole mess.  Virtual memory was a great idea; nobody could make it work.  It was a big 
mess. 
I had many conversations with MIT’s virtual memory skeptics, notably Jerry Saltzer and 
Dick Kain.  These guys were pretty pessimistic, because they didn’t see how to design a single 
strategy, or even a small set of strategies, that would make paging reliable enough that you could 
actually engineer a virtual memory system around them.  At the same time, they realized that we 
would be forced to execute computations with less memory than we wished.   We had to figure 
this out!  That’s what I was puzzling over. 
 
NORBERG:  How did you attempt to solve the problem?  Did you do this directly or did you 
have a combination of theory and practice? 
 
DENNING:  My initial approach was to see if I could model the underlying behavior of 
programs so that I could tell when LRU or FIFO would work well.  For example, if the program 
had one large loop, how well would LRU or FIFO work with it?  I don’t think I was getting very 
far with any of that, because every time I’d come up with a model, it was easy to find examples 
of programs that didn’t conform to the model.  I was feeling quite baffled and stymied by late 
fall in 1965. 
 
NORBERG:  That early?  I’m surprised, considering what you said about how difficult it was to 
prepare for the examinations for candidacy. 
 
DENNING:  I had taken the second round of qualifying exams in October 1965, and passed.   
But late fall I had nothing else to do but puzzle over this issue. 
 




DENNING:  Although study for qualifiers was a priority, it wasn’t the only priority.  Jack 
Dennis still didn’t want me to slow down.  Besides I had to impress him that I could do the work 
so that he would be my champion after the exams.  He liked my Master’s thesis.  He liked my 
quest to master replacement policies.  In our own discussions, he kept focusing on the practical 
objective -- of identifying a program’s “working set of information” which it needed in main 
memory to execute with acceptable efficiency.  We asked, how does LRU or FIFO (or any other 
replacement policy) generate a working set?  How accurate is what it says?  He suggested that I 
write up a technical report on what I had learned so far. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you remember your report? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, yes.  Over the Christmas break in 1965, I had time off courses and work.  One 
night I was pacing up and down the rooms of our house.  My wife shut herself in the bedroom, 
saying, “If you must keep the light on, keep the door closed, and don’t pound on the floor.”  So I 
was pacing very quietly in the semi-dark at midnight, thinking about everything that works and 
does not work in relation to the general notion of “working set”.  I suddenly had an “Aha!” 
moment, in which the working set concept as we now know it appeared.  I realized from all our 
experimental data that the recurrent pattern was the high likelihood of reuse of pages just used.  
Why not simply define the working set as the set of pages used in a sampling interval ending at 
the present moment?  The chances are quite high that, in the next sampling interval, the same 
pages would be used.  This could easily be implemented with usage bits. 
What was different about this idea was that it began with a measurement of what the 
program “wanted” rather than with a memory space to be filled and replaced from.  The 
sampling policy would tell us which pages the program most needed.  That set would grow and 
shrink over time and the program would tell us what it is by setting usage bits.  In contrast LRU 
fills the memory and then starts replacing when it’s full.  LRU has no inherent concept of a 
working set and its size is a constant.  None of the fixed-space policies was measuring inherent 
memory demand.  The working set sample policy directly measured a program’s inherent 
memory demand.  So that was the basic idea. 
There are two other important elements of this idea.  First, the sampling is done in the 
“virtual time” of the program, which means the execution time with all interrupts removed.  A 
sampling window is simply the number of memory references in the immediate past to consider 
for use.  So if I set my sampling window to 1000, I would define my working set to be the pages 
used during the previous 1000 memory references.  If I were to run my samples off real-time 
clocks, my measurements of pages used would be greatly distorted by the long, random times of 
page fault interrupts.  The working set truly was a measure of a program’s inherent memory 
demand. 
The third important element was that a “working set memory policy” could be used to fill 
a multi-programmed memory with working sets and then hold back all additional jobs until there 
is space in memory for their working sets.  This would automatically limit the load while 
continuing to maintain low paging rates.  It would avoid the performance collapse called 
“thrashing”.  We can come back later to thrashing. 
It was easy to explain why this worked from what Les Belady and I called the underlying 
principle of locality.  Thus the working set idea could be explained as a way to observe the 





NORBERG:  What’s the relation of this work that you had done to CTSS and MULTICS? 
 
DENNING:  These results didn’t apply to CTSS.  CTSS was already built.  It was not virtual 
memory and it was based on the idea of completely loading a program into main memory before 
executing it.  On the other hand, Multics was planning a virtual memory but had not yet 
committed to how it would be automatically managed.  The working set concept made precise 
and measurable some intuitive ideas bouncing around in Jack Dennis’s group. 
 
NORBERG:  Is the locality principle implied in your dissertation?  Or is part of it? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, it was a key part.  In the thesis (and the working set paper) I began from 
locality as an experimentally verified phenomenon about programs.  From there the working set 
sampling idea made perfect sense. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you collaborate with Belady on the formation of the locality principle? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, but not as a co-author.  At Gatlinburg, he and I compared notes on our 
definitions of locality.  In his experimental study, he had used it initially to describe the 
nonrandom behavior of programs -- it was an empirical fact that some pages were more 
referenced than others.  He used this to show that FIFO would exhibit linear increase in 
“lifetime” -- mean virtual time between page faults -- with memory size only if applied to a 
completely random program. That no FIFO paging curve was linear confirmed this for him.  
Real lifetime curves had an “S” shape.  He then defined locality as the contents of a FIFO 
memory whose size was at the inflection point of the lifetime curve.  My definition of locality 
was based on the tendency to cluster references in time and didn’t need to refer to any particular 
paging algorithm.  We both agreed that this was a good distillation of his and my ideas and the 
experimental data. 
 
NORBERG:  So locality was a group effort, in a sense. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  The intuitions were already swirling around in my group at MIT and Les 
Belady’s group at IBM.  When we put them all together, we found we agreed on the basic idea of 
locality as inherent in program demand for memory and independent of any particular paging 
policy. 
 
NORBERG: What is thrashing? 
 
DENNING: Oh, that was a nasty problem that plagued early 3rd generation operating systems in 
the mid 1960s.  Except for IBM, the major operating system makers all adopted multi-
programmed virtual memory for their new operating systems. 
Thrashing is a sudden collapse of system performance that occurs when too many users 
log in.  Engineers normally thought that as you add load to a system, its throughput gradually 
increases but saturates at some maximum determined by the bottlenecks of the system.  In these 
computing systems, throughput would rise to a maximum and then, with the addition of just one 
more job to the system, the throughput would drop suddenly to an almost imperceptible level.  
This behavior was completely unexpected and defied the common sense.  When they looked 
inside the thrashing system, they saw that all the jobs were queued up at the paging disk and 
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almost none at the CPU.  They said that the system was “paging to death”, but had no 
explanation nor any good ideas for avoiding it.  Companies like RCA, GE, or Burroughs became 
extremely worried that their operating systems would turn into multimillion dollar liabilities -- 
who would want to buy an expensive system that would unpredictably slow to a crawl? 
Armed with my new insights about locality and working sets, it was perfectly obvious to 
me why systems thrash.  If the number of active jobs got too high, the share of memory allocated 
to each one would be insufficient to hold its working set.  That would force all the jobs into a 
state of high paging.   They would all queue up at the paging disk.  I wrote up a paper 
“Thrashing: Its Causes and Prevention” for the 1968 Fall Joint Computer Conference to explain 
all this.  I showed that a working set policy would completely avoid thrashing.  That also became 
a famous paper. 
 
NORBERG:  When was the working set idea first tried in practice? 
 
DENNING:  The first group to try it in a real system was a group at Los Alamos led by Jim 
Morris; they said it worked perfectly.  It was efficient and could not be forced to thrash.  Another 
group at IBM tried it and reached similar conclusions.  A group in England also tried it and said 
it worked.  I believe that a group at INRIA (the informatics research laboratory in France) also 
confirmed it experimentally on one of their systems.  I can go look these up, if you like, that’s all 
I remember right now.  These experimental tests occurred between 1968 and 1970. 
 
NORBERG:  On what machines did they try it out on? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember those details.  A couple of them used IBM machines, but others 
used different machines. 
These successes attracted a lot of other people to the working set idea.  One of the more 
interesting (to me) studies was by Wayne Madison, a student of Alan Batson at University of 
Virginia.  Madison examined symbolic reference sequences of programs in higher-level language 
and found strong evidence of locality.  The clustering was observable on object and variable 
names.  Locality was coming from the behavior of algorithms themselves, not from some 
accident of the hardware. 
 
NORBERG:  You’ve mentioned a lot of names here, all of which I recognize either from your 
publications or because I was looking at their work before for the DARPA project.  One was 
missing.  Your 1968 paper on working sets acknowledges only two people: Jack Dennis and 
Donald Slutz. 
 
DENNING:  In those days, my practice was to acknowledge just those who had actually 
reviewed the draft and made comments.  A lot of other people were doing the same thing.  Don 
was my office mate at MIT and Jack was my advisor.  The two of them had been very helpful in 
helping me through the drafting and revisions of the paper.  I didn’t, at that point, try to bring in 
the whole circle of people I’d had conversations with. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you have a copy of the dissertation? 
 




NORBERG:  Can I read it tonight, please?  I have the working set paper from ‘72 and the virtual 
memory in ‘70. 
 
DENNING:  The dissertation came together in the winter of 1968.  In January, Jack said to me, 
“It’s time for you to finish up and leave.  Get to work on your thesis.”  I went into a crash mode, 
rented a math keyboard typewriter, and ground out a draft in two months.  The committee was 
not happy about my suddenly giving them a lot of work, but they were very generous with their 
time and comments.  They helped me scrub a lot of ungrounded claims, and by May we had a 
solid thesis and I was able to graduate. 
The thesis introduced a number of concepts.  First, we can measure the processor and 
memory demand of computations -- processor demand is the number of threads and memory 
demand the working set.  Both these kinds of demands follow locality principles.  Locality 
principles have been solidly confirmed in experiments.  The working set definition allows for a 
very efficient algorithm to compute working set size and paging rate.  Schedulers can be 
designed to balance processor and memory demand of active computations against available 
equipment, which maintains high efficiency and avoids thrashing. 
 
NORBERG:  The working set paper (published in ACM Communications, May 1968) became a 
classic.  What made it so? 
 
DENNING:  I think it offered a coherent explanation of how to do dynamic memory 
management efficiently and without thrashing.  It solved the troubling, Gordian-knot-like 
problems that threatened to scuttle virtual memory.  It was conceptually simple and had a 
powerful mathematical model that made some predictions that had to be confirmed by 
subsequent experiments (example: the system will not thrash).  In other words, the working set 
model gave us a scientific theory for memory management. 
As a graduate student, I was pleasantly surprised by all the attention the paper was getting 
and all the new research projects other people started because of it.  There is no reason anyone 
has to pay any attention to your work.  They have many conferences to attend and journals to 
read.  Even more surprising was the selection by the ACM Award Committee in 1969 of the 
working set paper as the best systems paper in 1968. 
 
NORBERG:  So there was external testimony to the value of the work. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  Years later, in 2005, ACM SIGOPS (special interest group on operating 
systems) elected it as one of the four most influential papers from the early SIGOPS conferences.  
In addition to my paper, they picked Butler Lampson’s paper on protection, Edsger Dijkstra’s 
paper on THE system, and Richie and Thompson on UNIX.  I was right up there with four guys 
who eventually got Turing Awards. 
 
NORBERG:  [Laughs] Maybe you’ll get one next time. 
 
DENNING:  Who knows?  The working set was so successful, it was quickly absorbed into the 
infrastructure of operating systems.  All the modern operating systems such as Windows, Mac 
OS X, and Linux use it.  It works so well, people just don’t think much about memory 




NORBERG:  So that’s what makes this one of the great principles, then. 
 
DENNING:  The working set isn’t the great principle -- locality is. The working set is a way to 
measure the inherent locality sets of a computation.  Locality has been very well validated.  It 
influenced a lot of research.  I think we counted up once that in subsequent operating system 
conferences, about 11 new research areas had been spawned based on this one, spread out into 
other areas. 
 
NORBERG:  Can you give me one example and make that clear for me?  Other areas. 
 
DENNING:  Well, in today’s world, we have web caching.  The “common sense” seems to say 
that because access times to servers in the Internet are fairly uniform (usually in the range from 
0.1 to 1 millisecond), locality would not make much difference because there is no huge time gap 
to get objects from web servers.  Well, this is not so.  Some web servers are very popular and 
there can be substantial queues of requests.  The congestion slows the response rate to a crawl, 
just like thrashing.  The web cache is a server in an organization, which keeps copies of an 
organization’s most recently accessed web objects.  When a person in that organization requests 
a web page a second time, there is a good chance it’s locally cached and can be retrieved rapidly 
without encountering congestion at the original server.  Web caching companies such as Akamai 
have been crucial to maintaining the performance of the Web. 
 
NORBERG:  I want to ask you two more questions on this area, and then we can move on.  One 
of them is that this was the period in which there was a long debate about whether IBM would 
give the MIT people what they wanted, or do they have to go to some other manufacturer?  Fano 
and others paid visits to IBM, to General Electric, and I don’t remember now how many others.  
But they decided to buy a GE-635.  Did you hear any of those discussions?  Were you a 
participant in those discussions? 
 
DENNING:  I wasn’t a participant.  I was only kind of a distant observer.  What I knew was that 
they initially wanted to work with IBM because IBM had been a good partner in the CTSS 
project.  IBM seemed to want to work with MIT because IBM had learned a lot about time-
sharing from MIT.  For Multics, MIT wanted some special hardware to handle the addressing of 
their segmented address space and the concept of protection rings.  I suspected that IBM felt that 
MIT was asking too much.  MIT found that GE was willing to do make the hardware mods that 
MIT was asking for. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  That’s the usual story.  I have no reason to challenge it.  Gene Amdahl told 
me once during an interview that he was opposed to IBM’s doing that at that time.  They didn’t 
see the value for IBM until later.  So that fits with what you were saying. 
 
Artificial Intelligence Studies in the 1960s 
 
The other thing that I’ve been thinking about since I started preparing for this interview 
is, this is a period in which people in the AI community are looking for principles that they can 
use to either predict what sort of behavior is going to come from what sort of program, or else be 
able to develop principles that will allow you to transfer knowledge in the head to knowledge in 
the machine.  In the early 1970s, AI researchers gave up the idea to find overarching AI 
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principles and started more intently working on smaller aspects of AI problems that you could 
work with, practical procedures that would work and so on.  Did you have any contact with these 
people, with the AI people? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  They were right down the hall from me.  I was never really taken with what I 
call the AI Project.  That term applies to the entire effort in the US to build an intelligent 
machine.  I had doubts about the whole effort, not just MIT’s part.  At the time the AI project 
didn’t look like science to me. 
 
NORBERG:  What did it look like? 
 
DENNING:  Today we’d use the term “pseudo-science.”  There were a lot of claims being made 
about what we could get machines to do.  There was no way to refute any of them if you wanted 
to try and refute it -- for example, Turing’s 1950 prediction that by 2000 a machine would fool 
half of its interrogators for at least 10 minutes.  There is no experiment you can run to test that, 
short of pouring in the research money for 50 years to see what happens.  Many of the people in 
AI were very emotional and passionate about the possibilities they saw.  I’m sure that those in 
Project MAC were equally passionate about time-sharing.  But for me, at least, we would know 
the answer to the time-sharing experiment in two or three years.  I just could not get my head 
around machine intelligence the same way I could get it around dynamic resource allocation.  I 
could not find models to validate or disprove. 
 
NORBERG:  So you didn’t pay any attention to the toy problems that were then developing? 
 
DENNING:  They didn’t interest me because they were toys and I could see no way to 
generalize.  In 1968 I visited Stanford on an interview trip and visited their AI lab.  They showed 
me the robot arm that stacked blocks.  I was awed.  I asked them how it worked.  It turns out that 
the video system only worked when there were exactly three white blocks of exactly the same 
size against a black background.  The block-detecting algorithm used some very specific 
properties of the outlines of three blocks.  It did not generalize in any way.  They had no idea 
how they would do it with more blocks, different color blocks, or different size blocks.  It looked 
like a dead end. 
Some of the problems also seemed ill-formed to me.  There were clearly fascinating 
problems, but when you dug just a little deeper you discovered you could not really define the 
problem.  For example, the goal of making a machine that thinks depends on having an 
understanding of thinking and what criteria we use to tell if someone is thinking.  Our own 
definitions of thinking seem to change over time.  So machine-thinking is a grabby idea, but it 
seemed to have no scientific program to get us there. 
 
NORBERG:  We had the Turing Test principle at that point.  Why couldn’t we apply that? 
 
DENNING:  Turing sidestepped the issue by saying, “Let’s not actually find out whether the 
machine is thinking.  Let’s just ask them if it behaves like somebody who is thinking.  We don’t 
need to know what goes on inside, only whether it behaves like thinking on the outside.” 
 




DENNING:  Even that notion proved to be slippery.  Joe Weizenbaum built the Eliza program, 
which simulated a conversation with a Rogerian therapist, and many people who interacted with 
it believed it was intelligent.  When Weizenbaum opened the box and showed them it was filled 
completely with ultra-simple mechanisms -- a few rules about transforming incoming sentences 
into outgoing sentences -- he expected them to recant.  He expected them to say, “How could I 
have thought some more understandable and less complex than a clock would be intelligent?”  
Some did and some didn’t.  Weizenbaum said that Turing hadn’t anticipated that some people 
would actually think a machine was intelligent even when it obviously was not.  He did not 
accept the Turing Test as a valid measure of behavioral intelligence. 
Turing himself said there were two ways to approach the project of building an intelligent 
machine.  One was to start at the top, with the questions, What does it mean to think?  To be 
rational?  To solve problems?  He made some headway with these questions by formulating them 
as logic problems.  He felt that he could get to an intelligent machine by mastering the mechanics 
of logic.  But Turing also said there was another path.  We could start at the bottom by 
simulating small animal nervous systems and gradually work up the ladder to more complex 
animals, finally attaining the human animal.  His preference was the top-down approach, but he 
believed bottom-up was equally valid and encouraged others to follow it. 
Most of AI seemed to hover in the state I was calling pseudo-science until the middle 
1980s.  By that time, the major sponsors of AI projects had become disillusioned at the lack of 
results.  They said, “Look, for 25 years you’ve been telling us about all the great things we’re 
going to get from this research.  And hardly any of them has come true.  We don’t believe you 
any more.  You have these wonderful dreams, but we have no reason to believe you can deliver 
on this stuff.  Frankly, we’ve been hoping that we’d get some technologies out of this we could 
use for fighting wars.  We have none.  For example, you’ve been promising us a real-time 
language translator that we could adapt for battlefield use in foreign countries.  That hasn’t 
happened.  The speech translation prototypes are pieces of junk.” 
 
NORBERG:  [Laughs] to put it mildly. 
 
DENNING: Those agencies started withdrawing funding and insisting on a science approach.  
The withdrawal of funding led to a period of gnashing of teeth and great introspection that Raj 
Reddy called “AI winter”, an allusion to the then popular term “nuclear winter”.  Despite their 
best efforts to try to persuade the sponsors to continue, the AI leadership was not successful.  So 
we wound up in a period of bad mood and bleakness. 
What emerged from it was what I think is a much more scientific approach to AI.  In this 
approach, we would say “We hypothesize that the following information process exhibits the 
same behavior as an intelligent human in a domain.”  We can validate the hypothesis by 
implementing the information process on a computer and comparing its behavior with the 
corresponding human behavior.  We can measure the degree of agreement between the artificial 
information process and the real behavior. 
An historical example of this distinction was the search for means to enable humans to 
fly.  The early attempts to build a flying machine sought to imitate birds.  But the machines were 
unstable and failed often.  Modern aircraft have become very reliable with fixed wings and 
control surfaces.  It flies but does not have to have “bird intelligence” to do so. 
With this approach, I would, through many experiments, measure the degree of 
agreement between a mechanical speech recognizer and a human being and provide a well 
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grounded assessment of the quality of the recognizer.  I would not have to make (much less 
prove) any claims that the machine “understands” the speech it is recognizing. 
This approach has been producing many useful results from AI in the past decade.  The 
AI winter has thawed. 
 
 
Seeking an Academic Position in 1968 
 
NORBERG:  When you finished your dissertation and defended it at MIT, what was the job 
market like?  That was 1968, which was terrible for physicists.  That’s when I left the field. 
 
DENNING:  I was interested in a job as a professor.  Academia was my calling.  I did not pursue 
opportunities at companies such as IBM Research or Bell Labs.  I did interview at universities.  I 
talked to MIT.  I talked to Stanford.  I talked to Cornell.  And I talked to Princeton.  They all 
wanted to make offers.  The salaries were pittances by today’s standards -- the lowest offer was 
MIT’s $9,500 for the academic year, the highest Cornell’s $12,500.  Princeton was in the middle 
at $10,500.  We’ve come a long way since then!  MIT and Princeton were the most attractive 
because I could stay on the East Coast, which was important to my family and me at the time.  
One day Lotfi Zadeh of Berkeley visited MIT and we talked about my opportunities.  He said, 
“As much as you like MIT and they like you, from a professional point of view we always advise 
people to go somewhere else -- at least for a while.  You can always come back.”  He went on to 
say, “You have a strong independent streak in you.  I think you’d do well in a different 
atmosphere.  I don’t think you’d get lost in it.  I think you would do well at Princeton and 
broaden your horizons beyond what you would get at MIT. Princeton looks like the place for 
you.” 
 
NORBERG:  Why?  What did they have going on at the time? 
 
DENNING:  Princeton was not well established in computer science, but wanted to be.  They 
had an internal battle between Ed McCluskey, who thought the new field should be housed in 
EE, and John Tukey, who thought it should be in Statistics.  McCluskey thought computing was 
about building computers, and Tukey about designing numerical algorithms.  Because 
Princeton’s leadership saw merit in both sets of arguments, they did not try to consolidate all 
their computing in one place, which was a good decision for the long term.  I found it appealing 
to be involved n the gestation of what looked like a new approach to computing -- involving both 
engineering and science -- that differed from what was going on at MIT. 
Another factor was that my wife wanted to be as close as possible to her family in New 
York City and Long Island.  Princeton was far more appealing to her than Cornell.  She had had 
her fill of the Cambridge-Boston area while we were at MIT for four years.  I found Princeton to 
be more appealing than Boston.  Certain aspects of the Boston area just didn’t appeal to me. 
 
NORBERG:  And I could guess what they are. 
 
DENNING:  By the time I was considering Princeton, McCluskey had actually left there and was 
happily ensconced at Stanford.  I met him when I visited Stanford for an interview.  Both 
McCluskey and McCarthy both seemed interested in my coming to Stanford.  But we didn’t get 
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past verbal offers because my wife was not interested in the West Coast.   She nixed that idea 
early. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s interesting.  And you took your family’s advice?  In a manner of speaking, 
that is? 
 
DENNING:  Her advice was: “We are not going to Stanford or Cornell.”  Okay.  That narrowed 
to two of the four.  Zadeh’s advice was compelling.  I selected Princeton. 
 
 
On the Princeton Faculty 
 
NORBERG:  What did you accomplish at Princeton, given the range of theoretical 
mathematicians there and some computer science activity with the IAS machine and so on?  
Who would you interact with?  It doesn’t seem to me to be the same vital group as at MIT. 
 
DENNING:  The computer science group at Princeton was in the electrical engineering 
department and was quite strong.  Jeff Ullman was there at the time.  Al Aho was at Bell Labs, 
but visited frequently to collaborate with Jeff, so I got to talk with him a lot.  The same for John 
Hopcroft.  Ed Coffman was there.  John Bruno was there.  The EE department had some very 
famous people in the signals, systems, and communication areas.  They included John Thomas, 
Stu Schwartz, and Ken Steiglitz.  They were of enormous help in my work with statistical 
methods.  We had lots of common ground.  Mac Van Valkenberg, a very well known electrical 
engineer, chaired the department.   I had used his textbooks at Manhattan. 
Ed Coffman and I quickly got into a close collaboration and we decided to write the book 
Operating System Theory.  We felt we understood a lot about the principles of operating systems.  
We went to work on that book and it became a major accomplishment after it was published in 
1973. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you have any teaching responsibility? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, yes.  I taught courses in operating systems, computer architecture, and 
programming.  I supervised a computer lab several times. 
Princeton had a long tradition of famous visitors.  We had our share in computer science.  
At various times while I was there Don Knuth was around (on staff for a period at the nearby 
IDA complex), Al Aho, Edsger Dijkstra, and Les Belady inspired me the most.  Dijkstra visited 
at the time he was developing his thoughts on structure programming … boy, did he make a big 
hit with that!  Les Belady was working on theories of evolution of large software systems … 
more great inspirations! 
In addition to all these great visitors, I had some unexpected collaborations that were 
professionally valuable.  Aho and Ullman helped me find a rigorous mathematical proof of the 
optimality of Belady’s MIN paging algorithm, which was intuitively obvious but required a 
subtle proof to show it is definitely true.  That was my first publication in the famous Journal of 
ACM!  Not long thereafter, while writing a chapter on parsing for my second book, Machines, 
Languages, and Computation (with Jack Dennis), I found a short proof of a theorem that Aho 
and Ullman said would take a hundred pages to write out in full.  They were so amazed that the 
nonstandard machine model in our book had such power, that they invited me to join them in 
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another paper for the Journal of ACM.  I got two high-value publications from those 
collaborations. 
 
NORBERG:  It seems like it was not a mistake to have gone there, considering all the people you 
had contact with. 
 
DENNING:  We had some real amusements too.  One day, Jeff Ullman invited his friend Alvy 
Ray Smith to come down and talk about his claim that he had solved one of computer science’s 
open hard problems about the power of a machine model called the linear-bounded automaton.  
Being familiar with the problem from writing my second book, I asked Jeff if he believed 
Smith’s proof.  Jeff said he had not seen Smith’s proof and we would both see it at the same time 
when he presented his lecture.  It was very funny.  Smith got up and gave a little introduction 
about the problem.  He said, “I’m going to do a construction, and then I’ll get to the result.”  He 
wrote down something on the board and announced, “This is my first assumption.”  Then he 
started to write the second assumption, when suddenly Ullman said, “I see what the problem is.”  
Smith said, “What do you mean what the problem is?”  Ullman said, “I see where the error in the 
proof is.”  Smith said, “But I haven’t even shown you the proof.”  Ullman persisted, “It doesn’t 
matter.  I see where the error is.”  Then the two of them huddled at the board for about five 
minutes while the rest of us looked on.  All we heard was high level yakkety-yak-yak-yak.  I 
didn’t even know what they were talking about.  Then finally, Smith says, “Damn!  He’s right.”  
He said, “I have nothing to talk about.”  He sat down.  Seminar over.  There were no hard 
feelings.  We had a great time.  Smith went on to a prestigious career as co-founder of Pixar. 
Another project I got involved with at Princeton was the NSF COSINE (computer 
science in engineering) initiative.  They were looking to develop specifications of core courses 
for computer science programs in engineering schools.  Bruce Arden was chair or co-chair and 
invited me to form a task force on operating systems principles.  I put together a team of people I 
had met at Princeton -- and it turned out to be a dream team -- Jack Dennis, Butler Lampson, 
Nico Habermann, and Dennis Tsichritzis.  We met several times and put together a report in 
1971 showing there was a sufficient core of principles for operating systems to merit its own 
core course in any computer science curriculum.  This was the first time anyone succeeded in 
getting a systems course accepted as core, on an equal level with logic design, numerical 
methods, or programming languages.  Our table of contents became the framework of numerous 
operating systems textbooks, and much of it survives in textbooks today.  Many schools soon 
adopted the proposed course.  I summarized the report in a 1971 paper, “Third Generation 
Computer Systems” for ACM Computing Surveys, which became required reading in operating 
system courses for many years until the textbooks were available.  I wrote a paper, “Operating 
systems principles and undergraduate computer science curricula”, for the AFIPS Spring Joint 
Computer Science Conference in 1972.  I laid out the argument why operating systems should be 
core, and predicted that a raft of other topics would evolve into core topics in the next few years.  
They all did.  I received the best paper award of the conference for that paper. 
 
NORBERG:  What about the 1970 paper on virtual memory?  How did that come about? 
 
DENNING:  By the time I arrived at Princeton, I felt that I had achieved a comprehensive 
understanding of everything about virtual memory.  I said to myself, “I think I see how to make 
that whole thing work.”  I’d integrated all the little pieces that we’ve been talking about, and I 
saw the big picture including address mappings, page size, fragmentation, replacement policies, 
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thrashing prevention, locality, and working sets.  I challenged myself to write it down.  That 
became my first major project at Princeton.  It was like writing a brand new PhD thesis.  I wrote 
several drafts and circulated them to a lot of people knowledgeable about virtual memory.  They 
were all great and contributed great comments and insights.  I acknowledged all of them in a 
long list of “virtual authors” at the end of the article.  I think a lot of people found it very 
convincing.  It cemented the idea that virtual memory could actually work.  It killed off the 
remaining skepticism that existed about it.  That paper became a classic and was required reading 
in operating systems courses until the first textbooks were available. 
 
NORBERG:  It may be optimistic thinking, but I suppose over the years that the skeptics 
disappeared. 
 
DENNING:  Remember that IBM eschewed the first round of virtual memory systems in the 
middle 1960s.  By 1970 or 1971, IBM got on the bandwagon and said, “We can do virtual 
memory.”  And they did, and did it well. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay.  Did you have any funding through DARPA for research during those years 
at Princeton? 
 
DENNING:  No, not then.   
 
NORBERG:  Any NSF grants? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, I had quite a few NSF grants, and I even had a NASA grant for a little piece of 
work.  Most of those projects concerned the management of storage, especially the performance 
of the system under various allocation policies.  They dealt with the same basic themes I had 
chosen at MIT. 
 
NORBERG:  Why did you come to leave Princeton?  You left in 1972, just four years after 
coming.  Since your family wanted you to be at Princeton, what made them change their mind 
about your leaving? 
 
DENNING:  I had followed all the advice of senior faculty about what it takes to be promoted 
and tenured -- teaching, research, and service.  I was one of the department’s best teachers and 
got a teaching award in 1971.  I was successful in getting NSF grants and publishing in top 
journals.  I had a book in press (with Ed Coffman) and another in draft (with Jack Dennis).  I was 
heavily involved in professional service, having been SIGOPS chair in 1969 and then chair of the 
brand-new ACM SIG Board in 1970.  I co-chaired the second symposium on operating system 
principles with Ed Coffman at Princeton in 1969.  I chaired the principles of operating systems 
task force and delivered its report in 1971.  I received two best paper awards, one from ACM (for 
working sets) and the other from AFIPS (for the core course paper).  I had collaborated with key 
senior members of the department and published papers with one of their leaders, Stu Schwartz, 
who was well respected in the department.  So in 1972 I sought early promotion.  Yes, I was 
probably a little fat-headed there for an assistant professor.  I had been very successful, published 
a lot of papers, and collaborated with a lot of the other faculty already on a number of papers.  




I asked Mac Van Valkenberg about going up for an early promotion -- anything earlier 
than six years is early.  Mac conferred with other professors and with administration and came 
back with not very encouraging news.  First, they don’t like early promotions and routinely 
discourage them.  Second, Princeton was at its limit on the total size of tenured faculty, and only 
one or two openings occurred each year with retirements.  That meant that the engineering 
school got one new tenure slot every three to five years.  Third, there would be four departments 
vying for the next tenure slot, not just EE; and the senior faculty in the EE signals and systems 
areas had a candidate that they had been waiting to put up.  Thus, the prospects of my getting 
tenure when my six years probation was over sounded dim. 
 




The Move to Purdue University 
 
DENNING:  I met Sam Conte at an ACM conference in spring 1972 and lamented this situation 
while riding an elevator with him.  Next thing I know, Sam made me an offer to join the CS 
faculty at Purdue as tenured associate professor with 50% more salary than Princeton was paying 
me.  What an elevator speech!  He confirmed by phone and followed up by letter.  Went back 
home and talked it over with his colleagues.  They all thought it was a great opportunity.  I 
thought it was too good to pass up and decided to do it.  My wife, however, was flabbergasted by 
my seriously considering this offer.  She had grown to love Princeton and did not want to leave.  
If she had to leave, Indiana was about the last place she would think of to move to.  She and I did 
a lot of battle over that decision.  It was a costly battle, because we eventually got divorced. 
 
NORBERG:  Oh, that’s too bad. 
 
DENNING:  She came out to Lafayette under great protest.  She was a New Yorker in a farm 
town.  It reminded me of the story about the country mouse and the city mouse.  She tried her 
best, but she couldn’t stand it out there.  On my side I was a difficult husband.  When I got out of 
graduate school, I didn’t give up my late-night and weekend study habits.  I was always tooling 
away on something that I thought would advance my career.  I didn’t make the time she wanted 
to be with family.  She often asked, “Aren’t you ever going to get a life?  I thought that when 
you got out of graduate school that you were going to have more time for the family.”  She was 
hoping that, with my acquisition of tenure, I wouldn’t tool as hard and I would spend more time 
with the family.  I just continued tooling in quest of the next accomplishment.  We finally 
concluded that this was not going to work.  She returned to New York to be with her parents and 
extended family in late spring 1973.  That was a traumatic time for both of us and for our two 
young girls. 
 
NORBERG:  You spent 11 years at Purdue, and it was a lively department there for a while.  
Before you got there, it was all integrated circuit work and so on that was being done with Lark 
Horowitz.  Was he still there when you came? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember him.  Remember, Computer Science at Purdue is in the School of 
Science, and Electrical Engineering was its own school.  They weren’t blended under one roof as 
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they were at Princeton.  There were many people in the EE side whom I did not meet for a long 
time.  He might have retired by the time I started paying attention to EE at Purdue. 
 
NORBERG:  He was an older man, it’s true.  What was the attraction of Purdue?  I know there’s 
no attraction to Lafayette.  But what was the attraction of Purdue? 
 
DENNING:  I wasn’t paying much attention to Lafayette.  I was immersed in the intellectual 
atmosphere and professional opportunities.  Purdue, first of all, had a strong interest in all of 
computer science, including operating systems.  They had a whole bunch of faculty there in that 
area, which was appealing to me.  At Princeton, I only had Ed Coffman and later Bob Keller to 
work with in systems. 
 
NORBERG:  I can understand that. 
 
DENNING:  Purdue CS also had a numerical analysis group.  Princeton’s numerical analysis 
group was very small; most of that sort of work was done in John Tukey’s group.  I always 
thought numerical analysis was important.  I was always amazed at how small round-off errors 
could amplify as they cycled through algorithms, leading to computed results that could not be 
trusted.  I had great respect for the mathematicians who figured out how to organize algorithms 
to avoid those problems.  I always thought they were under appreciated.  Many faculty, buoyed 
by the success of the systems areas of computer science, often said, “We no longer need 
numerical analysis.  That’s for the mathematicians.  We’re not mathematicians.”  Years later, 
when computational science started becoming important, the departments that still had numerical 
analysis groups became the major players. 
Purdue’s faculty was very congenial.  In the winter barrenness of Indiana cornfields, they 
had absolutely first rate gourmet groups.  They loved going to theater at Purdue, which attracted 
some really class acts.  They loved Friday night dinner gatherings at each other’s houses.  When 
a visitor came to town, they organized wonderful dinners and department-wide parties.  In 
contrast, Princeton was pretty stuffy. 
Purdue had many appealing aspects: the intellectual atmosphere, access to good 
mathematical minds, very sharp systems people, congeniality, and good homemade food.  The 
department had a great reputation; it was in the top ten of all computer science departments at the 
time.  Princeton wasn’t even rated at that point.  Princeton was still struggling with whether they 
were going to add “computer science” to their department’s title.  Certainly, the advancement of 
rank and the advancement of salary were no small items to me at that time.  But there were many 
other attractions. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you change your style of working as a result of a slightly more relaxed 
atmosphere and having tenure as an associate professor now? 
 
DENNING:  Well, my tendency to study and work late into the evening was still there.  I still 
have it now; it’s never gone away.  By the time I went to Purdue in 1972, I was heavily involved 
in ACM, more so than most; ACM was already a major part of my life.  I began to take on 
academic administrative responsibilities when I became department head in 1979 at the same 
time I was vice-president of ACM and running for president.  Until 1979, I was just a plain old 
professor.  I published lots of papers, had lots of graduate students, got plenty of grants, and 
designed new courses and curricula.  I was doing very well professionally on the technical level, 
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and administratively with ACM.  Now people in academia were looking to me for administrative 




NORBERG:  I want to pick up on the ACM involvement in the next segment of our discussion. 
 
DENNING:  I started becoming involved with ACM in 1967.  My involvement started as a 
trickle and turned into a torrent.  Many academic colleagues openly wondered why I did that at 
all.  They said, “Why do you do that?  A limited involvement with reviewing, editing, and 
helping conference program committees is enough to help you with your tenure and promotion.  
Your much larger involvement doesn’t help you professionally.  ACM is just a little 
organization.  Why do you want to chair a SIG or a board?  Frankly, there are many people 
around here who wonder whether your ACM involvement is going to distract you away from 
your good technical work and take away all the value that you had to us when you came to 
Purdue.” 
 
NORBERG:  Put pretty bluntly. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I took it as a challenge to demonstrate to them that I could maintain a strong 
research program and take leadership roles in ACM, and assure them that ACM experience 
benefits them.  Then, in 1979, the opportunity came to be CS department head.  The dean 
expressed similar reservations.  He said, “I think you are probably the right choice, but I’m 
worried about whether the ACM involvement will distract you away from doing a good job as a 
department chair.”  He, too, worried that if I did both ACM and department chair, there would be 
nothing left in me for a strong research program.  I replied: I can do it, and I’ll show you.  And 
so he gave me the job.   
 
NORBERG:  How many faculty members were in the department at that time? 
 
DENNING:  Thirty-two, plus a half a dozen instructors.   
 
NORBERG:  It was a big department to manage. 
 
DENNING:  It was one of the largest computer science departments at the time.  I worked hard 
to show everyone I could handle all the responsibilities well.  That didn’t leave room in my life 
for many non-work evenings or weekends. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you think there was a shift in your research activities at the time?  You had 
already published what I would call a substantial review of all virtual memory material that had 
been published at that time.  Your paper about “thrashing” was in 1968.  You made further 
extensions to the working set model in a paper with Stu Schwarz that came out in 1972.  It 
seemed to me that you were shifting the direction of your basic research. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, I began to merge the work with queueing network models.  Various 
researchers were finding that the mathematical model of a network of servers could be quite 
accurate for real computer systems and networks.  Al Scherr, who we discussed earlier, was one 
45 
 
of the first to notice this.  I was interested in whether I could use a queueing network model to 
demonstrate that working set memory management would be optimal at maximizing system 
throughput and minimizing response time.  The answer to this turned out to be “yes”.  With 
several colleagues, I published papers in 1976 showing this to be so.  One paper was called 
“Optimal Multi-Programming.” 
 
NORBERG:  Any other aspects to a shift? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, sure.  We had to move on.  By the time I got to Purdue, it had seemed like the 
vein of virtual memory had been mined.  The last result I was able to extract from the original 
working set model was published with Don Slutz (my office mate from MIT) in 1978.  We 
showed a simple generalization of the working set definition that allowed working set to become 
any other inclusionary paging policy.  “Inclusionary” means that when you add more memory, 
the contents of the larger memory always contain the data that would be in the smaller memory 
at the same time.  An interesting consequence is that the working set is very close to the optimal 
policy, a conclusion that some of my students verified with their experiments. 
 
NORBERG:  How did you choose your new direction? 
 
 
Queueing Network Models and Virtual Memory Research 
 
DENNING:  As I noted, I started blending virtual memory and queueing network models.  
Around 1975 I entered a close and productive collaboration with Jeff Buzen.  Jeff had started 
exploring a new formulation of queueing theory he called operational analysis.  It bothered him 
that the traditional queueing theory rested on several key, but untestable assumptions; an 
example was that over a long enough time, the system enters a steady state.  It was not only 
impossible to conclusively prove that, in a finite time, a system has entered a steady state, but 
most real systems demonstrably have no steady state.  And yet the models based on these 
unrealistic assumptions seemed to work well in practice.  Allan Scherr’s model of the CTSS, 
which we discussed earlier, is a fine example.  Jeff was wondering if there might be an 
alternative set of assumptions that would be testable and would lead to the same mathematics.  
He had a preliminary positive answer with something he called “fundamental laws” of 
performance analysis. 
A fundamental law is a simple statement about the invariance of a relationship among 
observed values.  An example is Little’s Law: the numbering system is the product of the 
response time and throughput.  In traditional queueing theory, this is a limit theorem for long 
term steady state.  In operational analysis, it is a law that is always true.  Another example is for 
virtual memory: the size of memory is the product of the space-time consumed per job and the 
throughput.  This law explained why the virtual memory criterion of minimizing space-time was 
the key to maximizing throughput. 
When I joined Jeff, we decided to tackle the key problem.  Could we find operational 
assumptions for queueing network models?  Jeff was well respected in that area because in 1971 
he discovered a fast algorithm for calculating throughput and response time of those models.  
That breakthrough led to an explosion of interest in queueing models of real systems and a lot of 
validation work showing that the models typically estimated throughput within 5% of the actual 
measured value.  We found operational assumptions and published them in 1977.  Suddenly 
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operational analysis was not just a fringe idea that produced an alternative way of interpreting 
basic laws, it was a serious contender for queueing models of computing systems.  It silenced the 
critics of queueing networks, who used to say, “How can my system violate every one of the 
model assumptions, and yet the model works?  It doesn’t make sense to me.”  When we 
operationalized it, we showed realistic and testable assumptions and how to measure the error 
between the assumption and the real system.  We got a lot of play out of that work.  We pushed it 
quite far.  Our students produced several PhD theses.  The researchers produced several books.  
Most performance evaluation texts for computers use operational analysis as a way to introduce 
queueing network models because it is so much simpler than the traditional approach.  Queueing 
models had become a major research area and we were making fundamental contributions to it -- 
what a heady feeling! 
In 1980 I wrote a major paper that reviewed the progress of everything having to do with 
working sets and virtual memory since 1968.  By that time several hundred researchers had been 
involved around the world and there was quite a scientific literature.  As I was writing that I 
realized that the working set formulation was operational (as meant by Buzen) and this is why 
the experimental validation was so easy.  Based on that literature I was able to conclude that 
working set management of memory would bring most systems to within 5% of their optimal 
throughput. 
That was a nice ending.  After that I wrote nothing more about working set theory and 
practice. 
 
NORBERG:  Didn’t you also write some early papers on computer security?  How come you 
didn’t move in that direction?  It’s become a big deal today. 
 
 
Computer Security Research 
 
DENNING:  Interesting question.  Yes, I had been very interested in protection and security of 
data ever since the operating systems core task force.  I wrote several papers in the area.  One of 
them (with Scott Graham) proposed a construct we called “reference monitor” that could be used 
in operating systems to give high assurance that all references to memory conformed to the 
security policies of the system.  That concept became the cornerstone of modern secure systems.  
I also wrote papers on secure computer architectures and operating systems.  So there was 
certainly a strong attraction to the area. 
In 1971 I interviewed at University of Rochester for chair of their computer science 
department.  That was at the time I was starting to look around because, as we discussed, my 
prospects for promotion at Princeton did not appear good.  I didn’t have the AI orientation that 
Rochester was seeking, and I was a bit young for their tastes (29), so no offer came from that.  
There I met Dorothy Davis, who was an instructor and member of the search committee.  
Dorothy was interested in getting a PhD.  A few months later, after I had accepted the Purdue 
offer, I remembered her interest and suggested that she come that very summer as a PhD student, 
rather than waiting a full year.  Sam Conte was impressed with her credentials and quickly 
offered her a position as instructor while she worked on her PhD.  In my operating system class, 
she soon expressed interest in security and wrote her term paper on that topic.  She became my 
PhD thesis student and pursued the security area.  In 1973 we took a romantic interest in each 
other and were married in early 1974.  She took my family name as her married name (Dorothy 
Denning).  I excused myself from her dissertation committee because of the obvious conflict of 
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interest, and one of the other faculty members took over.  She wrote a groundbreaking thesis in 
computer security (the lattice model for secure information flow) and went on to become one of 
the most well known international security and cryptography experts.  In the interest of domestic 
tranquility, I decided to quit the security area and leave that entirely to her.  I had pretty much 
phased out of the area by 1980. 
 
NORBERG: That looks like a wise decision for the security of your marriage. 
 
DENNING.  Yes, we are happily married for 33 years. 
 
NORBERG:  It seems to me, as I have read the papers and throughout all of our discussion that 
you were always pushing for the highest level of abstract knowledge in the case of each of these 
problems, from working sets on to queueing theory and even computer security.  I can see in that 
the seeds of what has become one of your passions today, the great principles of computing. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, looking for principles has always been a thread in my interests.  I became 
aware of it at Fairfield when, as a new member of the Science Club, Ralph Money asked me to 
present the fundamentals of electronic circuits to the club.  I loved that opportunity and knew 
from that moment I would be a teacher.  Teaching the principles seemed to make teaching easier 
and reduced the amount of memorization.  I found that if I remember the principle, I could 
reconstruct a lot of details as deductions from the principle.  This was a lot easier on my memory 
than trying to remember all the details without knowing the principle.  I figured my students 
would like it this way too.  Throughout my career I can see myself always interested in 
principles, sometimes seeking to discover them and other times to let them guide development of 
a system. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  But you don’t seem to have much activity in building systems anymore after 
you went to Princeton. 
 
DENNING:  It’s true that I didn’t have much personal involvement in system building at 
Princeton as I did at MIT.  But I did not forsake system building.  I had my students do that work 
and I supervised them.  I think that with all my involvements there was not enough time to do 
everything.  System building was one of the things I could delegate.  And I did. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s pretty common, actually, in science and engineering anyway.  I’m 
impressed with how much you’ve done. 
 
DENNING:  Finding and focusing on principles has turned out to be a good leadership practice 
for me.  It helps other people understand the “big picture” and orient their actions to accomplish 
the shared goal. 
 
NORBERG:  I think we have done a good job exploring your formative years and seeing what 
you brought forward with ACM.  In the next segment, we’ll take up the ACM portion of your 
career.  Thank you. 
 
 





Part III: Princeton and Purdue 
 
Session 2, Tape 1, Side A    
 
 
Understanding of Computer Science by Practitioners 
 
NORBERG:  You said you had one thing that you’d uncovered that we didn’t talk about 
yesterday. 
 
DENNING:  Well, actually there were two things.  You were interested in the role that math 
played in my early thinking or formative days.  As I was reflecting on that last night, it struck me 
that math was important, but so also was the hands-on engineering -- the building of projects. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, I thought we covered that rather well.  It came out well in the tapes as I 
listened to them last night. 
 
DENNING:  As we discussed, I also had a scientific streak in me.  I wanted to work with data 
and to experiment with things -- to see whether or not they worked.  Those three aspects were 
also three aspects that we considered core in computer science today -- the math, the science, and 
the engineering.  You can’t really understand the computing field without seeing all three pieces. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you think that most computer scientists who are trained post bachelor’s have 
that understanding when they emerge from graduate school? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t think so, no.  I think it really depends on their specialties.  Someone who 
dwelt in the theory part of computer science is likely to think that the foundations of computer 
science are all mathematical.  They’re not inclined to build things or run experiments.  Someone 
who loves building systems may not be interested in or care about the theory.  You’ve seen them 
-- programmers who don’t want anybody to tell them about complexity theory or theoretical 
limits.  They’re not interested.  They may not be interested in collecting data to see whether their 
programs work well.  Sometimes you have to force them to test things.  The historical record 
tells us that the combination of math, engineering, and science applied to information processes 
is what gives the unique flavor to the field. 
 
NORBERG:  I’m trying to think about some people that I’ve encountered, both in the department 
I was in at Minnesota as well as other departments that I’ve visited or companies that I’ve 
visited.  I remember the arguments inside the department particularly, when I was a faculty 
member.  I remember the conflicts about theory versus architecture, which influenced 
conversations from courses to hiring.  In our case, the department was working its way from low 
standing toward higher; the administration had promised them all sorts of slots.  They had four or 
five slots a year to fill.  Now, some of those slots were from attrition, but some were new.  They 
had a lot of trouble finding the right people, as they defined them, for example computer 
architects.  They put out advertisements for all sorts of specialties, such as architecture.  Then 
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they waited to see who applied.  In the end they chose people they thought were the best, 
regardless of specialty -- and they wound up hiring more theory people.  They didn’t have the 
discipline to say, for example, “We’re reserving this slot for a graphics person.”  I think then I 
sensed what you are saying now about balance of perspectives, but I didn’t put my finger on it at 
the time.  You have clarified it for me. 
 
DENNING:  When I have been department chair, I didn’t expect every faculty member to have 
an equal appreciation for all those three aspects, but I did want the department as a whole to have 
the balance -- to be a full computer science department.  We want people who are very good at 
theory, others at engineering, and others at experimental methods.  My main goal has always 
been to get them to appreciate each other, to see that collectively they make up a well-balanced 
department. 
 
NORBERG:  I think that’s a rare skill to have. 
 
DENNING:  I don’t think of it that much, I just do it. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, it comes out clearly in your series of essays (columns in the ACM 
Communications) about the professional in the field.  In one after another, those essays brought 
these things up.  I have tended to approach these things one at a time, and only later try to put 
them together as a whole.  I wasn’t always successful at seeing the whole. 
 
DENNING:  What you say is interesting.  I know that the balance of math, science, and 
engineering is important today, but I realize until we got into the questions that those three 
aspects were already part of the way I was approaching it back when I first got interested.  It was 
a lucky historical accident. 
 
Summer Jobs, Again 
 
NORBERG:  Let us return to one thing we missed in our previous discussion.  We talked about 
your undergraduate summer jobs at Bell Labs and IBM, and your involvement in Project MAC.  
But we left out the Aerospace Corporation. 
 
DENNING: That’s right.  In the summer of 1966 I had a summer job at Aerospace Corporation.  
I stayed with my parents, who lived in Santa Monica, and commuted every morning down to El 
Segundo.  One of the projects I worked on for them was how they could schedule the job load for 
their CDC 6600 computer to get the best throughput.  They were having the same arguments as 
at MIT, between people who wanted priority to batch processing and others who wanted priority 
to time sharing.  I wrote reports for them on how to adapt the MIT CTSS scheduler to their 
needs.  This work planted the seeds of an important idea that appeared later in my PhD thesis: 
the notion of a balanced system in which the workload is adjusted so that the total demand for 
each resource from the workload is equal to the amount of each resource available.  I also did a 
smaller project on how they could implement a stack in their memory so that they could make 
recursive subroutine calls in Fortran.  I don’t think they understood that very well.  Finally, I 
remember doing a bunch of statistical tests on pseudo-random number generators to help them 
find very fast and reliably random generators.  A nice mixture of math, science, and engineering 
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in that summer job!  Curiously, I also remember a day when a barber told me I had a lot of gray 
hairs for a 22-year old.  That remark made a lasting impression on me. 
 
NORBERG: Did you have other summer jobs? 
 
DENNING.  After Aerospace, I stayed at Project MAC for the next summer.  The summer of 
1968, after graduating MIT and before starting on the Princeton faculty, I worked at IBM 
Research Center in Yorktown, mostly on extending the memory management models I had 
worked with at MIT, and working with the IBM scientists to validate them.  I also spent a 
summer, 1969 or 1970, at Computer Associates.  Anatol Holt, a friend of Jack Dennis, was 
interested in having me work with him on models of coordination systems.  I had met “Tolly” at 
Project MAC and found him to be a fascinating character.  He was a far-out thinker.  I have to 
admit that I didn’t understand a lot of what he was talking about.  As a guy who liked to build 
and test mathematical models, I found it frustrating that I could not understand Holt’s work well 
enough to accomplish that for him. 
I do remember that, toward the end of that summer, Holt hired Shimon Even to join us 
for three weeks as a consultant.  Shimon was an expert in graphs, and Holt was using graphs as 
notations for his coordination systems.  Shimon discovered, as I had, that he didn’t understand 
what Holt was talking about.  He confided in me, “What I’ll do is teach him about graph theory 
and then get him to formulate his models using the language of graph theory.  Then I should be 
able to understand what he is talking about.  I’m convinced he’s on to some very fundamental 
stuff, but he needs a more effective way to communicate it.”  Shimon gave an excellent tutorial 
series on graphs and Holt did formulate a lot of his results in the graph terminology Shimon gave 
him.  His strategy worked!  I wished I had thought of that strategy myself! 
 
NORBERG: Did you have other summer jobs away from campus? 
 
DENNING: No, after that I had summer support from grants and stayed on campus with my 
students. 
 
NORBERG: We discussed earlier that you had some NSF grants at Princeton.  Did you do more 
virtual memory work in those summers? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, mostly variations of virtual memory supporting a couple of PhD students 
looking at program behavior models.   Those students advanced our understanding of locality 
and the conditions under which working set memory management would be optimal or near 
optimal. 
 
NORBERG:  Previously, I asked you specifically whether you had any funding from DARPA, 




DENNING:  Right.  At Purdue, I had more funding from the NSF; quite a bit of it, actually.  I 
don’t think I had any other agencies at that time.  One of the big projects I got into at Purdue was 
the CSNET Project.  That started in discussions in 1979.  Larry Landweber from the University 
of Wisconsin was agitating because the ARPANET of the time was small and closed.  There 
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were about 120 ARPANET sites, mostly government and military, but they included a few 
universities -- I remember UCLA, Berkley, Stanford, MIT, Maryland, Utah.  All of them had 
been advancing more rapidly in their abilities at leading-edge research than those of us without 
the network.  None of the Big Ten Midwestern universities was on the ARPANET at the time.  
(Purdue had been for a while.)  All we had for electronic communication was UNIX-UNIX 
connections and paper mail.  The speed and effectiveness of interactions with people off campus 
was impaired compared to those on the ARPANET.  The ARPANET “haves” did far better than 
us “have-nots” at getting new research funding and conceiving new research projects.  Larry held 
a meeting at Wisconsin in 1979.  He got Kent Curtis from NSF and Bob Kahn from ARPA to 
attend.  We all thought that the current situation was not healthy, either for our own faculty or for 
the strength of computing research in the US. 
At the meeting, four of us emerged to take leadership of an effort to get a network for 
computer science research.  They were Larry Landweber (Wisconsin), Dave Farber (Delaware), 
Tony Hearn (Rand, recently from Utah), and myself (Purdue).  We asked Bob Kahn if he could 
open up the ARPANET a little more and let us in.  He said no, you have to have DoD contracts 
to justify and pay for an ARPANET connection.  Kent Curtis suggested that NSF might be 
interested to help build a network that benefits the entire CS research community.  He and Bob 
said they could work together to help us prepare a proposal for NSF.  Bob thought he could get 
permission for NSF research partners to use the ARPANET if NSF paid for the connections. 
So, the four of us collaborated and drafted a proposal to create a clone of ARPANET for 
the CS research community.  Kent Curtis sent it out for community input and comment.  We got 
back a lot of negative comments, mostly because some departments didn’t want to pay for the 
full level of service the ARPANET could bring -- it was pretty expensive at the time.  We went 
through at least one more draft, incorporating new ideas picked up from the reviews, until finally 
we had something that Kent thought would get good reviews and would get the approval of the 
National Science Board.  We submitted our $5 million proposal in late 1980 and received word a 
few months later that it received favorable reviews and would be funded. 
The CSNET proposal was a comprehensive system with various levels of service that 
would appeal to most any budget.  Dave Farber (Delaware) contributed an email system that 
used the ARPANET protocol SMTP and was capable of exchanging mail with any server that 
ran SMTP, including those on the ARPANET.  We called his segment of CSNET the Phonenet, 
after its primary means of connecting mail servers to individual departments. 
Larry Landweber (Wisconsin) contributed a name server and a prototype “public server”.  
The name server was a white-pages directory of all faculty at all participating institutions.  It 
allowed them to update their own information and gave CSNET addresses of all participants.   
The CSNET addresses all ended in “.csnet”.  The public server was a dial-in server that traveling 
faculty or faculty at nonmember institutions could use. 
Tony Hearn was in charge of the bridge servers between ARPANET and CSNET.  At 
Rand, he got an ARPANET connection and provided the bridge machine with enough phone 
modems to handle all the relayed mail traffic.  I think he also worked with the ARPANET 
administrators so the ARPANET routing tables would know to send mail to the bridge server 
when its address ended in “.csnet”. 
At Purdue I was in charge of the project to build a version of TCP/IP that would run over 
a public commercial packet data network.  We could not afford the usual 56Kb lines that the 
ARPANET used and DoD would not let us use any of their existing 56Kb lines.  The only 
commercial packet network at the time was GTE Telenet, which offered only the X.25 protocol, 
the same as in Europe.  Our job at Purdue was to build a translator from TCP/IP to X.25.  Doug 
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Comer took charge of the actual implementation and did a great job.  It behaved exactly like the 
ARPANET! 
NSF had two major conditions: One was that CSNET had to be completely self-
supporting by the end of its five-year contract.  We therefore had to build into the proposal the 
work to create a consortium of universities to run the network and collect dues from its members.  
At NSF’s direction, we brought in UCAR (University Corporation for Atmospheric Research) as 
the consortium host and advisor.  They were located in Boulder, Colorado, at the NCAR 
(National Center for Atmospheric Research).  Although they were engaged in atmospheric 
research, UCAR had a lot of experience in running their consortium, and we needed their help to 
organize and run ours.  NSF put a portion of the $5 million into a contract at UCAR to pay for 
one of their people, Leonard Romney, to be the consortium manager during an initial two-year 
period.  After that, CSNET was to be run by its own governing consortium. 
The other NSF condition was that we set up a professional information and coordination 
center for the network.  We chose the BBN Corporation for that job.   They were performing 
many of the same functions for the ARPANET and had been part of the ARPANET community 
since its beginning in 1968.  They provided a help line for our members, distributed all the 
software, collected the dues, and paid the bills for CSNET.  They were the first ISP (Internet 
Service Provider)! 
We worked hard and accomplished all our goals.  We got our consortium running in the 
third year.  We had recruited industry research labs into the network, and received NSF and 
ARPA permission to allow commercial entities to be members.  The industry members paid 
higher dues than the university members.  By the end of 1986, we had virtually all the CS 
departments and major research labs connected as part of CSNET.  There were about 165 CS 
members in the US, Canada, and Europe, serving approximately 50,000 students, faculty, and 
researchers.  We had transparent connections to the universities of the ARPANET, which was 
our original objective. 
 
NORBERG:  I remember the glee in the department at Minnesota when they set that up.  They 
joined right away. 
 
DENNING:  Along the way, we had to work out various policies to implement the cooperation 
between ARPA and NSF and to allow industry members.  At the time, DoD needed host 
institutions to pay the annual connection costs, which at around $120K were not cheap.  NSF and 
ARPA had to negotiate some quid pro quo exchanges of services so no money had to flow 
between the agencies.  ARPA agreed to a partnership in which NSF contractors would be 
allowed to send traffic into the ARPANET.  At the time, DoD did not allow non-contractors to 
even send traffic into the ARPANET.  NSF and ARPA agreed to a policy statement that allowed 
industry members; at the time, commercial use was forbidden.  Industry researchers signed 
agreements that they were not using the network for commercial use.   These policy 
breakthroughs provided a framework that permitted NSF to later implement the NSFNET. 
 
NORBERG:  Is this what gave rise later on to separation into the military network and the 
ARPANET? 
 
DENNING:  No.  The DoD had already separated the production network for military 
communications from the research network (ARPANET).  They used the domain “.mil” for 
military and “.arpa” for the ARPANET. 
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Let me say more about the policy changes we had to negotiate.  The first important 
agreement was between ARPA and NSF, where ARPA recognized NSF contractors associated 
with CSNET as DoD contractors for the purpose of accessing the network.  The most important 
early benefit from this was permission to send packets into the ARPANET. 
The second policy agreement was issued by NSF.  NSF was initially very reluctant to 
allow industry participation in CSNET.  They were trying to help the academic community and 
did not want CSNET to be used for any commercial purpose.  But we wanted to have IBM Labs 
and HP Labs and other labs in CSNET because many collaborating researchers were there.  In 
addition, they were willing to donate additional money to CSNET to help it be self-supporting. 
NSF did issue a cautious policy statement, which allowed industry research labs to participate in 
CSNET provided they agreed to refrain from commercial uses. 
Those two policy decisions really opened the door.  Prior to that the ARPANET was 
totally closed. 
By 1985, NSF had gained considerable confidence that it could engage in successful 
networking projects within its research charter.  They decided to start a project to build an 
NSFNET that would connect all the NSF supercomputing centers and their user communities.  
They basically took the CSNET idea and extended it for all of science.  Many CSNET alumni 
joined their planning and implementation committees.  They successfully created the backbone 
structure that became the backbone of the modern Internet. 
CSNET was a critical bridge from the old, closed research network to the new, open, 
community-supporting network.  Sometimes CSNET is forgotten because the NSFNET is 
bigger, more prominent, and superseded CSNET.  [EDITOR’S NOTE: In 2009, the Internet 
Society recognized the seminal role of CSNET by bestowing the Jon Postel Award on CSNET 
and citing the four initial PIs.] 
 
Faculty Member at Purdue 
 
NORBERG:  Now  I’m looking at your timeline diagram, and I have more questions about your 
Purdue years.  There is a label saying, “Operational analysis performance evaluation.”  What is 
that? 
 
DENNING:  Yesterday we discussed that much of my research after MIT was around the general 
subject of virtual memory and storage systems.  In my PhD thesis, you saw that one of the big 
ideas was the definition of the demand that a computation has for resources and how to measure 
that demand.  The scheduling philosophy of the system would be to balance the demand against 
the available resources.  So, when the system is balanced, all current computations collectively 
consume all available resources.  If there is too much of an imbalance between the active 
computations and the resources, degraded performance and possibly thrashing would show up.  
Pursuing that idea for optimal system performance occupied a large chunk of my attention from 
Princeton to Purdue.  As part of that, I entered the collaboration with Jeff  Buzen to reformulate 
the standard queueing network models based on operational rather than stochastic assumptions.  
That is what that label refers to.  By the time I left Purdue (1983) I had a total of 13 PhD students 
working on problems in the system performance and system balance area. 
 




DENNING:  Several of them validated different types of program models.  Remember, we were 
trying to explain why locality was so universal because it was the key to the success of working 
set memory management.  We asked, “What’s going on inside the programs that guaranteed that 
locality is an observable phenomenon of a program?”  Our approach was to propose 
mathematical models of program address traces and see experimentally if they generate the same 
kinds of data as the actual address traces.  My students Scott Graham, Jeff Spirn, and Kevin 
Kahn made significant discoveries about locality in their PhD theses. 
 
NORBERG:  Which we did talk about yesterday. 
 
DENNING:  The appeal of operational analysis in that work was that it simplified the process of 
fitting models to data.  It was easy to measure how well the data satisfied the modeling 
assumptions, which helped us assess the accuracy of the models.  I had several students working 
on developing the operational framework for system performance modeling.  Gianfranco Balbo, 
Jeff Brumfield, Subhash Agrawal, and Andre Bondi made significant contributions to the 
validation of queueing networks.  I also had students investigating computer architectures that 
would allow very efficient operating systems.  George Cox, Don Dennis, and Dave Schrader did 
this sort of work.  Mayer Schwartz looked at the security of databases under multiple queries, Joe 
Fasel abstract data types, and Bob Brown distributed program composition systems.  It was quite 
a group. 
 
NORBERG:  Where did some of these students go after getting their degrees? 
 
DENNING:  Graham became a professor at University of Toronto, his hometown.  Kahn, Cox, 
and Dennis went to Intel; Kahn is now an Intel fellow and Cox a senior manager of secure 
systems.  Dennis retired and I’m not sure where he is now.  Spirn went to HP labs and then we 
lost contact.  Schwartz went to Tektronix.  Simon went to a startup in Cambridge.  Balbo 
returned to his hometown, Torino (Italy), and is now a professor at the University of Torino.  
Fasel went to Los Alamos Labs.  Brumfield went to University of Texas Austin.  Schrader 
worked for several major database companies.  Agrawal became a vice president at BGS 
systems, where he developed and marketed performance modeling software.  Bondi went to Bell 
Labs.  Brown worked at Silicon Graphics and then a series of startup companies, which allowed 
him to make his fortune in Silicon Valley.  His most recent company is education.com -- he paid 
a million bucks for that domain name!  He said that if the company folds, the domain name will 
still be worth a fortune. 
Three of these graduates were later selected by the Purdue CS Department as recipients 
of their annual outstanding alumnus award: Agrawal, Kahn, and Schrader.  I’m proud of them.  I 
didn’t learn that so many of my own students were among this group until my wife Dorothy was 
selected for one of the awards this year (2007). 
 
 
Part IV: ACM Volunteer 
 




NORBERG:  All right.  I’d like to go on to ACM, and I have a series of rather specific questions.  
You said yesterday that you became a member of ACM in 1965 roughly. 
 
DENNING:  Right.  
 
NORBERG:  How did you become involved with ACM as a volunteer? 
 
DENNING:  It started with the Gatlinburg Operating Systems Principles Conference.  There I 
met all the people who were interested in principles of operating systems.  And somebody -- it 
might have been Walter Kosinski -- said, “We have an ACM special interest committee called 
SICTIME (special interest committee for time sharing).  We’re interested in the sorts of issues 
we have been discussing in this conference.  We have occasional meetings, and there’s a 
newsletter.  You’re welcome to join us.”  That sounded interesting, so I signed up and joined 
SICTIME.  Six or eight months later, around the time I finished up at MIT and went to 
Princeton, they asked me if I would be the editor of the SICTIME newsletter.  I said okay, and 
there I was, newsletter editor.  I took the job seriously and wrote up a four-page newsletter every 
quarter on topics in operating systems and rushed it off to ACM for printing and distribution.  I 
typed it all myself.  Typing wasn’t a problem for me -- I taught myself touch typing back in 
Fairfield Prep and I had plenty of practice while doing my PhD thesis. 
Now, I didn’t do that very long, a little over a year and a half.  Given that most of the 
topics in the newsletter were about operating systems, not just time sharing, I started pushing the 
idea with the SICTIME leadership that we should upgrade from a committee to a group and 
change the name to operating systems.  I wound up doing most of the work to prepare the 
documents for the new SIGOPS -- charter and bylaws -- and submit them to ACM Council for 
approval. 
 
NORBERG:  So the bylaw changes were a lot of the conversion work. 
 
DENNING:  Well, every SIG had to have a set of bylaws; the SICs did not.  But it wasn’t that 
much work.  I acquired the bylaws of another SIG and copied them.  The ACM Council 
approved the proposal in 1969.  Shortly after it was approved, ACM President Bernie Galler 
asked me to chair the new SIG.  Bernie told me he had the unanimous support of the SICTIME 
leadership. 
 
NORBERG:  So Galler was president at the time? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, he was president in 1968-1970. 
 
NORBERG:  Then what? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t have clear memories of the details of what we did.  I do remember 
appointing a vice chair, secretary, and newsletter editor as called for in the bylaws.  
Unfortunately I don’t remember all the names except for Bill Konigsford and Marc Auslander.  
Both went on to serve as SIGOPS chairs later. 
In 1968 Ed Coffman and I decided to propose to ACM that we host a second conference 
on operating systems principles at Princeton, to continue the work of Gatlinburg.  SICTIME 
agreed to sponsor, and passed that to the new SIGOPS.  I was general chair of the conference, Ed 
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Coffman was program chair, and our colleague on the faculty Stan Altman was the local 
arrangements chair.  We dubbed it SOSP-2 (symposium on operating system principles number 
2).  We held the SOSP-2 in October 1969.   We had a stellar cast of speakers and authors every 
bit the equals of SOSP-1.  I had the pleasure of being SIGOPS chair by the time of the 
symposium. 
SOSP-2 turned out to be very popular.  We planned for 150 attendees and had to cut off 
registration at around 190, the room limit.  We published the proceedings and had it distributed 
to all SIGOPS members.  We continued the “tradition” of SOSP-1 and had a selection of best 
papers published in the ACM Communications.  The success of the meeting really put SIGOPS 
on the map.  SIGOPS adopted the SOSP as a tradition and continues to this day to hold it every 
other year. 
 
NORBERG:  So can I justly conclude that you saw your technical specialty was operating 
systems at this time? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  So then came a very interesting moment in 1970.  In the early spring Jean 
Sammet invited all the SIG/SIC chairs to an emergency meeting in New York. 
 
NORBERG:  What was Jean’s role at the time?  She was president in 1974-1976. 
 
DENNING:  Jean was chair of the SIG/SIC Steering Committee, which oversaw the SIG/SIC 
activities.  She was upset about various proposals that the ACM headquarters had to create a set 
of overhead charges to be levied on SIGs.  I think that she realized that the SIGs had to pay for 
the services they needed from ACM Headquarters, but she disagreed with the manner in which 
the charges were figured. 
So she called an emergency meeting with as many SIG/SIC chairs as could possibly 
come.  For me it was easy to get there -- I just got on a train from Princeton.  The conversation 
was amazing.  Jean had divided the world of overhead into four categories, which she called 
direct-direct, direct-indirect, indirect-direct, and indirect-indirect.  She had examples of services 
in each category.  I think we finally decided we were willing to pay overhead charges for the 
things in the direct-direct category, but not the indirect-indirect category; and Jean would 
negotiate on our behalf for minimal or no charges in the other two categories.  This was my 
introduction to the innards of ACM political conversations. 
In those days, ACM had frequent money crises.  They operated on a cash-flow basis and 
frequently got crunched by unexpected membership fluctuations or rises in postal rates.  They 
finally implemented an accrual system a few years later, which guided them in setting aside 
funds needed to pay future bills as they became due.  In 1970, however, the ACM was looking 
everywhere for money for the general fund.  The SIGs were growing and placing more and more 
demands on Headquarters, which could only be met with additional staff.  The SIGs had to pay 
for the staff needed to serve them.  This all made sense to me.  After that, the SIGs started paying 
overhead to ACM proportional to their memberships.  The overhead rates were a constant source 
of discussion and dissention over the years and still are even to this day. 
Jean also used the overhead emergency to push one of her agenda items, which was to get 
a seat for the SIG/SIC steering committee chair on the Council.  She argued that since the SIGs 
had become such an important part of ACM’s technical program and finances, they ought to be 
represented in the group that decides the annual budgets.  Many other councilors agreed with her 
and in mid 1970 the Council approved a proposal to establish a SIG/SIC Board with a seat on the 
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Council.  Jean did all the work, which included the politicking and the new bylaw for the SIGs 
that had to be added to the ACM Bylaws. 
 
NORBERG:  Who appointed the SIG/SIC board chair? 
 
DENNING:  No one.  It was an elected position.  The chair was elected from among the SIG 
chairs. 
Right after Council established the board, I got a call from Jean asking me to run for the 
position.  She said they were also putting up Pat Fischer, the chair of SIGACT (automata and 
computability theory), as the other candidate.  That invitation really put me into a tizzy. 
 
NORBERG: Why?   It sounds like an honor. 
 
DENNING:  Indeed, it was an honor to be considered and to know they had the confidence in me 
that I could go a good job.  I was in a tizzy because it would be a shift of career direction and I 
was not sure it was a good time to do it.  Remember, I was an assistant professor for about two 
years then and concerned about doing all the right things for tenure.  Tenure was a highly 
competitive process at Princeton and a stellar research record was essential.  I could see that the 
ACM post would be time consuming and I was scared that it would put my career with Princeton 
in jeopardy. 
I spent several days talking about this with other faculty and my wife.  The other faculty 
seemed to think it was an honor, but not such a good idea for an aspiring assistant professor.  It 
could ruin my research career.  They thought it would be a great thing once I got tenure and they 
encouraged me to say no and wait.  My wife was generally supportive, saying that opportunities 
often come but once and if I ever thought I might want to do this, now is the time to jump in.  I 
finally decided to do it and rationalized “Pat Fischer is an experienced SIG chair and well known 
and popular in that group.  He’ll easily beat me and I can run again in the future after tenure.”  
So I called Jean and accepted the invitation, though with anxious sweat on my brow. 
 
NORBERG:  But by November 1970, you were chair. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I was shocked when Irene Hollister of ACM called and said, “You won.  
Congratulations, you are now chair of the SIG/SIC board.”  She said I had garnered one more 
vote than Pat Fischer. 
From that moment, my life changed.  I had to figure out how to fit a board level 
responsibility of ACM into my life without sacrificing everything else.  I have to tell you, my 
colleagues at Princeton were very skeptical.  They asked, “Why are you doing this?”  I 
responded, “It’s an honor not just for me but for the department.  I can handle it.”  They said, 
“Good luck.  And good luck getting promoted.”  I said, “I know you guys will help me, and if 
you think I’m getting too intent over there, you pull me back.”  So that was the way we did it. 
I started spending a lot of time trying to help this new SIG Board get organized.  There 
were immediately some big battles to fight.  Remember, Council was starved for money.  Every 
year they had to deal with a financial crisis.   Now I was part of that.  They were letting people 
go from headquarters and then hiring them back.  It was precarious, nowhere near as stable as it 
is now.  Several times the Council actually thought the ACM was going to go out of business 
because they just didn’t have enough money to pay for everything. 
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I was hardly seated as SIG Board chair when in spring 1971 the Council decided that it 
had to expropriate the SIG surplus fund into the general fund.  They saw no other way to keep 
ACM solvent.  I put up a strenuous fight.  I told them to cut something else but not hurt the one 
part of ACM that was actually solvent.  I lost.  The Council decided to take the funds anyway. 
Even though many Councillors hated that budget, they felt they had to vote for it to 
maintain ACM in business.  But it left them with sympathy for protecting the SIG surplus in the 
future.  I set out on a campaign to revise the SIG bylaw to make it very difficult for Council to 
expropriate SIG surpluses.  I led the development of a bylaw revision to bulletproof SIGs against 
this in the future.  I worked on that for a year.  I finally got it through council.  I think they were 
still feeling guilty about what they did to the SIGs, and that’s why they passed it. 
The result was a very strong bylaw governing SIGs.  It granted SIGs considerable 
autonomy.  Under the protection of that bylaw, the SIGs grew into a very powerful, quasi-
independent organization.  They are sometimes not easy to deal with -- but that is by design.  
Over the years, the SIGs have had many spats with ACM about the overhead rates. 
As a result of that Council decision to steal the SIGs’ surplus in 1971, we wound up with 
a very strong SIG organization.  Maybe it was not as misguided as we thought at the time. 
 
NORBERG:  Stole?  [Laughs] 
 
DENNING:  That’s what we said and what many Councilors said afterwards.  That event planted 
an important seed.  Had the Council left SIGs alone, the motivation for a new bylaw wouldn’t 
have been there.  We wouldn’t have designed a new SIG organization protected with a bylaw.  
Maybe we wouldn’t have wound up with such a strong SIG organization. 
Anyway, so I know we did many other things while I was SIG Board Chair.  All our 
actions were all oriented to organizing the SIG Board, representing the SIGs on Council, and 
founding a lot of new SIGs. 
 
NORBERG:  You know, one of the things I found very interesting is that this is your first time as 
a Board chairman.  But in November of 1971, you published an editorial about SIGs in CACM, 
which is, again, like the research we were talking about yesterday.  In the editorial, you moved 
from some sort of practical level up to a higher level, a principle level, if you want to call it that.  
That editorial is another example of your doing that.  People who do things like this stand out 
usually, and I assume that’s what happened to you in ACM.  But I didn’t notice another 
publication until 1979, eight years later.  I may have missed something.  But the point is that you 
were thinking about the structure of the SIGs and trying to prepare for their ease in moving from 
one venue to another.  Did this help in the work that you just described, getting a new bylaw for 
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DENNING: Oh, I published quite a bit in ACM publications between 1971 and 1979.  Many 
were technical.  I had another editorial in December 1971 about looking ahead to ACM’s future, 
a statement about ACM’s proposed code of conduct in 1973, several ACM Forum letters in 
between, an analysis of ACM’s awful publication delays in 1979, and an ACM Executive 
Committee position on experimental computer science in 1979.  I’m sure that setting out a more 
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general philosophy of the SIGs helped many people understand the bigger picture and the value 
of the SIGs to ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Was that 1971 editorial a first salvo in the battle with the Council?   You gave a 
very detailed survey of statistics about each SIG and SIC. 
 
DENNING:  No that wasn’t a first salvo.  It was a later part of the process to sell the Council on 
a new structure and bylaw for the SIGs.  The first salvo happened, as I said, at my first or second 
Council meeting as SIG Board chair.  That was when I discovered that the budget on the table 
for approval contained the confiscation of the SIG surplus. 
 
NORBERG:  But I see you were trying to say to them…(and this is me talking now; not you, 
certainly), “Look.  Here you have an organization that you’re not dealing with very effectively, 
and here’s a better design to take care of them in our organization.”  Now, that would precede the 
stealing of the funds, wouldn’t it, in November ’71? 
 
DENNING:  No.  As I said, I was blindsided by the Council move to take the SIG surplus in the 
budget cycle of spring 1971.  I don’t remember the details; it was either part of the budget 
proposed by the Executive Committee or someone proposed it as a floor amendment.  Either 
way, I was not prepared and the Council adopted it over my strenuous objections.  At the time, 
the Council was so desperate that they really weren’t in the mood to discuss it.  I remember 
Bernie Galler saying he was very sorry that they were doing this.  He felt very bad about it.  But 
he said it was necessary for the survival of the ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Necessary because ACM’s general account was going negative. 
 
DENNING:  We were the only part of the ACM that had a surplus.  We felt that we should not 
have to subsidize poor decisions elsewhere in ACM that we had no say in. 
 
NORBERG:  So like a cash-starved dean, isn’t it?  To go around to the departments and take any 
surplus they had.   
 
DENNING:  That set me off on the campaign not only for a better bylaw, but to gain recognition 
for the value of the SIGs to the mission and future of ACM. 
 
NORBERG: That’s a very powerful statement. 
 
DENNING:  It was also for the members to understand what the SIG organization was all about. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay.  We’ll come back to some of those SIGs in the mid-1970s before we’re 
finished.  I’d like to ask a couple of questions which will sort of round off the period.  What 
other professional associations were you a member of in the ’60s and ’70s while you were 
treating with ACM as the principal one? 
 
DENNING:  I was a member of the IEEE and its computer society.  I joined the electrical 
engineering honor society Eta Kappa Nu and the Engineering Honor Society Tau Beta Pi when I 
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was a senior in college.  I joined Sigma Xi, the honor society for researchers, when I was in my 
final year at MIT.  I joined AAAS shortly after graduating from MIT. 
 
NORBERG:  For Sigma Xi, you have to be proposed by someone else. 
. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  You need somebody who’s already a member to propose you.  MIT faculty 
nominated most of the soon-to-graduate PhD students to it.  The ACM got most of my attention, 
so I never did any real volunteer activities for the IEEE or for the AAAS.  From time to time I 
received invitations from IEEE Computer Society and AAAS to run for offices, but I just never 
had the time.  The AAAS invited me to run for chair of its “Section T”, which is their 
information technology area.   It was a prestigious post, but I just didn’t have the time. 
 
NORBERG:  I can understand that. 
 
NORBERG:  I want to ask some more questions about the SIGs, especially SIGOPS, the one you 
were a party to as its chair, before you became board chair.  How does a SIG govern itself? 
 
DENNING:  Each SIG has elected officers: a president, a vice president, a secretary, sometimes 
a treasurer.  Sometimes it also has a small advisory council.  All those positions are spelled out in 
the SIG’s individual bylaws.  The SIGs hold elections every two years, in the off-year from the 
ACM elections.  Some people run for multiple terms. 
The scheme I just described is the general prescription from the new ACM bylaw for the 
SIGs we got passed.  Prior to that, SIG officers were selected by whatever means were specified 
in their individual bylaws.  There was huge variation. 
Remember that SIGOPS was formed by transforming a committee (SICTIME) to a group 
(SIGOPS).  Committee chairs were appointed by the ACM president.  On the transition, the 
ACM President (Bernie Galler) appointed me as the first SIGOPS chair.  When I stepped down a 
year later to take over the SIG Board, SIGOPS had an election to fill the vacant post.  When I 
was chair I remember that Bill Konigsford and Marc Auslander were officers.  Both became 
chairs at different times after I left. 
As SIG Board chair, I spent a lot of time talking with the SIG and SIC chairs about the 
kinds of activities SIGs and SICs should be involved in.  Typical activities included the 
publication of a newsletter and the sponsorship of research conferences.  In the case of SIGOPS, 
the officers continued the newsletter and took on the symposium on operating systems principles 
(begun at Gatlinburg in 1967 and continued at Princeton in 1969) as their permanent flagship 
conference. 
SIGOPS frequently collaborated with other conferences.  For example, we worked with 
SIGPLAN chair Peter Wegner to define a series of conferences of the form “Principles of 
programming and systems”.  It may still be going today.  Many other SIGs followed the SIGOPS 
lead and defined their own conferences with titles beginning “Principles of …” 
 
NORBERG:  And the board then became the buffer zone between the individual SIG and the 
Council.  Is that right? 
 
DENNING:  And the executive committee, yes.  The board worried about policy and procedure 
statements that applied to all SIGs.  We developed sample bylaws so that a new SIG didn’t have 
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to write its own bylaws. We drafted procedures for periodically reviewing SIG viability, and 
guidelines for de-chartering SIGs that failed their reviews. 
 
NORBERG:  Now, along the same lines, this brought you membership on the Council, didn’t it? 
 
DENNING:  That’s correct, the SIG/SIC Board chair was a new position on Council. 
 
NORBERG:  What was your reaction to the early meetings of the Council that you attended in 
the first half of the 1970s? 
 
DENNING:  Well, the first couple of meetings, I was the new guy. I didn’t know the history 
behind what was going on there.  We had some very colorful characters then.  Herb Grosch was 
one of them. He loved to create confrontations with the president, each and every president.  
Even if he agreed with the president, he would still create a confrontation.  He just loved 
confrontations.  For him, it was a game, but he got under people’s skin.  Even though he thought 
it was a game, others didn’t think it was a game.  There were times when folks would come close 
to fisticuffs with Herb, and Herb would say, “You don’t have a sense of humor.  I’m, you know, 
just joking with you.  Where’s your sense of humor?”  He’d wiggle out of it that way.  
[Chuckles]  While it was amusing to watch, it was also very disruptive.  Many Council meetings 
never got through their agenda because of these disruptive confrontations, and the poor president 
struggled to manage them.  Council meetings were frequently emotional and contentious. 
Another colorful character was Ken King, the regional representative from New York.  He was 
quite willing to take Herb on. 
 
NORBERG:  It seems to me so was Jean Sammet. 
 
DENNING:  Indeed so, Jean Sammet took him on.  She would get very emotional about it, and 
Bernie Galler spent a lot of time trying to smooth things out.  That was the kind of group I found 
myself in.  I tried to figure out how these people did business, what motivated them, and how I 
could win my cases with them. 
 
NORBERG:  There was a major issue that came up for the SIG Board in 1976 having to do with 
the SIGMAP controversy. 
 
DENNING:  Oh, yes, I remember there was a controversy around SIGMAP [mathematical 
programming].  I was no longer the chair at that time.  I was chair until 1974.  I was a Council 
member-at-large. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you remember the SIG map controversy? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, I remember there was a controversy.  But I’m not remembering the details of 
the SIGMAP controversy.  Can you refresh my memory?  ACM was a growing and changing 
organization -- there were frequent controversies.  On almost any issue, there was likely to be a 
controversy between Herb and Jean. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay, but this one seems to be different to me, which is the reason why I picked it 
out to talk about.  Sammet [past president] wrote to Dan McCracken [vice president] and Dave 
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Brandin [secretary] a letter labeled “not for circulation”.  It was her custom to circulate memos 
so labeled.  She alleged that the SIGMAP officers refused to abide by the bylaws of the ACM 
and should be removed. 
 
DENNING:  Is this the one where the officers refused to become members of ACM, even though 
there was an explicit policy that SIG officers should be members? 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  That was all part of it. 
 
DENNING:  She wanted to can them and replace them with new officers? 
  
NORBERG:  The council did ask for an election, and there was one.  This letter from Sammet 
enumerated the possibilities in great detail: “If this so-and-so gets in, what’s going to happen?  Is 
the controversy going to be continued? If this so-and-such gets in, can we get them to resolve 
this situation?” I assume it was not for circulation because it named people and speculated about 
their actions and attitudes.  I think the controversy was settled by someone paying the member 
dues of the recalcitrant officers.  One of the consequences was that Council became much more 
interested in how individual SIGs were doing.  They wanted the SIG Board to pay more attention 
to faltering, inactive, or unviable SIGs.  That’s my view of what I see in the record.  Would you 
consider that a fair assessment? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  In that time there was high interest in the SIG viability question and formal 
review process.  The SIG Board set up a regular review cycle for every SIG, which had to file a 
self-study report during review in addition to their regular annual reports.  Each year, the SIG 
Board reviewed a certain number of SIGs.  Many weak SIGs went on probation from this 
process and a few were de-chartered because no one stepped forward to revive them. 
 
NORBERG:  Was that taken during your reign as chair of the SIG Board? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember clearly, but there was some interest in reviewing when I was the 
chair.  Obviously, it got stronger after that. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, I’ve seen some reports of the SIG Board where they’ll go through SIG A, 
SIG B, SIG C, and so on.   
 
DENNING:  Yes, it became a standard part of their agendas:  “Here are the ones we’re reviewing 
this year.  The SIGs up for review know they’re going to be reviewed and have to submit a self-
study report.  It goes pretty smoothly now.  Back then, it could be contentious if a SIG disagreed 
with the Board’s assessment that it was weak. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, it would have led to some of the chaos within the Council, I should think. 
 
DENNING: I think it was more the times.  It was a time in which ACM was much younger and 
its elements more likely to tussle and object to “bureaucratic processes”.  That was true of SIGs 
and of Council.  I don’t think SIGs caused Council contentiousness. 
Take the example of Jean Sammet’s fussiness over whether SIG officers were ACM 
members (as required in their bylaws).  Some of the officers thought that paying their member 
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dues was the least ACM could do to recognize their service.  Jean felt that all volunteers should 
first be members.  She reviewed all the membership records to see which SIG officers were not 
members, and called them up to ask them to become members. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, yes, but there you could see some legitimacy for it.  But how about 10 years 
later?  Was she still doing it then? 
 
DENNING:  I can’t tell you that.  But she was always worried about it.  On receiving her phone 
call, I think they’d say to her, “Well, Jean, I just think I’m making enough of a contribution now.  
I don’t know why I have to pay dues.  Okay?  You’re getting more out of me than you get out of 
most people.  The time I put in is worth far more than $15 dues.”  Jean pressed her argument that 
the volunteers should be members; many times they didn’t reach an agreement.   The SIG chair 
would say, “Well, Jean, if you really feel that bad about it, then I’m not going to be chair, and 
I’m not going to pay any dues.”  I remember being involved in a few of those disputes, working 
offline to resolve them.  Basically we’d find a third person who’d say, “Look, I’ll pay the guy’s 
dues.  If he’s so stupid and can’t see the value of ACM and doesn’t want to pay the dues, I’ll pay 
them.  I just want this thing to go away.”  So his friend would pay his dues, and the chair would 
say to his friend, “You didn’t have to do that.”  He would say, “Well, yes, I did because I wanted 
this thing to go away.  You’re being too stubborn and Jean’s being too stubborn, but it’s taken 
care of.”  And wouldn’t you know, some of those chairs paid up when their renewal notices 
came. 
 
Council Structure and Business 
 
NORBERG:  I want to come back to something that was occurring in that period, but before I do 
that, I’d like to add in here your description of the relationship between ACM Council and the 
regions, which are now different from the SIGs. 
 
DENNING:  Boy, you’re tugging on my memory here.  I believe that when I came on the 
Council in 1970, there were 12 regions—some of them in the US and a few abroad.  Every 
region had a regional rep elected from within the region.  Half the Council was regional reps.  
My recollection is that most of them were pretty quiet, except when something came up that 
clearly impacted their region.  Their interests were completely different from say the members-
at-large. Regional reps tended to focus on the region more than on the big issues of ACM.  For 
members-at-large, it was the other way around—they’d focus on the big issues and not worry 
about the regions. 
 
NORBERG:  But as you just pointed out, there were quite a number of these, and they could 
swing a board vote very easily, I should think. 
 
DENNING:  Oh, yes.  Many of them sent out newsletters to their regions.  I remember Jerry 
Salton was the regional rep for the northeast region for a long time.  We all loved waiting for 
Jerry’s newsletter to tell what happened at the Council meeting because it always seemed that 
Jerry went to a different Council meeting than the rest of us.  His meeting was always more 
interesting than ours! 
 




DENNING:  He paid attention to many little off-agenda things such as side-conversations or 
contractions in people’s statements.  He was a colorful character. 
 
NORBERG:  Just to deviate for a moment, when I was a young faculty member, around 23 years 
old, I guess, I was asked by the president of the college (a small school up in Burlington, 
Vermont) to join a committee on faculty welfare.  I did.  This committee was the president, the 
vice president for planning, and me—just the three of us.  As the new boy on the block, I got to 
write the minutes of these meetings.  After two or three of the meetings, we were going over the 
activities as recorded in the minutes.  There had to be minutes because they wanted the faculty to 
know that there was a faculty input (me).  We talked about health plans and insurance plans and 
all the rest of that, and I was getting a good education, but I couldn’t contribute to this 
conversation.  After two or three meetings, the president leaned over and said, “You should stop 
editorializing in the minutes.”  [Laughs]  I had a different agenda than he did, that was sure. 
 
DENNING:  You should have replied, “You should write the minutes, because then the editorials 
will come out the way you want.” 
 
NORBERG:  That didn’t occur to me.  I was nervous enough in there.  But I raised this question 
about the Council and the regions, because there was a reorganization plan posed in 1975.  Jean 
Sammet (as president) appointed Bernie Galler to chair a reorganization committee.  The 
committee proposed a complete overhaul of ACM’s governance structure.  It caused a 
considerable amount of discontent.  In fact, as far as I can tell, that reorganization plan never 
went into effect.  A later one did, but not that one.  But I should think this would have raised 
some disagreements on the Council.   
 
DENNING:  Yes.  As I look back over the years -- 40 of them -- it has seemed to me that about 
every seven years someone proposed a reorganization plan.  These things seemed to come up 
because many people felt that the Council was too large to conduct business.  Too many 
members of the Council saw themselves as analogous to the US Congress, representing a 
constituency, rather than being a governing board.  They were more interested in trying to push 
the interest of their constituency onto the awareness of the Council than they were trying to reach 
agreements with other Council members and complete the agendas at meetings.  Presidents were 
regularly frustrated by this.  Jean Sammet in particular was frustrated.  She was a very careful 
agenda planner, and she would get frustrated when she couldn’t get through the agenda -- all the 
unfinished items had to be saved several months for the next Council meeting.  That’s why she 
wanted to reduce Council size.  The regional reps were an obvious choice for the reductions.  
She wanted the executive committee to be able to complete business between Council meetings; 
enlarging the executive committee was a way to do that.  Those proposals, of course, always 
generated lots of controversy.  The regional reps didn’t take kindly to this proposal, taking the 
position that it would disenfranchise the members.  Jean took the position that they were already 
disenfranchised when their regional reps couldn’t complete the business or adopt an annual 
budget. 
 





DENNING:  Yes.  A typical characteristic of reorganization proposals was shrinking the Council 
and increasing the size of the executive committee. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, we got up to five during this period by adding two members of the Council, I 
guess, who were not the top officers of the association. 
 
DENNING:  Making certain Council members automatic members of the executive committee 
was often met with resistance on the grounds that members of the executive committee ought to 
be elected directly by the members.  Those reorganization proposals were always contentious.  It 
might have been about the third one I saw that finally got enough traction to actually get 
somewhere. 
 
NORBERG:  That would have been after your presidency. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, after I was elected president. 
 
NORBERG: McCracken wasn’t going to stand for any reorganization plans, no matter how 
many came to the Council. 
 
DENNING:  Neither he nor I wanted to spend time on organizational structure issues.  We both 
thought the Council was so easily given over to wanting to talk about voting procedures and 
structures that they couldn’t complete their meeting agendas.  You may have seen this discussed 
in my editorials.  No matter what was on the agenda, somebody would want to talk about 
whether the voting procedures had gone well in some election.  If the procedures hadn’t gone 
well, they would insist that the whole group talk about it.  They’d dig their heels in when the 
officers asked to get back to the agenda.  We couldn’t get them off of it, and then they’d get 
contentious.  If Dan or I said, “You’ve got to get off of this.  It isn’t on the agenda,” they’d say, 
“Oh, there you go again, trying to disenfranchise some members.”  That era was painful.  It was 
really hard to get business done in that sort of an atmosphere. 
Today, I’m wiser than I was then.  Today I have a reputation for being able to steer a 
complex meeting of many characters to reach a conclusion.  In those days, I did not realize there 
was a skill at running meetings.  My approach was to put my head down and plow through the 
agenda.  I didn’t have enough of an appreciation for people’s emotional sides that I could harness 
their feelings to help get the agendas done.  When they resisted my exhortations to stick to the 
agenda, I would get defensive.  In that state I would annoy some people and make it all the 
harder to mobilize them behind the agenda.  Jean Sammet and I were a lot alike in this regard -- 
we’d both get impatient when we weren’t making progress, and the manner in which we would 
then interact would offend somebody.  Then we’d wind up in the middle of a pointless argument. 
 
NORBERG:  I can sympathize with all that. 
 
DENNING:  There were many subtleties.  Some leaders, like Bernie Galler, had a wonderful 
smoothness about them.  Bernie would acknowledge your feeling or concern and ask if you 
could put it aside and help the cause now and get on with the vote.  He was better at that than 





ACM Publications Issues in the 1970s 
 
NORBERG:  Well, one of the other perennial topics, like reorganization, had to do with 
publications because that was essentially the business of your organization, as I see it.  Right? 
 
DENNING:  Yes. 
 
NORBERG:  The subject came up in the later ’70s.  February ’78 is one I remember.  Herb 
Bright raised a number of issues concerning Computing Reviews and whether it was really 
serving the mission for which it was established.  But I also looked at the budgets at the same 
time and I saw that the big budget items got the most discussion.  Half the budget went to 
publications.  Publications were ACM’s historical strength.  And yet there were numerous 
complaints about publications from the members.  In an attempt to respond, publications were a 
major item in the Council agendas of the later 1970s.  In that time there was a controversy 
around the “Journal for All Members”, or JAM.  The various editors-in-chief had their own 
strong views on what ACM should publish.  You played a big role in this as chair of the editorial 
committee and twice an editor-in-chief.  Can you speak to this issue of why there seems to be 
some fundamental uneasiness about publications? 
 
DENNING:  I can relate to the identification of ACM with strong publications.  Even before I 
became active as a volunteer, I was an avid reader of the Communications and the Journal, 
which were regarded as the top two journals in computing.  These were clearly the primary 
places for me as a researcher and author.  While there was great prestige to publish in these 
journals, there was enormous competition and the rejection rates were high. 
When I got to be an insider, beginning as editor of the SICTIME newsletter, I became 
friends with the publications people in ACM.  They include the editors-in-chief such as Gerry 
Salton [JACM], Stuart Lynn [CACM], and Elliot Organick [CSURV]; various chairs of the 
Publication Board such as John Gosden and Eric Weiss; associate editors in the Communications 
and the Computing Surveys; and the headquarters editorial staff.  All these people fascinated me.  
They taught me much, and I enjoyed giving them advice whenever they would listen.  The 
editorial part of the ACM seemed, to this novice anyway, like a pretty solid piece of the ACM. 
This was part of the reason the budget battles were so difficult for me.  My opponents 
were the publications.   To keep them afloat during the hard times the leadership had to look for 
money in other parts of the ACM.  The SIGs were a juicy target!  I had to figure out how to 
protect the SIGs while keeping the publications healthy. 
The Communications was the target of most complaints.  Everyone received the 
Communications as part of their member benefits -- it was ACM’s flagship publication.  The 
problem was that the Communications was a research journal and about four-fifths of the ACM 
members were non-academics, mostly software developers.  As much as they wanted to track the 
new developments in the field, those members found most papers in the Communications to be 
inscrutable.  They would sound off loudly at town meetings and say they were not being served 
by the Communications.  And of course they weren’t being served by the Journal either, but it 
was not mandatory.  SIG newsletters could be more appealing, but there was little quality control 
and their publication schedules were erratic.  For those members, ACM did not seem like a 
hospitable place.  Thus the ACM leadership started to seriously search for ways that the flagship 
publication would contain material of interest to the nonacademic members.   That was what the 
JAM discussion was all about. 
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You can see why the SIG Board paid so much attention to the viability of SIGs, the 
quality of their conferences, and the quality and timeliness of their newsletters.  At least the SIGs 
could be hospitable until the general publication situation improved for the bulk of the members. 
I should add that the researchers, who were the main contributors to the journals, were 
also unhappy.  Printing and distributing journals is expensive.  ACM never had the resources to 
keep up with the demand.  Even with high rejection rates, the queues of accepted papers in the 
Communications were often 24-36 months.  Many authors experienced 3-4 years from the time 
of original submission to final publication.  Even the primary audience of the journals was 
dissatisfied. 
You can see why these things rose up to the Council so often. 
One of the ideas for increasing member satisfaction with the flagship publication was 
called “unbundling”.  Jean Sammet wanted it discussed.  (I don’t know if she believed in it, but 
she thought it needed discussion.)  The idea was that members would select any one of ACM’s 
journals as their regular monthly journal.  The biggest objection to this was the fear that the 
Communications might actually go under and would no longer be ACM’s leading voice for 
research.  Another objection was that there would be no common place for ACM to distribute 
news and calendar items; starting a special newsletter for that sole purpose seemed too 
expensive.  Unbundling got a lot of discussion, but went nowhere. 
Since so many people thought that the Communications should be a genuine flagship, 
there was considerable discussion about how to reorganize it to be a JAM.  Bob Ashenhurst, who 
was the editor-in-chief of the Communications, was the deepest thinker on that issue.  He laid out 
the architecture of a flagship that would have a balanced mixture of research, news, general 
articles, and computing practices. 
But as attractive as Bob’s proposals were, it was unclear how to move from the current 
situation to the new flagship.  What would be done with the excellent research papers already in 
the queue and in future pipelines?  Can new journals be started for them?  Where would the 
money come from to pay for those journals and the changes in the Communications? 
 
NORBERG:  Say more about those backlogs.  They sound unconscionable. 
 
DENNING:  I remember that in the late 1970s the CACM backlog was long (as noted) and the 
JACM was no better.  The other ACM journals, like the Transactions on Mathematical Software, 
had the same problem.  The field was growing fast and the available journal pages were fairly 
constant.  The journal authors and readers became increasingly unhappy because the delays were 
interfering with their ability to keep abreast of the new developments.   They eventually 
complained bitterly to the ACM leadership that the journals were not serving them by not 
distributing research information in a timely manner.  There was a lot of pressure to put a lot 
more pages into the journals.  That was extremely difficult because ACM was almost broke and 
could not afford anywhere near the number of pages that were needed. 
It was worse than that.  We estimated that we would have to triple the pages in the 
CACM to reduce the backlog to six months.  Each issue would be close to half an inch thick!  
Even if we could afford that, the CACM issues would simply become unwieldy.  All this 
discontent pushed authors and readers to the SIG conference proceedings as the primary medium 




NORBERG:  Well, in all the organizations I’ve belonged to, that was always an issue that was 
talked about.  Increasing dues to pay for more pages would be a nonstarter with the bulk of the 
members who are not researchers. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, we were in a bind.  We could not satisfy the internal pressure for more pages.  
And we could not satisfy the external pressure for publications more relevant to the bulk of the 
members.  We had to do something about it, but we did not know what to do. 
 
NORBERG:  Was there an organizational structure to look into these problems? 
 
DENNING:  There were a few ad hoc committees, but their recommendations did not offer much 
of a solution and got nowhere.  I remember a large, well organized publications planning 
committee established by the Publications Board and blessed by Council that did a thorough 
investigation.  That study was headed by Stuart Lynn, who had graduated from CACM editor to 
chair of the Publication Board.  Stuart was determined to find a way out of the mess. 
I particularly admired Stuart’s approach to dealing with the resistance that proposals 
often faced from some faction or another.  At several key points in the process he came to 
Council to give progress reports and he’d say, “Before we go any further, let’s agree on four or 
five principles.  If we can’t agree on the principles, we can’t go much further.  And if you agree 
on these principles, we’ll come back next time with some details about how to implement the 
principles.  And if we agree to those details, we have an action plan.”  He worked each set of 
principles through the Council and used them as his mandate to proceed further toward 
recommendations.  The Council had some very constructive debates about what principles they 
wanted to realize in ACM publications.  They had not had such a discussion before. 
Before long, the shape of a solution began to emerge from this process.  ACM would start 
brand new transactions in the technical areas most needing new pages.  The initial set of new 
transactions included ones on databases, operating systems, and programming systems.  The 
SIGs would take leadership roles in planning and launching the new transactions.  Any SIG that 
wanted to propose a transaction was welcome to propose it to the Publications Board.  They did 
have to have a viable business plan.  The ACM would create a fund to loan a new transaction the 
startup funds they needed, and the business plan had to specify when the loan would be paid off.  
This approach would create new journals as needed and put the burden of the planning and 
execution on those who most wanted them.   It was an attractive strategy. 
As part of this, the research departments in the CACM that overlapped with the new 
transactions would be discontinued and all the papers would go to the transactions.  The 
Publications Board and Council did not want the CACM to compete with journals.  But this 
forced the issue of what the CACM would be.   Eventually, the bulk of its research would move 
out to transactions.  What would a new CACM look like? 
 
NORBERG:  What surprised me about the backlogs is that there’s a financial issue here.  If I’m 
buying a journal for volume #23 dated January of 2007, but I don’t get it until 2009, how does 
the financial report indicate what are reserved funds for a past journal, what are reserved funds 
for one that’s in process now? 
 
DENNING:  Are you talking about if the journal is delayed from publication? 
 




DENNING:  Well, that was not the usual problem.  The queue was the problem.  The CACM 
and JACM were coming out every issue on time.  But when your paper was accepted, it could 
take 24 months before you came to the head of the queue and the editor would notify you that 
your paper has been scheduled for publication. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay.  I misunderstood that. 
 
DENNING:  So the strategy of the late-1970s publications planning committee would take the 
heat off of the page problem.  As I noted above, that strategy brought the JAM [journal for all 
members] issue to a head.  If research papers move out of CACM, what moves in?  This was a 
subject of intense discussion. 
Bob Ashenhurst wrote (1977) a very thoughtful editorial where he laid out a set of 
departments and the relative amount of pages for each one.  He strongly advocated a computing 
practices section.  It would contain the material specifically aimed towards the practitioner.  In 
those days, “practitioner” was intended to mean the opposite of “researcher”.  The JAM, said 
Ashenhurst, should have a limited amount of research material and a greatly expanded amount of 
practitioner material.  He also advocated that the research articles be carefully edited so as to be 
able to convey the sense of new research results to practitioners. 
Ashenhurst, also, wanted to develop the ACM Forum, which was the discussion section 
of topics that members wanted to write about.  He would put technical letters in a different 
section. 
His proposal was hotly debated, along with several others.  His had the most influence on 
what ultimately emerged from the process. 
 
NORBERG:  There had been earlier attempts at a JAM.  Anthony Ralston (president 1972-1974) 
established a committee to investigate the idea. 
 
DENNING:  Ralston had a different idea.  He wanted to develop a new magazine, modeled after 
Scientific American, which would appeal to current members and attract new members.  It was to 
be called Abacus.  He initially formed a committee in AFIPS (American Federation of 
Information Processing Societies).  They spent a lot of money to develop a full prototype issue of 
Abacus with help from an editor who used to work at Scientific American.  Dorothy Denning 
(my wife) and I worked with them to contribute a sample article called “The limits of data 
security”.  It was quite an experience having our draft completely rewritten and restructured by a 
professional editor.  We liked the results much better than what we originally drafted.  This, of 
course, is exactly what Ralston had in mind. 
Ralston’s committee developed a business plan for Abacus.  It would take about three 
years to become profitable.  Depending on sales and marketing success, its gap between 
expenses and income could reach as much as $1.5 million in the second year.  That, 
unfortunately, was the downfall of the plan.  AFIPS was not much better off financially as ACM 
and just couldn’t face a new project with such a downside exposure.  It felt like betting the farm.  
Even though they loved the idea and admired the sample issue, they turned the proposal down. 
Ralston then tried to get ACM to take a pared-down version of Abacus.  The Council too 
was spooked by the expense and didn’t approve it. 
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The rights to Abacus eventually went to one of the other societies, but I don’t remember 
which one.   I don’t think it is published any more.  Dorothy and I published the Abacus data 
security article in the Computing Surveys in 1979. 
 
NORBERG:  When Jean Sammet became president, she named a new committee to take up the 
issue of JAM, superseding the committee formed by Ralston.  You were a member of Sammet’s 
committee.  (You might have also been on the earlier one; I didn’t find a list of members for that 
committee.)  And it was apparent to me that you wrote the report. 
 
DENNING:  I did that for a lot of the committees.  I’m a pretty fast writer. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, I think so.  There was an interim report in October 1975, which focused on 
the journal for all members.  This ad hoc committee described the proposed content and a 
business plan.  They studied the effects the new journal would have on other publications and 
concluded it was minimal -- except for the CACM.  I haven’t been able to find records about 
what happened next. 
 
 
Session 2, Tape 2, Side A 
 
NORBERG:  Do you mind if we pause to clarify something?  You alluded earlier to your 
editorial experience in ACM, beginning with the SICTIME newsletter in 1968.  You must have 
had considerable experience by the time of the JAM discussions to wind up on these ad hoc 
committees. 
 
DENNING:  As we have discussed, my first volunteer position was editor of the SICTIME 
newsletter.  By 1979 I had published 50 refereed articles in ACM and other journals, including 6 
articles in CSURV.  I had also contributed the sample article to the prototype Abacus.  So I had 
good credibility as someone who was familiar with the formal refereed side of ACM publications 
as well as the write-for-all-members side.  I was editor of the CSURV in 1976-1977 and I 
chaired the editorial committee around that time. 
I don’t remember the detailed dates of the new JAM committees any more.  I do 
remember that we decided it was silly to give up on the CACM, which was already regarded as 
the flagship.  Why not revitalize the CACM?  Why not move all the good JAM ideas, like 
computing practices, into CACM?  That would be cheaper and more palatable than starting a 
new magazine. 
By the early 1980s, the publications plan to expand the number of transactions was under 
way and several of the most active research departments of the CACM were disbanded and all 
their papers sent to the new transactions.  This was hurting the CACM because the lost content 
was not replaced with anything new.  It increased the pressure to come up with a good 
revitalization plan. 
In addition to wanting to include the Ashenhurst ideas into our plan, we wanted to imitate 
the way Science magazine handled research contributions.  The new CACM would have a 
limited research section, and we hoped we could use it to capture important papers that stood a 
chance of being seminal papers.  We also wanted fast-turnaround on reviewing so that we didn’t 
wind up with the horrible backlog problem that we were trying to escape from. 
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We wanted editorial help with our general interest articles.  We realized that researchers 
who were not experienced in writing for a general audience would write many of these articles.  
We proposed that ACM hire professional editors who would help authors rewrite their general 
articles for our audience. 
Unfortunately, some of these proposals didn’t get included in the final product because of 
that old bugaboo, the cost.  Science magazine had a staff of people whose job was to phone up 
potential reviewers and ask if they could turn items around in two weeks.  It took work to find 
qualified reviewers and then locate one who could give fast turnaround.  Council thought that 
fast turnaround was a nice idea, but not nice enough to justify the cost.  That went. 
And, as much as they liked the idea of editors helping authors with their presentations, 
they did not want to pay for the staff increases.  That too went. 
We wanted to hire professional writers for computing practices.  That was considered an 
important and valuable addition to the CACM, but was only partially funded. 
I was asked to be the editor of the new CACM beginning with the February 1983 issue.   
I had to work creatively with the ACM Headquarters staff to find ways to implement as many of 
the Ashenhurst ideas as we could with the skimpy budget we had available to us.   It was a big 
challenge. 
 
NORBERG:  Even if all the members were paying for it, and the other journals were providing 
some amortization? 
 
DENNING:  I remember feeling disappointed that we weren’t able to get the money needed for 
the full CACM revitalization.  It was far cheaper than Abacus, but still too expensive for 
Council.  I felt that after all the strong talk about revitalization Council was pretty stingy about 
giving the resources needed to do it.  As the new editor-in-chief, I felt like I had a major 
challenge ahead -- revitalizing on a shoe-string. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you recall what the increase in cost would be for a journal of that kind, for the 
CACM to become useful to all members? 
 
DENNING:  The proposal was for about a dozen new staff members.  We needed a graphics 
design person to deal with the covers and layouts of each issue.  We needed several editors to 
help rewrite and several writers for the computing practices.  We got about half that. 
 
NORBERG:  I was guessing that these new people, whether stationed in New York or New 
Jersey, would be over $600,000.  You got about half that. 
 
DENNING:  We did the best we could within the constraints.  Here’s an example.  We said, 
“Although our ideal would be to imitate the Scientific American, we can’t do that with the 
number of editors we’ve been given.  What can we do?”  And our answer was, “Let’s try to be 
more like American Scientist, which seeks out good writers from the scientific community and 
pairs them up with a good editor who helps them be successful in their communication and 
preserve their voice.  If we start with good writers, the editor won’t have as much do to and can 
serve more authors.”  So that became our approach. 
In computing practices, we thought we might be able to do more with volunteers.  I 
invited Al Spector (CMU) and Dave Gifford (MIT) to be editors of Case Studies, which would 
be part of computing practices.  Spector and Gifford did a fabulous job with that for two years.  
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They visited project engineers in industry and interviewed them.  The readers loved hearing 
about what the engineers experienced in developing real software systems, warts and all.  But 
each case turned out to be a lot of work for Spector and Gifford.  They asked to wind down their 
involvement.  We never did find good replacements for them as case study editors, so that 
feature disappeared by 1986.  And we were still unable to persuade the publications board to 
give us more budget so that we could hire in-house editors to do the same job following the 
Spector and Gifford model. 
Another innovation we created was regular columns.  We got well known people to write 
columns several times a year and established a practice of one or two columns per issue.  By far 
our most popular columnist turned out to be Jon Bentley, who wrote “programming pearls”.  We 
got Don Knuth to do a few on literate programming.   The readers responded well to the 
columns.   That is now a well-established part of the CACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  I remember a policy column. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  In addition to a column covering policy issues from Washington, we started a 
news section with news snippets in it.  It was difficult to get that right.  The problem was finding 
interesting snippets that hadn’t grown old by the time the issue was published. 
So that was the environment in which we revitalized the CACM.  We had a good plan for 
content as a result of the long planning process.  But we didn’t have the budget to do everything 
in the plan.  We couldn’t get the super-fast review system because we couldn’t hire the people to 
manage it.  We had to limit the number of graphic artists we hired for issues.  We had to limit 
editorial rewriting.  We could only afford one freelance writer, which crimped what we could do 
with computing practices. 
Despite these challenges, the staff kept on improving the magazine.  Over a period of 
several years, it matured, and the editors who were working on it were pretty darn good.  The 
magazine received a couple of awards from industry groups.  Reader surveys indicated a much 
higher level of satisfaction among most reader groups than in the pre-revitalization CACM.  We 
felt that we were on a good track. 
There was a serious complaint, from the research community.  They objected to the 
magazine concept and wanted a return to the “golden days” of research publication that they saw 
in CACM during the mid 1970s.  Doug McElroy of Bell Labs was one of the most vocal.  He 
minced no words: “You guys have ruined the Communications.  You’re turning it into a 
magazine.  I don’t want a magazine, I want a high quality research journal.  I want to see the next 
round of seminal papers such as the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman cryptosystem paper in 1978.  You 
moved content of the mainstream areas of research off into separate journals, leaving nothing for 
us to see in the Communications.”  Doug was right that we had not made any serious attempt to 
publish occasional research papers in those mainstream areas.  We did try to get the SIGs to send 
us the best papers from their conferences, but we didn’t get much interest. 
 
NORBERG:  And people only wanted to buy one journal, or get it with the membership in that 
case. 
 
DENNING:  Remember, the Council had rejected the idea of “unbundling”, which would allow 
members to choose any ACM journal as their monthly publication.  Even though there were 
many announcements of the impending changes in the CACM, many readers did not grasp them 
until they started receiving issues.  The researchers were not happy.  They took their ire out on 
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the editors.  We would patiently explain that the new CACM was reached by a consensus 
decision of SIGs, Council, and several presidential committees.  That did not satisfy them; they 
would respond, “Well, they made the wrong decision.   Get it changed.”  I was not able to 
console them by explaining that if they could persuade the Council to allocate more funds for 
more professional editors, we could create a selected research section where we ask authors of 
recent highly regarded research papers to rewrite them for the CACM audience.  The critics did 
not feel like campaigning with Council.  That suggestion got nowhere. 
 
NORBERG:  Not unusual for the Councils and members of societies.  
 
DENNING:  Still, nonetheless, I got beat up a lot.  I was being portrayed as a guy who’s 
unfriendly towards research and going along with this travesty, etc., etc.  We thought the 
controversy had died down gradually.  The industry awards kept coming and the reader surveys 
indicated no big discontents.   When Dave Patterson became president (2004), he took an interest 
in what the researchers said and resurrected the issue. 
 
NORBERG:  He did? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, yes.  He said, “I keep hearing complaints from members that the old golden 
days of Communications have been lost and the Communications is out of focus, out of touch 
with the members.”  The editors were very surprised by these allegations because the 
Communications regularly took focus groups and reader surveys, all indicating a good level of 
satisfaction.  Dave’s claims didn’t seem to match up with the data.  He was hearing from the 
folks in the research community who would like to see more research papers in the 
Communications.  Finally, Dave decided to set up a committee to do a complete review of the 
CACM and advise the Council on what should be done.  He asked Moshe Vardi to chair the 
committee.  Moshe looked carefully and talked with many people representing many reader 
constituencies and got confused.  He was very receptive to the research community argument 
that there ought to be research papers in the CACM.  He also heard from representatives of 
practitioners that the CACM was not taking care of their interests very well. 
 
NORBERG: I though it was an objective of the CACM to serve practitioners. 
 
DENNING: That is an interesting story of its own.  As I said, we were never given enough 
money to do the job right, as originally envisioned in the revitalization plan.  The coverage of 
computing practices was uneven as a result.  When he was president, Steve Bourne (2000-2002) 
started to advocate that ACM should start a new publication for practitioners.  He thought that 
putting more money into CACM would not do the job because CACM was shared with many 
other interests.  He also thought that a practitioner publication could attract many new members.  
He set up a committee that put together a plan for the ACM Queue magazine, geared completely 
for practitioners. 
Queue was started and turned into a great money hole for ACM.  It fulfilled the fears I 
saw on Councils in the 1970s that a professional magazine would be too expensive for ACM.  
Although Queue was high quality and achieved what we were never able to for computing 
practices in the CACM, it became clear they were not attracting the subscriber numbers they 
hoped for.  That was a big disappointment. 
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Dave Patterson came up with the idea of merging Queue back into the new CACM that 
the Vardi committee was exploring and at the same time publishing it online only.  Getting rid of 
the print version and the associated distribution costs would make Queue less expensive and 
more affordable.  Steve Bourne didn’t like that but went along because the alternative would be 
the demise of Queue. 
I think the existence of Queue and all the money ACM was spending on it may have 
helped re-stoke the desires of researchers for a greater share of the CACM.  Surely, they thought, 
ACM could help them at a fraction of the cost of Queue. 
 
NORBERG:  Why would Moshe Vardi think that Queue would work within the CACM 
umbrella, when it didn’t work on its own? 
 
DENNING:  Moshe, working with the executive director (John White) and the president (Stuart 
Feldman) convinced the Executive Committee to merge Queue, but not take the budget away.  
They did not want to repeat the mistake of the past, and they wanted to preserve the good side of 
Queue at lower cost.  Moshe said, “You’ve got to preserve Queue funding.  You’ve been trying 
for all these years to make the Communications work, and every time you try, you don’t give it 
the budget.  You give it unfunded mandates.  Just this once, please, let’s give it the budget 
needed to do it.  And then if it fails, you can’t blame it on the budget.  You can only blame it on 
the management.” 
 
NORBERG:  Have you seen enough years to make a judgment? 
 
DENNING:  It’s very interesting that Moshe in his complete review of the CACM and the 
interests of members came up with virtually the identical plan to the one we put on the table in 
1981.  I was convinced then that the plan was good and the reason it didn’t meet all its 
expectations was that Council didn’t fund it.  Moshe actually convinced the Council to fully fund 
the new revitalized CACM.  He took advantage of ACM’s generally healthy financial climate, 
which we didn’t have in 1981.  It was a great accomplishment for him. 
When Queue was formed, the CACM lost its computing practices content.  Moshe’s plan 
got the computing practices back, and properly funded so that it could succeed.  Moreover, under 
Bourne’s leadership, Queue had developed into a wonderful approach to computing practices.  
So Moshe didn’t have to do anything special for computing practices in the new CACM -- it was 
already perfected from its time as a stand-alone publication. 
The new plan explicitly provided for some research in a Research Highlights section.  
Each issue would have two research papers that the editors, working with the SIGs, had 
identified as potential seminal papers.  Each paper would be accompanied by a perspective from 
an expert in the field who would set the context for the CACM readers and tell them what was 
important about the paper.  That section satisfied the research readers.  And, of course, it was 
fully funded! 
It was surrealistically amusing to see a vindication.  The researcher-criticized “Denning 
plan” for the CACM in 1982 was almost identical to the “Vardi plan” in 2006.  The difference 
was that the Vardi Plan was fully funded and computing practices was taken care of by Queue.  I 
think Vardi can pull if off. 
 




NORBERG:  I hope he does.  Now let’s turn to the ACM Digital Library, which came into 
existence while you were Publications Board Chair 1992-1998. 
 
DENNING: I served as the editor of the Communications until 1992, and then I became chair of 
the Publications Board.  When I became the chair of the Publications Board, there was increasing 
talk going on about having electronic publishing and electronic journals.  “Digital library” was 
becoming an accepted term, as was “ACM electronic community”.  In the early 1990s there were 
several ad hoc committees looking at these pieces, but there was no integrated plan to move 
ACM into that world.  It would require many changes in ACM business practices, publication 
policies, and financial plans to get there. 
The big charge to the Publications Board was to plan and execute an ACM Digital 
Library.  I was, as chair of the board, to be the project leader. 
Over the next five years, the board moved from brainstorming about how to do a digital 
library to increasingly architectural plans, business plans, and implementation plans.  We wrote 
new copyright policies to deal with online media, breaking all sorts of new ground.  We were the 
first professional society to come up with a complete framework for digital publication.  That 
framework, and subsequent pieces of it, has been adopted by other societies.  ACM became the 
first scientific society with a genuine digital library and many others followed the ACM lead. 
 
NORBERG: How did ACM pay for the digital library?  Money has always been an issue. 
 
DENNING: There I credit the genius of Joe DeBlasi, the ACM executive director.  He 
anticipated that ACM would need a fund to capitalize the digital library.  He worked with the 
executive committee on a check off system for member dues renewals, so that members could 
make charitable donations to that fund.  By the time we came to implementing the digital library 
plan, the capital funds were available and we did not have to make a special plea to Council for 
the budget.  Joe also worked out ways to phase out older print publications just as we were 
phasing in new aspects of the digital library, allowing us to transfer funds from one part of 
publications to another without asking Council for new funds. 
Then around 1997 we saw an opportunity to license the digital library to libraries, 
consortia, and businesses.  We started issuing licenses.  At first there was a concern that 
members would not purchase digital library subscriptions because their employers would already 
have access.  But since the digital library was a subscription service rather than an archiving 
service, and the prices were extremely good, ACM got a lot of member subscriptions and a very 
large number of licenses.  Eventually the digital library became ACM’s main “cash cow” source 
of income, and it has been called “ACM’s crown jewel”. 
When he became executive director around 1999, John White saw the potential of the 
digital library and worked with Internet service providers to get mirror servers around the world.  
He also convinced the Council to spend something like $500,000 to scan in all ACM’s print 
publications, thereby making the digital library complete back to the beginning of ACM’s 
publications in 1947.  That was one of Council’s wisest investments.  It substantially increased 
the value of the digital library and helped sell all those licenses.  The IEEE Computer Society’s 






NORBERG: I want to turn to another area.  We’ve been talking about management and the 
issues so far, and that includes the SIGs and the Council and publications.  I want to turn to you 
personally now.  What made you decide to run for vice president of the ACM? 
 
DENNING:  After I completed four years as SIG Board chair, I ran for election as Council 
member-at-large, a post I held 1974-1978.  In 1976, the nominating committee nominated Carl 
Hammer and me as candidates for President.  Let me tell that sordid story first. 
Herb Grosch wanted to be president for some time and made his wishes known to the 
nominating committee.  He had become such an irritant to so many people that the nominating 
committee was not about to grant his wish.  He felt snubbed.  He immediately announced he 
would run for president by petition, and soon had the signatures needed to get him on the ballot.  
Herb often portrayed himself as anti-establishment even though there was never a more 
“establishment man” than him.  He had a sharp mind and tongue to match and was well known 
and popular among the members. 
Herb accused Jean Sammet (president at the time) of manipulating the nominating 
committee to exclude him.  Jean denied that.  And she made no secret of her personal belief that 
Herb would not be good for ACM.  Dan McCracken, who was nominated for vice president and 
was a wary friend of Herb, told Jean that he thought the association would be just fine even if 
Herb only pushed his pet projects and poked everyone in the eye.  Jean demurred and went on a 
private campaign to defeat Herb. 
She approached me and made a strong argument that I should withdraw and let Carl and 
Herb be the only two candidates.  She believed that Carl and I would split the “anti-Herb” vote 
allowing Herb to win.  I told Jean that if she wanted to defeat Herb, her best bet would be to back 
me and convince Carl to withdraw.   Meantime, both Carl and I decided neither of us would 
withdraw because we thought that would do serious harm to the ACM electoral process.  Jean 
was very disappointed with my decision and worked hard behind the scenes to convince people 
to vote for Carl.  She believed Carl had the best chance to defeat Herb. 
I still remember election day, May 15, 1976.  Executive director Sid Weinstein called to 
tell me the election results.  Herb had 42%, I had 35%, and Carl 23%.  I was disappointed but not 
surprised.  Herb was elected president and Dan McCracken vice president.  When I saw the 
numbers, I was sure that I would have beat Herb if we were the only two candidates.  Jean did 
not get her wish (defeat Herb).  Carl was gracious about his loss, but surprised because he 
thought he had a good chance at it beating Herb. 
 
NORBERG:  Was Carl Hammer ever president? 
 
DENNING:  No, he wasn’t. 
 
NORBERG:  So why didn’t you run for president again in 1978? 
 
DENNING:  Simple.  Dan McCracken wanted to run for president and was sure to be nominated.  
He was very popular and I did not want to a second bid to be president.  I decided to run for vice 
president and position myself for a run for president in 1980. 
Much to my surprise, the nominating committee declined to nominate me for vice 
president in 1978.  I thought this was some sort of payback for not withdrawing from the 1976 
election.  I never knew. 
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I decided to follow in Herb’s footsteps and run for vice president by petition in 1978.  I 
circulated petitions and easily got the required signatures.  In that three-way race I trounced the 
other two candidates with over 60% of the votes.  Dan was elected president also by a substantial 
margin.  My strong showing completely surprised Jean Sammet, who thought I was unlikely to 
draw more than 30%. 
 
NORBERG:  Too bad, Jean. 
 
DENNING:  I think she was happy with the outcome.  It just wasn’t the one that she thought was 
going to happen.  In the end, it all worked out in a way that Jean was happy with.  I got to be vice 
president, and then when it was time for the next election, it was easy to run because of that. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay.  In 1980, you were nominated for president by the nominating committee. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  Straight and smooth, no petitions. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay, so that’s the normal activity.  When I went through the various documents 
that the Babbage Institute has, I discovered that in ACM it is not “automatic” that the vice 
president becomes the next president.  That is pretty common in other societies, but not in ACM.  
I don’t know whether that tendency was built into the structure or whether there was a hidden 
way of keeping certain people out and letting other people in. 
 
DENNING:  I don’t know.  I have the impression that many of the vice presidents, who wanted 
to, went on to become president, but not all. 
 
NORBERG:  Not all, yes.  I know a few who didn’t. 
 
DENNING:  And there were a few who didn’t run for election at all and disappeared.  In the 
period I was elected an officer was a period of a lot of petition candidates.  Herb and I were not 
the only ones.  I think two presidents who came after me, Paul Abrahams and Brian Kocher, 
were petition candidates. 
In that period there was also some talk, stirred up by Herb, that he would run for another 
term as president as soon as he finished his term as past president.  Various people convinced 
him not to pursue that, just on the basis that the framers of the ACM constitution did not 
anticipate the same person coming back for multiple terms.  Herb concluded that it would be 
more statesmanlike to remain a past president and not run again. 
Finally in the late 1980s the ACM system settled down and the nominating and election 
processes followed their normal paths. 
 
NORBERG:  It was the same in the American Chemical Society.  They had never had an 
industrial person as president, and they were undergoing the same sort of changes. 
 





DENNING:  The main duty was managing the six boards.  The committee consisting of the six 
board chairs was called the vice president’s committee.  The vice president held frequent 
meetings with those board chairs—to make sure they were doing their basic jobs. 
 
NORBERG:  So in a sense, the vice president is serving as an evaluator. 
 
DENNING:  More than that.  A customer of their promises and a facilitator with Council to get 
positive votes on items they put up.  I also helped set all the executive committee and council 
agendas. 
 
NORBERG:  What I’ve seen, though, from the ACM documents was an increase in the 
significance of the vice president in 1978 because of the number of issues that were handled.  
Previously they were all handled by the president, it looks like to me.  Jean Sammet, in my 
opinion, wouldn’t delegate any authority if she could get away with it.  The space in the CACM 
reserved for the president was being opened to other officers.  I have several examples here of 
vice presidents writing columns in that space. 
 
DENNING:  I guess I wrote a couple while I was vice president. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, you did.  And it was all about the SIGs.  Here is one in November 1979 by 
you. 
 
DENNING:  I remember that the executive committees were becoming more active and 
powerful.  I helped the executive committee write its own position papers on a number of issues, 
such as the experimental computer science issue when I was president. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  I will come to those. 
 
DENNING:  I remember giving a lot of help to Stuart Lynn and the Publications Board as they 
worked on the recommendations for the revitalized CACM and the establishment of the new 
Transactions. 
 
NORBERG:  Now, being a member of the Council by design, you also had to handle some sort 
of Council business, did you not?  Or just as a member, you handled Council business. 
 
DENNING:  By the time I was president, I already had eight years experience on the ACM 
Council.  As SIG board chair, I put many SIG issues before Council.  As member-at-large, I 
chose interesting issues and helped others move them through Council, and occasionally 
championed something of my own. 
My role changed a lot as vice president.  I spent a lot less time pushing my own issues 
and a lot more helping the president manage the agenda.  McCracken and I spent time before 
Council meetings trying to anticipate where the hot spots would be and what kinds of 
information or argumentation we would need to move past them.  We also tried to anticipate 
non-agenda issues that might come up.  We often collared key Council members in breaks to 
solicit their support of certain items and tactics.  It was always helpful if someone beside the 
president or vice president expressed opinions about the importance of an issue. 
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There was a lot of strategic thinking, as well as tactical, in the process of agenda 
management.  When we had major issues, such as publications change, we developed strategies 
for how to work them through Council over a series of Council meetings.  We had to find out 
what was on people’s minds and find ways to take care of their concerns.  We could not do all 
that in one meeting. 
 
NORBERG:  Were not all three members of the executive committee involved in these agenda 
strategy discussions? 
 
DENNING:  Certainly.  Dan and I did most of the heavy lifting, and the secretary was often a big 
help. 
When I was president, Mike Harrison was vice president and Kathleen Wagner secretary.  
Mike started a project to create an ACM Foundation that would receive charitable donations and 
put them to work on worthy projects.  I spent a lot of time working with him on that.  Kathleen 
had agendas of her own and was not very interested in the foundation project.  Although Mike 
got the appropriate bylaws and policy statements enacted, the foundation itself was never very 
successful. 
 
NORBERG:  You did raise some.  Million and a half? 
 
DENNING:  It did raise some, but it just didn’t go to the level that everybody wanted it to.  We 
just couldn’t find the donors. 
 
Serving All the Members: Professional Development 
 
NORBERG:  We’ve been talking about ACM publications and your activities as vice president.  
There’s this tension in the organization between the research community members and the 
practitioners, who were mostly in businesses, I guess.  How did this debate get resolved?  Or did 
it ever get resolved? 
 
DENNING:  Some time in the late 1990s, when Joe DeBlasi was executive director, there was a 
retreat of ACM leaders to discuss who our constituencies are and how we might serve them.  
One of the primary issues in that retreat, as it had been in every other Council retreat, was how 
well do we serve our practitioner community?  They are 80% of our members.  We’re not doing 
the job as well as we might.  How do we serve them better?  Joe DeBlasi got us to change from 
using the word “practitioner” to using “software developer”.  He said, “Even the researchers are 
practitioners in their part of the profession.  What exactly are we trying to get at with this word?”  
He said, “We’re really talking about the people who are developing real software for real 
applications and making real money for companies—developers creating real value.”  He 
thought the word “practitioner” was too broad.  Moreover, since the term had actually originated 
with the research community, it sounded to some as a second class designation to “researcher” or 
“academic”.  At the retreat, a lot of people accepted that software developers were the main 
community we wanted to serve better. 
 




DENNING:  No, it focuses on the problem better.  The Queue proposal was an explicit attempt 
to reach out to software developers and give them a publication that they could call their own.  
The proposers felt that Queue would help increase membership because it would give software 
developers something to identify with. 
Unfortunately, as we have discussed, Queue didn’t meet those ambitions.  It didn’t attract 
a slew of new members and did not meet its business plan, which is why it got into financial 
trouble.  To me, that wasn’t a big surprise because, by that time, I had concluded that ACM’s 
membership problem wasn’t with the publications any more.  It had to do with our self-image.  
Our self-image is reflected in what ACM does.  ACM had a publications oriented, academic 
image that was just not very attractive to a major segment of the community.  A new publication 
was part of the old self-image.  There are numerous people out there who are Web-oriented.  
They grew up immersed in information technology.  They are gadget and communication 
oriented and take pride in new practices such as texting, video streaming, and multitasking.  
ACM was not doing a lot with those kinds of technologies and those types of online 
communities.  And if we really want to appeal to that new generation, we’ve got to rethink our 
approach and self-image.  Publishing a really slick magazine is not going to do it. 
 
NORBERG:  This is the general problem for all associations, I would think.  I’ve seen it in 
associations whose membership is mostly from the academic community.  Although most of 
ACM’s membership is not academic, most of its leaders are. 
Do we have a generational problem here?  The ACM leadership may be from an earlier 
generation and are, without realizing it, out of tune with the current younger generation.  A 
software developer can see in ACM many things that support the academic community -- such as 
a rich range of research publications and many refereed research conferences in the SIGs -- and 
wonder how ACM can help them in their own careers.  Is it an “old boys” club from before 
1960?  After 1960, it seems to me, presidents and executive committees became more reactive 
than proactive.  Is that a fair assessment, do you think? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, I don’t think it’s a generational problem.  The SIGs constantly cultivate many 
new young volunteers who bring their thinking into the mainstream before long.  I think the 
leadership has become skewed toward the academic community. 
I remember writing on the topic of how Council liked to spend its time in one of my 
president’s letters.  I found it difficult to manage Council meetings to complete their agendas.  
We were constantly being sidetracked into procedural issues such as who has the right to vote, 
whether someone is a valid regional representative or SIG officer, whether various constituencies 
had proper representation on Council, and the like.  I would try to get the people who wanted to 
talk about these things to submit them as agenda items in the next Council meeting, but they 
wanted to talk now.  I found it frustrating. 
This tendency seemed to affect all Council members, whether they were academic or not.  
Maybe it was a sign of a still immature organization.  I think the situation is much better now.  
The Council and Executive Committee work through their agendas in a businesslike fashion. 
 
NORBERG:  Did it sometimes seem like it was not worth it? 
 
DENNING:  I wouldn’t say that.  I saw many worthwhile things ACM could do.  I remember 
writing a president’s letter laying out a series of worthwhile programs ACM could undertake and 




NORBERG:  Did this in any way serve your agenda? 
 
DENNING:  No, it wasn’t even my agenda.  I pointed to timely issues we could be discussing.  
The issues all had to do with the way ACM interacts with the outside world and not with itself, 
things that could produce value out there in the world.  If we could just pick three of these 
outward-looking issues and discuss them, we’d be doing far more than when we discuss inward-
looking regional representative voting issues. 
 
NORBERG:  And did any of this take? 
 
DENNING:  No, not really.  Some of them thought I was insulting them by saying their favorite 
issues were not worthwhile.  A few said, “You’re absolutely right.  We should be talking about 
those kinds of issues.” 
 
NORBERG:  And then went back to the old ones. 
 
DENNING:  This has been a persistent problem.  I have an unpopular view about its source.  I 
think that ACM is dominated by academics.  I love my academic colleagues, but we collectively 
give priority to the things that make the most sense in our world, like publications and 
conferences.  Things that make sense to non-academics (such as software developers and 
application designers) such as Web services, friends networks, wikis, and podcasts are not 
considered as seriously as new publications.  I visited Google a couple weeks ago and found 
myself asking, “How could ACM be relevant to the Google community?” 
 
NORBERG:  How can they expect a professional group to do that? 
 
DENNING:  Well, a good example is the ACM professional development center.  It took us the 
longest time to create that!  Having a major professional development program as a member 
benefit was under discussion for at least 15 or 20 years during the time I have been around.  We 
finally got it done.  The online ACM professional development center has a whole bunch of 
really good courses in it.  ACM accomplished this by going online and partnering with Sony and 
other companies who put together good online courses.  The center has been very popular with 
the members. 
Many SIG conferences are designed for developers and attract those people.  Some of the 
SIGs record their preconference tutorial and make them available as podcasts after the event.  
ACM is just starting to get really good at designing and delivering online services.  They have a 
first rate IT staff.  These new services have been slow in coming because they are not 
publications services. 
 
NORBERG:  I remember a project that Sanford began around 1995 to try to do history on the 
Web.  It was funded by Sloan Foundation.  I went to one of the evaluation meetings in 1999, and 
learned about one of the stumbling blocks experienced by the historians who had been involved 
in these developments.  Eight sites were all participating, each with a different focus on the 
historical issues.  The best historian of the group, a Stanford professor, said that they had not 
realized at the outset that they lacked the technical skills to build the Web sites they envisioned.  
They had not budgeted for the technical help needed.  By the time they realized they needed it, 
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the project was almost over.  Now, how does this sort of thing play out in the ACM environment 
you’re talking about?  How does a professional development center come into being?  You have 
the technical help, but do you have the management help?  By “management” I mean the people 
in management schools as opposed to just hiring a director to develop it.  Did it take a while for 
ACM to understand what it needed to do in order to generate such a thing as a professional 
development center? 
 
DENNING:  It was a slow process.  Several things had to come together.  One was a plan that 
was vetted through focus groups and other surveys so that ACM would be convinced there was a 
business case for professional development.  Another was quality control -- there were numerous 
offerings of low quality out there and ACM did not want to be associated with low quality 
professional development.  ACM had been the professional development arena for years -- 
almost completely through the local chapters.  The conversations were about how to “take it 
international” through publications or online services.  The turning point came when we saw that 
there were some online services with very good offerings.  We made inquiries and discovered 
that they would be interested in partnering with the ACM. 
Money was always an issue in these discussions.  When I was first a member of Council 
in 1970, ACM had a policy that limited editors and professional development instructors from 
receiving honoraria of more than $300 a day.  Many people felt that ACM members should not 
be charged a lot to line a lecturer’s pockets.  It was many years before this policy was changed, 
but it discouraged people with good material from presenting it to ACM audiences.  I thought 
there was a connection between that policy and the inability to get high quality material. 
Some of the professional development conversations speculated about doing video 
recordings of lectures at SIG conferences and making those recordings available to members.  
This had its own problems.  The cost of recording a lecture on video tape was pretty high.  Some 
of the lecturers would not allow the recordings unless they got a royalty from ACM, something 
that ACM was not willing to do at the time. 
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Others speculated about approaching high quality companies, like the Teaching 
Company, and entering partnership agreements to make their materials available to the members.  
This was not attractive to many because they specialized in college level courses and not the 
bread-and-butter stuff that members would look for in ACM professional development. 
The CACM once had a section called “self assessment”.  You could take a quiz in an area 
and rate your level of knowledge.  You could get references to the portions where you were 
weak.  A self-assessment committee created these tests once or twice a year.  It was fairly 
popular, but a not very active way to provide some professional development.  Eventually it fell 
by the wayside because the work of preparing the self-assessments and getting them through a 
review process got too high as the computing field kept expanding.  The committee disbanded 
when finally no one wanted to be on it. 
This is just a flavor of the long and endless discussions that went on over the years about 




NORBERG:  I can see why the companies with good online material were an attractive partner 
for ACM in the late 1990s.  ACM no longer had to worry about the quality content. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  ACM made deals with them to offer their courses through the professional 
development center at a member’s price.  It helped the company gain visibility in the big ACM 
market and it helped the member get access to high quality courses.  Everyone won.  That is why 
our professional development center finally exists and is a success. 
Another issue that often came up in the 1990s was professional certification.  Should our 
professional development efforts be limited to offering courses, or should we also offer 
certificates?  Should we give those who complete a course simply a completion certificate, or 
should we try to test them and certify that they are competent with the basic knowledge?  This 
turned into a hotly debated issue. 
 
NORBERG:  But didn’t ACM have some experience in that area with ICCP (Institute for 
Certification of Computing Professionals)? 
 
DENNING:  The ICCP is a separate organization.  ACM had a representative there, but did not 
participate in the development of certification exams.  Moreover, ICCP had a limited selection of 
areas in which they certified, such as programming and data processing. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, that’s right.  That, I understand. 
 
DENNING:  Java is an example where ACM members would be interested but ICCP would not.  
Where does someone turn to be certified as a competent Java programmer?   ICCP won’t help 
them.  What about network management?  Security analysis?  Wireless configuration?  There are 
numerous areas of potential certification. 
The debates around whether ACM should get directly involved in certification were often 
contentious.  Some did not want to expose ACM to legal liability for certifying someone who did 
not really deserve it.  Some did not think any written exam would be adequate to tell if someone 
is competent.  Some thought it would be dreadfully expensive to do certification right.  Some 
thought that our knowledge of some areas, like software engineering, is not deep enough to 
permit meaningful certification; a certificate would enable false hope about someone’s 
capabilities to produce safe and reliable software. 
 
NORBERG:  Didn’t Council pass a resolution declaring that ACM would not get involved in 
professional certification? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, in the mid 1990s ACM was invited to join IEEE and help the State of Texas 
establish a Professional Engineer (PE) certification in software engineering.  That brought the 
whole debate to a head.  Those who believed that certification is not possible in a young field 
and would give false hope about people’s capabilities as software engineers held a slight 
majority in Council.  They passed a resolution that ACM would not participate in any way with 
certification efforts.  No one has ever proposed to revisit that. 
 
NORBERG:  Let’s come back to something simpler.  The ACM offers courses through its 




DENNING:  No, it’s part of a member benefit. 
 
NORBERG:  Let’s back up still further and look at the various professional subgroups that might 
be interested in ACM SIGs, publications, or professional development offerings.  Are there 
groups that benefit more than others from affiliation with ACM?  The academic community 
might be an example. 
 
DENNING:  You say a subgroup.  What would be an example? 
 
NORBERG:  Well, say, SIGPLAN (programming languages).  They’ve sponsored a number of 
conferences that appealed much more broadly than just to people who are in programming 
languages.  For example, SIGPLAN, with NSF help, sponsored three History of Programming 
Languages conferences.  Is programming languages a favored group?  Numerical analysis?  
Artificial Intelligence? 
 
DENNING:  You’re suggesting that the areas in which SIGs have formed are favored areas.  I 
don’t think so.  ACM has a strong egalitarian streak.  “All technical areas are welcome to have a 
SIG” has been the prevailing attitude.  ACM has over three dozen SIGs and welcomes the 
formation of new ones.  It’s a bottom-up process started by groups of members who want to band 
together and help others with the same interests. 
I agree that the academic community has done very well over the years.  The software 
developer community has fared less well but is catching up in recent years as ACM learns how 
to serve them. 
 
Computation and Grand Challenges in Computing 
 
NORBERG:  I’m not going to refute any of that.  One of the earliest SIGs was SIGNUM 
(numerical computing).  At that stage of the field numerical computation was very important.  
We did not know how to solve the differential equations of physical models very well and our 
algorithms often gave incorrect results because of accumulated round off error.  This field was 
important to the ACM readership in the 1960s and 1970s, but it does not seem as important 
today.  SIGNUM is gone and there is no replacement in the form of a scientific computing SIG. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, indeed, the field has evolved over the years and the set of SIGs reflects the 
changes.  In the beginning years of computing, numerical analysis was extremely important 
because at the time, because we (or more properly, our ancestors) realized that computers don’t 
really implement real numbers.  They implement a real number by rounding it off to the nearest 
number represented in the bits of the machine.  That guarantees there will be errors between 
what the computer says the answer is, and what can be observed in the world.  It was a huge 
research problem to design algorithms that would not accumulate round off errors over time, but 
would instead cancel them.  The results were some very sophisticated algorithms that were 
collected into mathematical software libraries.  Today we just use the libraries and don’t do 
research on error propagation in algorithms. 
The interest in building mathematical models of physical processes and using computers 
to make predictions based on the models remained strong.  Much of the parallel computation 
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research in the 1970s and 1980s was focused on how to use parallel processes to solve 
mathematical models of science.  That area came to be called computational science. 
In the 1980s, propelled by luminaries such as Physics Nobel Laureate Ken Wilson, 
computational science became a national movement.  The government agencies banded together 
to form a high performance communication and computing initiative (HPCCI) to apply their 
research dollars to the conquest of “grand challenge problems” in science and engineering.  An 
example of a grand challenge science problem is protein folding and its application to drug 
design.  An example of an engineering challenge is aircraft design.  Eventually the HPCCI was 
recognized by a law passed by the US Congress in 1991, sometimes called the “Al Gore” law 
because he championed it. 
Ken Wilson expressed considerable dissatisfaction at the apparent lack of interest in 
computational science among computer scientists.  The very people he most wanted to 
collaborate with were apathetic.  In exasperation, he proposed that universities set up their own 
computational science departments.  To heck with the CS departments! 
 
NORBERG:  Did you agree with that assessment? 
 
DENNING:  No.  I was at NASA-Ames when he said these things.  I headed up RIACS, the 
Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science.  Our mission was to get computer scientists 
collaborating on NASA science problems.   We became very good at computational science from 
the CS side. 
Since I knew from the RIACS experience that this could be successful, it made no sense 
to me to try and split computer science and computational science apart into separate 
departments.  This proposal became a major subject of discussion.  Gordon Bell accepted the 
position of CISE (computer science and engineering) director at NSF so that he could define 
research programs that would draw computer scientists into collaboration with other scientists.  
He said, “Computer scientists, like all other researchers, follow the money!”  Gordon’s HPCC 
initiative was successful, computer scientists did get involved with the grand challenge problems, 
and the pressure to form separate departments of computational science faded. 
 
NORBERG:  Indeed.  [Laughs] 
 
ACM and Broad Public Policy Participation 
 
DENNING:  Around the same time, the ACM leadership decided that ACM ought to be more 
involved in policy conversations.  Whether the US government should encourage the formation 
of computational science departments, as Ken Wilson proposed, was an example.  They felt that 
the only way to have an influence would be to establish an ACM Washington office.  But the 
cost of that was more than ACM wanted to bear. 
An alternative was for the ACM to work with an older organization called the Computer 
Science Board, which had been formed by the chairs of computer science departments around 
1972 to run an annual conference called the Computer Science Conference.  The CSB was 
generally interested in all sorts of policy issues affecting education.  The CSB eventually became 
the CRA -- Computing Research Association.  I don’t remember when the conversion took place. 
I was a proponent of ACM’s working with CRA, and letting CRA be the computing 
policy voice.  CRA could, in fact, represent the IEEE CS (computer society) as well, and be 
more effective by presenting a united front.  This idea caught on.  ACM, IEEE CS, and SIAM 
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(Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics) sent representatives (and maybe some money) 
to CRA in return for CRA being our common “Washington voice”.  ACM liked this solution 
since they got the “voice” at less cost than going it alone. 
 
Relations with other Professional Societies 
 
NORBERG: Speaking of professional societies or groups outside of ACM, computing as we 
know it has always been a multifaceted field.  Even during your tenure as president of ACM, the 
field was represented by a number of different groups.  In the 1970s, the four most important 
were AAAI, AFIPS, DPMA, and IEEE CS.  Were the relations of ACM with any or all of these 
groups at the time good?  Or if they’re not good, why not? 
 
DENNING: Let’s start with AAAI (Association for Advancement of Artificial Intelligence).  
They were formed to pull together everyone in AI.  ACM’s SIGART had not achieved 
dominance in the area (as has SIGGRAPH in graphics).  Many SIGART leaders were also part 
of AAAI.  I don’t remember too many interactions with AAAI during my tenure.  Although there 
was some rivalry, it was not a source of either much friction or new actions. 
The DPMA (Data Processing Managers Association) was another “sister” organization 
that we interacted with frequently.  I remember people like Bob Bemer and Walter Carlson were 
very active with DPMA, as was our ACM SIGBDP (business data processing).  DPMA was 
formed in 1962 and established the Certificate Data Processing (CDP) professional examination 
program.  At some point the DMPA spun off the CDP into Institute for Certification of 
Computer Professionals (ICCP) to administer the exam and encourage its industry acceptance.  
In 1996 the DPMA was transformed into the Association for Information Technology 
Professionals (AITP), which has a much broader scope.  I have not tracked the relationship with 
AITP.  ACM had a very close relationship with ICCP including a representative on their board 
appointed by ACM Council and later by the ACM Education Board. 
The IEEE CS (IEEE Computer Society) is a “sister” organization that is part of IEEE 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers).  The IEEE has a vast membership of 
engineers worldwide.  They have a number of internal “societies” that serve them in the same 
way that SIGs serve ACM.  The computer society was the one closest to ACM.  There was a lot 
of rivalry between ACM and IEEE CS.  For example, we had approximately the same number of 
members (around 80,000 at the time) and seesawed as to which was the “largest computing 
society”.  We had many competing publications.  Because of the rivalries, it was not always easy 
to form collaborations on issues where it was obvious that we should collaborate.  Some of the 
successful collaborations included the CRA, ICCP, and depending on the issue the AFIPS.  We 
can return to the IEEE CS later if you like. 
By far the biggest of the four during my time was AFIPS.  AFIPS was an umbrella 
organization that included representatives from all US societies claiming an association with 
information processing.  AFIPS had a convoluted voting scheme that weighted votes according 
to the size of the affiliated society’s membership.  ACM and the IEEE CS were the two most 
influential members.  Several ACM presidents had gone on to become presidents of AFIPS.  
During my time on the executive committee (1978-1982), relationships between ACM and 
AFIPS were a constant discussion item. 
The AFIPS had been formed originally to produce two major annual conferences for the 
entire computing field -- the Spring Joint Computer Conference (SJCC) and Fall Joint Computer 
Conference (FJCC).  When I was a graduate student, it was a prestigious accomplishment to get 
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a paper accepted at either and present it there.  My very first technical paper -- “Effects of 
scheduling on file memory operations”, an outgrowth of my masters thesis -- was published in 
the proceedings of the 1967 SJCC.  AFIPS gave me a best paper award in 1972 for my daring 
proposal that operating systems be considered part of the computer science core.  Since AFIPS 
helped me get started in this way, I had a warm feeling for the organization well before I came to 
the ACM executive committee.  It was a mainstay of the computing field. 
When I became a member of Council I started learning that AFIPS was a constant 
discussion item for a different reason: money.  You see, in running its wildly successful 
conferences, AFIPS took in a lot of money (mostly from exhibits), and distributed that money 
back to the member societies through a distribution formula proportional to the number of votes 
the society had in the AFIPS board.  Every year ACM received a major distribution from AFIPS, 
often several hundred thousand dollars.  Given that ACM was always teetering on the edges of 
bankruptcy, that was a very important check.  Many ACM leaders importuned the Council to 
draft budgets that did not assume AFIPS would make a distribution -- after all, who can tell how 
successful the next SJCC or FJCC would be? -- but Council frequently adopted budgets that 
required the distribution for solvency.  Fortunately, AFIPS came through every year and we were 
OK. 
I also learned that it was not actually AFIPS making all the distributions.  AFIPS had 
established a subsidiary NCCB (National Computer Conference Board) to manage the 
conferences and handle the monies.  This allowed AFIPS the parent organization to be a tax 
exempt organization.  I believe that the charter of NCC was written so that the two major 
partners -- ACM and IEEE CS -- got half the conference proceeds off the top, and the rest was 
sent to AFIPS.  AFIPS used those proceeds for AFIPS projects and then distributed the 
remainder to its members.  Thus, ACM got a quarter of the conference distribution plus a share 
of the AFIPS half.  It was pretty complex. 
The NCC revenues helped AFIPS do things on behalf of the computing field that no one 
of the member societies could afford.  The most prominent example for me was the Abacus 
project, which we discussed earlier.  AFIPS put up a considerable sum to create the prototype 
Abacus issue in 1979, with the intention of creating a new publication venture. 
Somewhere around 1980 AFIPS wanted to move into a new headquarters building and 
located a good deal on a property near Dulles Airport.   There was a big discussion of whether 
ACM should support that, since it would reduce the AFIPS distributions to ACM.  Eventually 
ACM decided to support AFIPS in getting its new building. 
All this worked fine, in spite of its complexity -- until the money started drying up.  The 
SJCC and FJCC conferences peaked out and started to decline.  The NCC distributions started to 
shrink.  AFIPS “cash cow” was no longer producing all the milk needed.  AFIPS could not 
distribute funds back to its member societies.  Member societies started getting into spats over 
the dwindling money stream.  The smaller societies were mad at the ACM and IEEE CS for 
taking so much from the distribution, leaving pittances for them.  The AFIPS board was 
increasingly gridlocked. 
Eventually, the whole thing fell apart.  AFIPS does not exist any more. 
 
NORBERG:  Not since 1989. 
 
DENNING:  It always seemed to me like the United Nations.  Complex and convoluted voting 
rules to satisfy various political agendas.  Just like the UN, few in computing quite understood 
88 
 
how AFIPS worked.  When it finally collapsed of its own weight, I don’t think anybody in ACM 
shed a tear. 
 
NORBERG:  Didn’t they shed a big tear when the $100,000 distributions dried up? 
 
DENNING:  In the heyday, the annual distributions were several hundred thousand.  But the 
amounts had been trickling down for years.  It was easy to see that the end was coming. 
 
NORBERG:  In the 1980s, the ACM finally got away from its close brushes with insolvency and 
was trying to build its reserves.  The AFIPS distributions were being contributed to reserves, so it 
had to be a problem when the distributions dried up. 
 
DENNING:  Yup, the AFIPS cash cow died.  ACM had to learn to build reserves in other ways. 
 
NORBERG:  Wasn’t the president of ACM also an ex-officio member of the Board of Directors 
of AFIPS? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I remember going to a few AFIPS meetings representing the ACM then. 
 
NORBERG:  But you didn’t see this as a focus of your administration. 
 
DENNING:  True.  Despite my earlier warmth for the organization, I was put off by the strange, 
non-egalitarian arrangement of voting rights on the board and distribution formulas.  I saw a lot 
of internal bickering already happening on the AFIPS board and concluded they were not as 
powerful an organization as I had once thought.  I didn’t put a lot of attention on it myself.  I 
made sure our representatives were there, but I didn’t spend a lot of personal energy on that. 
 
NORBERG:  Come back to the IEEE Computer Society. 
 
DENNING:  IEEE CS has always been a kind of competitor to the ACM in the sense that we’ve 
had similar membership numbers over the years.  There’s a substantial overlap of members.  I 
think maybe about 20% of our members belong to the other group.  A long time ago, ACM 
negotiated a joint membership agreement with IEEE (the parent of the CS) -- an ACM member 
got $5 off their ACM dues if they were a member of IEEE (not the CS).  It was reciprocal.  I 
believe it was negotiated back when dues were $25, at which time it was a substantial discount.  
Today, the $5 agreement remains, but the base dues are over $100.  I remember that the IEEE CS 
people would complain about the ACM discount -- the IEEE implemented it by deducting the 
discounts from the annual allocation to the CS. 
 
NORBERG:  Sizeable amount in the beginning, but not a percentage discount. 
 
DENNING:  True.  As a percentage, it started out close to 20% and today it’s less than 5%. 
 
NORBERG:  Were there any joint concerns between the two associations? 
 
DENNING:  The two groups tried to cooperate on any number of issues over the years, but it 
was not always easy.  Let me give an example.  When I was editor of the Communications, we 
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created a project around 1985 to do a special issue of the Communications on the frontiers of 
computing.  We would publish a series of papers on how computing is pushing back the frontiers 
in various fields of engineering and science.  IEEE CS agreed and we formed a joint committee.  
We invited authors and put together the special issue.  We worked out the details of what our 
respective headquarters staffs would do in the actual production and distribution of the issue.  
Production turned out to be a struggle because their editorial staff didn’t give it the same priority 
we did, and they just didn’t get the tasks done that they said they were going to do.  ACM staff 
wound up doing over 90% of the work. 
 
NORBERG:  Oh, that’s too bad. 
 
DENNING:  There have been other complaints of that type within the ACM.  I don’t know what 
complaints they’ve had about ACM over at IEEE, but we’ve had persistent problems on trying to 
make these joint things work.  I don’t know why. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s like two people writing a book, isn’t it?  One tends to do more work than the 
other just by the very nature of the activity. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  But it often seemed that the IEEE CS did far less than half the work and took 
more than half the credit for the result.  I always wondered if they had a similar story about 
ACM.  I never really understood why because we both had similar objectives. 
The success of joint ventures seemed to depend heavily on the rapport of the project 
leaders in ACM and IEEE CS.  Over a number of years I had become good friends with Mike 
Mulder, who was a top leader in the CS in their education and publication areas.  Mike and I 
often had phone conversations about how we could cut the red tape on either side and get our 
projects done.  And then when Mike got ill and died of cancer, the IEEE lost a powerhouse and 
the ACM lost a friend.  Subsequent joint education projects haven’t been quite as easy to make 
happen as they were when Mike was there. 
 
ACM’s Roles in the Period 1970 to 1990 
 
NORBERG:  All right.  I have some new questions that might sound as if they’re duplicates of 
what you already said, but I’d like to approach in a different context.  I’m interested to know 
what you thought ACM’s role was in the 1970s and 1980s.  We can go to finished documents 
and see what the organization came down with in the end, but what were you thinking about 
this? 
 
DENNING:  I viewed ACM as having the potential to do for the computing field what the IEEE 
had already done in the engineering field: to be a broadly representative professional society with 
a wide range of very relevant publications, conferences, special interest groups and chapters, and 
also involvement in certain types of national and maybe even international policy issues.  I 
viewed ACM as a teenager, and the IEEE as the 30-year-old successful adult.  I wanted to grow 
up to be like them.  I was inclined to support ACM involvement in activities that led in that 
direction.  This is why, to me, issues like the voting rights inside the regions were of secondary 
importance.  I learned that a lot of ACM people didn’t see it that way.  They thought that the 
ACM’s job was to respond to the needs of its constituencies and that the Council was the place 
where those constituencies were represented.  Many seemed to view ACM as a political 
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organization that should help those in need even if we couldn’t see our way clear to paying for 
the help.  In that type of organization, the rules of voting would be very important.  Some of 
them thought I was an academic idealist trying to shape ACM to suit academic interests and not 
the interests of other constituencies. 
 
NORBERG:  Summarize for me, then, what the principal functions were in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
DENNING:  I put my priorities on publications, SIGs, and education.  You can see that was how 
I spent my time.  The early 1970s were my SIG years.  I then devoted more and more time to the 
publications, eventually being the editor of the Communications (1983-1992) and chair of the 
publications board (1992-1998).  I also spent a lot of time on education matters including helping 
to start SIGCSE, working with the CS department chairs (through the Computer Science Board) 
on the “seed corn” issue in the early 1980s, and chairing the committee that produced the 
influential report “Computing as a Discipline” in 1985.  I was a fan of grassroots power -- the 
opportunity for members to form groups (like SIGs) to carry out mutual activities of interest to 
them, with general support from the ACM organization.  I thought that was the way to develop 
identifiable communities of expertise that ACM or other people could tap. 
 
NORBERG:  In general, do you think the other members of the Council felt the same way about 
that list you just gave?  
 
DENNING:  I think they agreed at the strategic level in the importance of publications, SIGs, 
and education to ACM’s future.  We had disagreements over the relative priorities and budget 
items in these areas. 
You have to keep in mind that I was a seasoned academic well into the 1980s, with some 
leavening imposed by my stint at NASA Ames Research Center beginning in 1983.  I could be 
pretty dogmatic about advancing an academic point of view, and I’m sure that left others feeling 
that I did not understand how the world looked to them.  They were probably right.  For 
example, I did not have first hand experience with the problems businesses faced in computing.  
I didn’t take a lot of interest to find out what it was like to be an IBM or Control Data employee 
in computing.  I didn’t take a lot of time to find out what Digital Equipment Corporation felt 
about ACM publications.  I agreed that these were important questions, but relied on others to 
make the actual contacts. 
 
NORBERG:  Who did want to pursue them vigorously? 
 
DENNING:  I thought that the business oriented people on the Council would bring us that 
perspective. 
 
NORBERG:  People like Walter Carlson, I assume. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  How does ACM help with the computing business community in the United 
States? 
 
NORBERG:  And should it? 
 




Denning as President 
 
NORBERG:  As you came in as president, did you have any initiatives that you wanted to see 
instituted into either the planning process of ACM or in short-term projects that could be 
accomplished during your two to four years as president and past president? 
 
DENNING:  When I came in as president one of the big issues that was on the national table at 
the time was an academic issue that affected industry.  A lot of people were concerned that the 
industry need for people in the systems areas -- for example large-scale programming, systems 
architecture, operating systems, graphics, or networks -- exceeded the university’s ability to 
produce these people. 
Two things were happening to limit the supply.  One was a drift inside the CS 
departments toward theoretical computer science.  The standards for mathematical publishing 
tended to dominate the thinking about promotion and tenure, and it was difficult to get systems 
oriented faculty promoted.  Thus they tended to be in short supply.  The other aspect was 
aggressive hiring of system faculty by companies in need of the expertise.  For these two reasons 
the headcount of system faculty was diminishing and we were worried that we would not be able 
to produce the graduates industry wanted. 
The NSF was also concerned.  They were looking for ways to stimulate faculty interest in 
experimental and systems research.  At the time I was working with Larry Landweber and others 
to propose to NSF that they sponsor the CSNET, which we have already discussed.  Kent Curtis 
at NSF was interested in this because it was one way to stimulate interest in systems and 
networks.  NSF was looking to the professional societies to propose initiatives that would help 
reverse these trends. 
I used the pulpit of the president’s office to help promote awareness of the issue and 
search for solutions.  I wrote a number of articles about this issue in the ACM President’s Letter 
space of the Communications -- “What is experimental computer science?” (October 1980), 
“Productivity in crisis” (November 1980), and “Eating our seed corn” (June 1981). 
 
NORBERG:  I especially choose one of these papers about the ACM Executive Committee 
position in response to the Feldman report to NSF. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, I helped the Executive Committee when I was vice president to put together an 
ACM executive committee position paper, and it had some influence.  I think we put the word 
“crisis” in the title. 
 
NORBERG:  That is always a good attention-getter.  
 
DENNING:  At that time, I felt like we were in danger of losing an important piece of computer 
science, the experimental piece. 
 
NORBERG:  So there are two issues here—not just the production, but also the experimental. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  As I suggested a minute ago, we were having trouble retaining system faculty, 
which put at jeopardy our ability to educate students and conduct research in systems.  And this 
was exacerbated by an internal “identity crisis”.  Do we, as a field, want to have experimental 
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computer science as an important component of our field?  The Executive Committee joined me 
in declaring, yes, we do want experimental computer science to be an important part of our field.  
We do not want to become a purely mathematical science field. 
 
NORBERG:  You also wrote an article, “A Discipline in Crisis”, in the Communications of June 
1981. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  That was the culmination of a related project with the Computer Science 
Board (now CRA).  Every even-numbered year, the CS department chairs convened in 
Snowbird, Utah, in July to consider issues that affect the CS academic community.  In 1980 the 
big issue was the “crisis in experimental computer science” that had been investigated by a group 
headed by Jerome Feldman.  The Feldman report documented many systems contributions that 
the university community had contributed to computing (for example, the invention of time 
sharing) and claimed that the ability of universities to continue this kind of work was severely 
threatened.  The CS department chairs decided to take a public stand endorsing what Feldman 
had said and added new ideas to the mix.  I was there as head of the CS department at Purdue.  I 
worked with a committee (Ed Feigenbaum, Paul Gilmore, Tony Hearn, Bob Ritchie, and Joe 
Traub) to draft a position statement for the entire group of chairs to endorse.  I did most of the 
writing and was declared the editor.  Our report -- “A discipline in crisis” -- was published in the 
June 1981 Communications.  We called it the “Snowbird Report”. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay.  Did NSF help? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, they did.  NSF subsequently created a research program they called 
Coordinated Experimental Research—CER—and created grants that went to various university 
centers.  These were centers that specialized in experimental systems research and attracted 
faculty and students.  It was very successful at attracting attention to systems research in the CS 
departments.  I think they ran that program for about five years or so. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  That is usually their timeline.  But the experimental science issue never really 
went away. 
 
DENNING:  You’re right, it never really went away.  Although there was research funding for 
system work, the faculty were still ambivalent about promoting system faculty because they did 
not fit the traditional model of disseminating their work through journal articles.  They wrote 
occasional journal articles to be sure, but they favored conferences, where they could report out 
their work far sooner.  They also distributed their software.  The amount of experimental work 
and software programming diminished their capacity to publish journal articles. 
That issue popped up again in the mid 1990s.  At the behest of Bill Wulf, who was at 
NSF at the time, the National Research Council (NRC) formed a study committee to examine the 
promotion question and make recommendations for promotion guidelines for system faculty.  
Larry Snyder chaired the group.  Despite the report and the publicity the NRC gave it on release, 
I frankly don’t think it made much difference.  I would say that today systems faculty get 
promoted as well as anyone else, but that has been a process of acceptance from within. 
 
NORBERG:  When I entered the computer science department (I came in with tenure!), I already 
observed differences with other fields.  Conference papers were significant, given much more 
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weight than physicists or chemists would in their fields.  Participation in professional activities 
was important.  It counted heavily in your favor if you were appointed chair of a major 
conference, because that was taken as a sign of stature in your field.  I never saw that in other 
disciplines before, even ones I was in or ones that I know something about from historical study.  
How did this come about?  Do you have any idea?  Do you see it the same way I just described 
it? 
 
DENNING:  I know what you’re talking about.  When I was department head at Purdue, I had 
the annual duty to represent the department on the school of science tenure committee, which 
consisted of the chairs of the eight science departments plus another department representative.  
Computer science was definitely following different standards from most of the other fields.  I 
had a lot of defending to do!  I discovered that the name of the game was peer recognition.  
Therefore I emphasized how these apparently non-standard things are signs of strong peer 
recognition. 
In tenure committees I participate in today as chair of the CS department at NPS, I find a 
much more tolerant attitude.  The chairs of the other departments ask first what the criteria in our 
field are, and then they demand that we demonstrate that our candidates meet or exceed those 
criteria. 
At Purdue, I experienced the approbation of the other departments for not adhering to the 
standards of science in deciding whom to promote.   Now the conversation is quite different.  It 
goes like this: “We understand that in your field, you place a lot of emphasis on conference 
publication.  We understand that the reason for that is that your field is rapidly changing, and the 
long delays waiting in a publication queue for a journal are unacceptable in your field for 
communication and research.  We know that you have some conferences that have very low 
acceptance rates, and we’d like to know which ones they are and how your people are doing with 
regard to those.” 
 
NORBERG:  I would imagine that it’s difficult to get the dean’s support for your cases, since 
most deans have not come from computer science. 
 
DENNING:  As I said, once I learned that peer recognition is the name of the game, I made sure 
our cases were full of evidence about peer recognition.  The dean and the promotion committee 
accepted these arguments.  Today, it is much better and there are more deans with computer 
science background. 
By the way, I personally don’t accept the argument that a candidate’s being chair of a 
major conference makes him or her more tenureable.  I’d play that down.  I’d say the candidate’s 
an involved professional, which we want.  The candidate has helped promote his or her own 
stature by doing this.  But professional service is just a piece of the whole picture. 
 
NORBERG:  We’ve entered a different area now in terms of computer science and education 
and training as a general topic.  You’ve mentioned the manpower shortages that faculty feared—
would they have enough faculty over the years?  You mentioned the Snowbird Report.  You 
mentioned that experimental computer science being in some difficulty.  What could ACM have 
done about these things, anyway? 
 
DENNING:  Well, we thought that ACM could add its voice to all the other voices.  This will 
help convince NSF there was strong community support for their involvement.  When the ACM 
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speaks up and says, “As representatives of a significant community, here’s what we have to say,” 
they listen to that.  That’s what we wanted.  We wanted our voice to be heard and we hoped it 
would be influential in helping to steer things to a good outcome. 
 
NORBERG:  What are the outcomes that came from this?  I think we’re already talking about 
those. 
 
DENNING:  I mentioned that we helped achieve the outcome of NSF sponsoring experimental 
computer science research.  I think the support that ACM showed also helped the NSF agree to 
sponsor the CSNET project, which benefited the entire computing research community. 
As president, I helped the ACM take positions on national issues.  You have seen 
president’s letters I wrote about government proposals to limit scientific publication.  I think 
those helped a little because they helped show of Congress how the proposals might hurt 
scientific research. 
I also helped my successor, David Brandin, with the Cryptography Study Group.  By 
1980, the computer science community had achieved considerable visibility in cryptography.  
The NSA (National Security Agency) was concerned that published works about cryptographic 
systems might help enemies develop stronger cryptosystems and make it harder for NSA to 
protect US interests.  The NSA director, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, agreed to form a study 
group with representatives of the professional societies to see whether they could devise some 
guidelines for crypto publications.  I think he personally favored requiring authors to get NSA 
review before they published, but he was open to other proposals.  Dave Brandin was our 
representative on the study group. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, it did come to a head during his administration, though you had something to 
say about it. 
 
DENNING:  The NSA was trying to get the society publishers to voluntarily agree to restrict 
certain publication on the grounds that it might affect national security in cryptography.  We 
didn’t like that one bit, but we agreed to participate in a study group to look at the issue and see 
if there was a basis for doing that.  I think most of the work was done during Brandin’s 
administration. 
 
NORBERG:  It goes back further.  Jean Sammet appointed a committee in 1974 on privacy.  She 
wanted the committee to prepare an essay on the subject of privacy that ACM could use publicly 
as its position.  McCracken was chair of the Committee on Computers and Public Policy, and 
Peter Lykos was chair of the Special Interest Group on Computers and Society.  I bring this up 
because the intent of Sammet’s action was to have these two groups work together to come out 
with some sort of a reasonable document that could be used.  This, it seems, was at the same time 
that AFIPS was interested in this problem, too, and had appointed a committee under Willis 
Ware.  But Jean believed, as it comes out in her letters, that Ware wasn’t really attending to the 
task.  The committee had not met, so she was giving him some advice on what he ought to do.  
But at the same time, she was giving advice to McCracken and to Lykos.  What’s interesting 
about this is that you wrote a letter as well in February of 1976, having to do with an ACM 
position on issues of computers and society.  As I read this document, you were opposed to 
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DENNING:  I believed that ACM had the most to contribute in areas that directly related to its 
emerging technical expertise.  It was not a very well established field yet.  I thought that the 
power of ACM’s voice would come from its having gained respect for technical expertise in 
computing.  I thought it was premature for ACM to devote significant resources to political 
issues.  I saw those issues as a distraction from the hard work that lay ahead for ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you maintain that position through the last 30 years? 
 
DENNING:  Yes and no.  As I have suggested before, I thought ACM had more than its fair 
share of political activists in Council and volunteer leadership positions.  These people aspired to 
have ACM become the spokes-society for their political agendas.  It happens that I did not agree 
with many of the political agendas.  I knew there were others among the members and leadership 
who also did not agree.  But I did not endorse activism in favor of the political agendas that I 
favored.  Given all the dissention I saw happening as people argued over their political positions, 
and all the energy it sapped from volunteers, I wanted ACM to be free of political activism.  A 
sort of Switzerland among professional societies.  I wanted ACM to be a place where computing 
people of all stripes could convene and do technical and educational work together without 
fearing approbation because of their political beliefs. 
I thought it was especially destructive for a young society with big aspirations to get 
involved in political activism. 
I also thought that it was risky for the executive committee to take public positions on 
political issues because they would not be speaking for all members.  I strongly favored offering 
up analyses of public policy situations from an ACM perspective, where we could discuss pros 
and cons and avoid as much as possible offending any member’s political views. 
I realized that this was a minority position but I did my best to steer political discussions 
toward analysis rather than polemics.  I always had mixed feelings about this because I also saw 
the budding power of ACM’s voice and wanted to use it.  Dan McCracken and I had many 
discussions about this.  Although we were on opposite political sides on most issues, we found 
common ground in ACM’s taking positions based on its domain expertise rather than its politics. 
 
NORBERG:  Would it be presumptuous of me to ask you what your political position was at the 
time?  Liberal, conservative, middle of the road, whatever?  On these issues.  I’m not speaking 
about political preference. 
 
DENNING:  I suppose my political positions at the time were more ill-formed than they are now, 
but I was generally very suspicious of government involvement in a lot of things.  The 
government seemed to be capable of screwing things up more than helping, and I thought ACM 
was playing with fire by inviting the government to start nibbling around the things that mattered 
to the computing profession because they might give us regulations that we would then later on 
regret. 
 




DENNING:  Yes, for me it’s a mixed bag.  At the risk of overemphasis, I would say the two 
biggest things that motivated my response were, first, my feeling that ACM was still immature 
among professional societies and its future credibility depended on staying focused on 
developing itself in its expertise, and second, my extreme discomfort about trying to represent 
political views of members that I hadn’t polled and I had no idea what they’d think.  I thought 
political activism should be a secondary interest of the ACM.  It didn’t seem to fit the main 
thrust of the ACM charter. 
 
NORBERG:  That could be the same for any professional society, then. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  The ACM has been granted a special tax status of 501(c)(3), which means it’s 
supposed to be primarily engaged in matters for the public good. 
 
NORBERG:  Not lobbying. 
 
DENNING:  Our tax status explicitly forbids involvement in lobbying to influence legislation.  
To me, some of the activist proposals sounded too close to lobbying.  I felt very uncomfortable 
trying to represent my view as the view of the membership on a lobbying issue.  So that was 
where I basically was coming from. 
When it came to public policy issues where, because from our perspective we could see 
weaknesses or downstream consequences, we felt we should speak out.  I joined with Dan 
McCracken, Jean Sammet, and others, on several occasions when a public policy proposal had 
weaknesses that its promoters didn’t suspect.  Even though I felt uncomfortable speaking out on 
the use of social security numbers as national identifiers, or the unlikelihood that software 
engineering could produce a Star Wars control system that would work, or the un-workability of 
prepublication review of crypto papers, I did support position papers on these issues.  I did work 
to keep them as position papers rather than political recommendations. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, Dan certainly had a position, and it comes out clearly in some of his letters in 
1977 and 1978, while he was vice president, and then president. 
 
DENNING:  He was the first to oppose the use of social security numbers in ID. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s right, he was. 
 
DENNING:  At that time, I thought ACM should stay out of that issue.  Dan thought using SSNs 
for identifications was a very bad idea, and I agreed.  Today I wouldn’t oppose him if he were 
president and wanted to take the same position.  In those days I thought getting involved was off 
ACM’s charter.  Although he and I didn’t agree on that, I thought that his position paper on it 
was a good model of a position paper for ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Dan’s last published president’s letter offered a number of suggestions of issues 
that he hoped his successor would take under advisement, and I’m wondering if you did. 
 




NORBERG:  I don’t have it with me here.  He mentioned education issues.  He mentioned 
financial issues, especially a financial computer system for the headquarters.  He thought it ironic 
that the lead society in computing was so backwards in using computing to run its business.  He 
thought that headquarters staff was laboring under great duress doing a number of things by 
hand.  He also mentioned some public policy questions, but not the ID numbers again.  He 
mentioned cryptography, security, and privacy primarily.  Did you pay any attention to this at 
all?  Or did you not care? 
 
DENNING:  I cared about those issues.  He and I had actually been working on some together, 
especially the cryptographic review issue proposed by NSA.  We agreed that the “seed corn” 
issue was important and worked together on that one too.  I certainly agreed with him that the 
headquarters should have a proper computer system. 
Where I tended to come down differently with Dan would be on the advocacy for 
legislative or regulatory change.  I was much more conservative about even getting involved in 
them than he was.  On the ones that I would be inclined to get involved in, we often had different 
philosophies about what the nature of our involvement should be.  For example, I agreed with 
him on the risks of SSN IDs, but I didn’t think we should be trying to influence legislation on 
that issue. 
 
NORBERG:  How about the name change that he proposed? 
 
DENNING:  That’s an interesting story.  I had seen two previous proposals to change the ACM’s 
name.  A lot of people felt that having the word “machinery” in the title was antiquated and did 
not convey the full breadth of what ACM did.  I rather liked the ACM name and did not support 
the proposals to change it.   Dan did support a change. 
One day he came up with a very clever idea to break the logjam.  He said, “Let’s keep the 
acronym and simply call ACM the Association for Computing.  If somebody asks about the ‘M’ 
in the acronym, we’ll answer that it’s the ‘M’ in computing.”  He won me over with that one.  
Not only me, but most of Council.  That name change proposal made it to the ballot. 
Of those who voted on the ballot, two-thirds affirmed the name change.  But, 
unfortunately, the number of votes cast fell short of the required quorum.  The ballot failed.  Jean 
Sammet quipped that if a hundred more members had voted no, the proposal would have passed. 
 
NORBERG:  You said the name change idea came up before? 
 
DENNING:  I think I had seen it twice before.  Many people debate but nobody thought of a 
better name.  There were at least two more proposals after that.  They came about every seven 
years, you know.  On one of them, the executive committee even hired a consultant to help find a 
better name.  The consultant may have concluded that “Association for Computing” would not 
be bad, but thought we should have a catchier acronym, ACX.  He liked the letter “X”.  Many 
people reacted to his proposals with astonishment.  “We paid money for that?” 
By the mid 1990s ACM had settled down on the name change issue and was satisfied that 
“ACM” and “Association for Computing Machinery” were respected brand names.  For a while, 
ACM used the motto “the association for computing” on its letterhead.  ACM has developed a 
brand name now, and people know what it means.  They know ACM is involved in a lot of good 
things like the programming contest and the chess matches and all these things.  So, the concern 




NORBERG:  So what was the bottom line for you on Dan’s list? 
 
DENNING:  The bottom line is, I think we continued to work on many of the things on Dan’s 
list.  As you can see, I got involved in some public policy issues such as the seed corn crisis and 
enlisted the executive committee to help write position papers.  Dan supported these positions 
and used to tease me because I was not consistently against taking public policy stands. 
 
NORBERG:  What was your most serious disagreement? 
 
DENNING:  It was the Equal Rights Amendment, which was a bill before the US Congress to 
amend the constitution to declare equal rights for women.  Dan was squarely in favor of ACM’s 
taking a position favoring the amendment.  I thought it was blatant lobbying for pending 
legislation, which put an ACM stand outside of ACM’s scope. 
There was a strong contingent of social activists among ACM volunteer leadership who 
wanted ACM to take a stand.  They said it was too important an issue for ACM not to take a 
stand, and they were willing to risk the IRS revoking ACM’s tax-exempt status. 
In my private capacity, I disagreed with the amendment.  I thought that the civil rights 
laws already on the books provided the protections needed and didn’t want to inflict downstream 
negative consequences that would inevitably flow from a constitutional amendment.  I kept my 
personal view to myself as I did not think I should use my official capacity in ACM to promote 
something that many members felt was outside ACM’s purview.  I think over 90% of my 
academic colleagues agreed with the amendment, and I regularly got roasted when I questioned 
the need for it.  The same happened in ACM when someone provoked me to say that I personally 
disagreed with the amendment.  They called me a “chauvinistic pig” and said that I was trying to 
use my official position to block ACM from doing the right thing.  The whole thing got pretty 
nasty with a lot of name calling around and many skewer-Peter sessions. 
Jean Sammet also got roasted for her position.  She said that in her personal capacity she 
strongly supported the amendment but in her official ACM capacity she did not because 
lobbying was outside the ACM charter. 
 
NORBERG:  I was just thinking, “Does he mean he’s against it?” 
 
DENNING:  I was against the amendment but not the principle of equal rights.  I thought that the 
constitution and civil rights laws already declared the principle.  If somebody asked, “Would you 
be for or against the ERA?” And if they managed to pin me down, I’d reply, “No, I would not 
vote for it.  I think it wouldn’t serve us well.”  Since I wasn’t for it, I was, according to the 
activists, against it. 
 
NORBERG:  Did the association make some tips of the hat to the ERA by changing the location 
where a meeting was to be held? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember. 
 




DENNING: Jean Sammet startled her women colleagues by her position that the ERA shouldn’t 
be on the ACM’s agenda.  She thought the issue was too political, too far afield from ACM’s 
purpose, and did not draw in any way on ACM’s computing expertise.  As far as I recall, all the 
other women volunteers supported ACM’s taking a stand. 
 
NORBERG:  Why do you think there weren’t more women in computer science even then?  Not 
now, but even then. 
 
DENNING:  That’s a conundrum.  The science and engineering fields have traditionally had low 
representation of women.  Somehow the male style worked its way into our thinking and we 
wound up with an image of the field that many women find unappealing. 
I often criticize today the view we’ve evolved over the years that “CS = programming”.  I 
don’t like this because it focuses on the programs rather than what we might be doing with the 
programs.  A guy who says, “I’m a programmer,” is communicating a love for working with 
programs.  Most people understand that programs are complex, abstract objects that often rely 
heavily on math and logic and are really hard to get right.  Contrast that with a guy who says, 
“I’m a banker and I make banking better through algorithms.”  That communicates a person who 
is interested in the banking industry and in better serving customers.  Different story.  Our stories 
about “we are programmers” don’t communicate how we help people in the world with 
programming.  I think this image is unappealing to many women. 
But it’s still a conundrum since the first programmers were women! 
 
NORBERG: It looks like the early members of the computer science community cut women out 
in the very beginning. 
 
DENNING:  “Cut them out?”  That doesn’t sound right -- the very first programmers were 
women. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, but those women lost their position after World War II, when the men came 
back from the war.  Many men then thought the woman’s role was secondary. 
 
DENNING:  I wasn’t old enough after the war to observe how men in computing looked at 
women in computing.  By the time I came along, this “unsocial programmer” image was so 
ingrained that there wasn’t room for anybody else. 
 
NORBERG:  Sure, yes.  I think that’s right. 
 
DENNING:  When I went to the exhibits at my first SJCC in 1967, I was struck by the role of 
women in the exhibits.  By and large they were portrayed as bathing beauties to attract male 
buyers to the exhibits, where the male salesmen would go to work on them.  It certainly didn’t 
convey that women contributed mightily to the technology.  I was put off by that. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay, I want to switch the topics again.  Which officers did you work most closely 
with? 
 




NORBERG:  What about George Dodd? 
 
DENNING:  Much less.  George and I were good friends. 
 
NORBERG:  And Aaron Finerman? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, indeed.  Aaron was ACM treasurer and was on many of the same Executive 
Committees as me.  I found Aaron somewhat difficult because he was too much of a social 
activist for my taste.  He wanted the ACM to be involved in these issues.  He had very 
persuasive moral arguments, and he often almost persuaded me.  I remember talking to him and 
saying, “Aaron, you can’t do this to me.  This is outside ACM’s charter.  We shouldn’t be 
involved in this.”  And he said, “Yes, we should.” 
 
NORBERG:  How was he as a treasurer? 
 
DENNING:  He was extremely conscientious and strongly ethical. 
 
NORBERG:  He essentially had the purse strings of the organization, which gave him a very, 
very strong position in the Executive Committee, I would think. 
 
DENNING:  Indeed.  I remember him as kind of the ACM’s conscience on a large number of 
issues.  Scientific freedom in Russia was another one of his favorite issues.  He was always ready 
to speak out on any of these issues and ready to have the ACM advocate them.  I loved the guy, 
but sometimes I just wished he would not push the rest of us so hard on these things. 
 
NORBERG:  How did you get to know these people?  Was it just through ACM?  Or had you 
known them professionally in other areas besides ACM? 
 
DENNING:  I met a lot of people.  I think the reason I came to their attention was a combination 
between my research, academic, and ACM work.  Bernie Galler of Michigan invited me to come 
talk to them about virtual memory after having met me at ACM gatherings.  That would 
stimulate technical discussions, and then I might invite some of those people to participate in 
ACM.  ACM was part of my life by that time, as was the technical work.  As I said, I managed to 




Interacting with Headquarters Staff 
 
NORBERG:  How about the executive directors of ACM?  Who were they, and what was your 
relationship with them? 
 
DENNING:  The one I worked the most closely with was Joe DeBlasi.  That was because we 
were joined at the hip doing the digital library project.  He was a strong supporter of the digital 
library and the electronic community.  He helped put together the business plans for the digital 
library—how would the headquarters do this thing?  One of the Gordian knots that he cut 
through was the cost of the initial system.  The business plans showed good stable revenue once 
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it was started – but how do we get it started?  The ACM had a new-projects fund that members 
could contribute to, and it had sufficient funds to pay for the capitalization of the project.  Joe 
proposed to spend that money to capitalize the project and then pay the fund back.  I think they 
still do things like that now.  But that’s how he got past that knot.  He was great. 
Joe laid out business alternatives and built income and expense scenarios with 
spreadsheets.  One set of detailed spreadsheets showed us how we could make money selling 
licenses in the digital library.  Licenses were renewable annually and thus were not the same as 
purchasing the entire digital library.  Joe’s analyses convinced the Executive Committee that the 
digital library would work.   
He also was a wizard at managing the Executive Committee.  He told me that the job of 
the executive director is to manage the Executive Committee.  I thought that was a strange thing 
to say, since he reports to the Executive Committee.  Joe said there is a serious point.  The 
Executive Committee is volunteer leaders like me.  Volunteer leaders change every two years.  
Their interests are short-lived.  Even the most steadfast of them is likely to be gone within four 
years.   Many new ACM programs need five years or more to mature and reach a stable state.  
Joe thought it was his job to keep the successive executive committees’ interest up so that the 
original program will actually become viable.  Because he understood that, Joe was able to keep 
a succession of Executive Committees engaged and interested in the digital library project until 
we got it done. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, but Joe’s one of the last executive directors you knew. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  He’s the one I worked most closely with.  The one I next most closely worked 
with was Sidney Weinstein, who was executive director when I was president.  We worked a lot 
together on trying to form external issues that we could get the Council to pay attention to 
instead of internal governance issues.  We were somewhat successful with that, as I said, but the 
Council just loved talking about governance issues and we couldn’t get them off of it. 
Going back in time, I recall a guy named Don Madden as executive director when I first 
became involved.  I remember Don as a nice guy but I had little contact with him because he 
preceded my time of executive level involvement.  Don was replaced by Gordon Smith, with 
whom I interacted a lot as SIG Board chair. 
 
NORBERG:  Is this the Gordon Smith that worked with Memorex? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember.  He was a big, tall, friendly guy. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, there were two Gordon Smiths. I’m trying to distinguish between the two. 
 
DENNING:  I know he was executive director in 1971.  I remember because in December of that 
year my father died.  Gordon sent me a wonderful condolence letter that became a model I have 
used when it has been my turn to give condolences over the years. 
There may have been another executive director between Smith and Weinstein.  We’d 
have to look it up in the records. 
After Weinstein retired, there was another executive director named Dick, but I can’t 
remember his full name right now.  He stayed only a couple of years and then moved to the 
Harvard Business School.  Joe DeBlasi followed him. 
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After Joe retired, John White came in and is our current executive director.  John has 
been a great supporter of the Digital Library and helped see it firmly established at the center of 
ACM’s business and identity. 
 
NORBERG: How about inside the headquarters?  We’ve been talking about the executive 
directors.  Any other staff you remember?  Deputy, area directors, office of publications, and the 
like. 
 
DENNING:  At the time, most volunteers had little interaction with the headquarters staff other 
than the executive director and his chief administrative assistant, Irene Hollister.  Irene was the 
“virtual executive director”.  She had been with ACM for many years, and through her 
knowledge of history, people, and procedures, maintained continuity and stability.  One time 
Irene gave me a gift of a wonderful little book, Exercises in Style, by Frenchman Raymond 
Queneau, who had received a prize for this book in France.  It was the same mundane event 
reported 99 times through the eyes of different observers.  I loved it and tried his method in some 
of my own writings, with positive effects.  Irene also knew I was a wine connoisseur and 
introduced me to a wonderful little wine shop around the corner from where she lived.  It’s funny 
how we remember little things that had a big effect in our lives.   These little things about Irene 
represent the way she took care of all of us who worked with the ACM leadership. 
I also had a great relationship with Myrtle Kellington.  Myrtle was the executive editor of 
the Communications, a post she held pretty much since its beginning.  The Communications was 
her tour-de-force.  She worked closely with the editor in chief and the associate editors and 
turned out a product that most members liked for many years.   When she retired, most of us 
were very sad to see her go. 
Another unique editor of the early 1970s was Lee Revens.  He was the editor of 
Computing Reviews, ACM’s publication that tracked and reviewed the entire computing 
literature.  Lee was an extraordinary grammarian, the type that would impress the likes of Bill 
Buckley.  I learned more about good grammar and writing from Lee than from any school 
teacher.  Unfortunately, Lee was taken from us early by cancer. 
I remember a day when Irene introduced me to her new assistant, Pat Ryan.  Irene had 
personally selected Pat, I think because Irene was preparing for her own retirement and wanted 
someone she trusted to inherit the job.  Irene chose well.  Pat has been with ACM as long as 
Irene was and is now the COO (chief operating officer).  I know that Pat continues to be in 
regular contact with Irene to this day. 
I also remember a day around 1975 when someone introduced me to a new editor who 
had just been hired for the Communications.  His name was Mark Mandelbaum.  He too turned 
out to be a long-timer.  He rose up through the editorial ranks and is now the Director of 
Publications.  I worked very closely with him in that capacity when I was chair of the 
Publications Board (1992-1998). 
Mark appointed his deputy Bernie Rous to be the key person for the digital library 
project.  Bernie was a real wizard with the data systems and oversaw the implementation effort.  
He also helped me think many things through.  I remember at the end of a long discussion about 
copyright policy in the digital library, being so impressed with the progress Bernie and I had 
made, that I proposed we co-author a special report on the ACM copyright policy.  We did so 
and it was published in the Communications some time in 1994.  It turned out to be a seminal 
work that helped other societies develop their own copyright policies for the Internet. 
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When we started the Communications revitalization project in 1983 I had the opportunity 
to work closely with the Communications executive editor Janet Benton.  She was brilliant at 
helping us map our ideals about what the Communications could be into the real world of 
publication on a monthly schedule.  When she left ACM, we hired Jim Maurer as her 
replacement and promoted Diane Crawford of her staff to senior editor.  Jim and Diane and I 
were able to find ways to implement chunks of the revitalization plan that were not funded by the 
Executive Committee or Council. 
Another staff member of long standing in ACM is Lillian Israel, the director of 
membership.  She has always been extremely helpful in finding ways to provide publications and 
publication services that are valued by the members.   Through her surveys, focus groups, and 
other interactions with members, she had developed (and still has) an extraordinary feel for what 
they find valuable from ACM. 
When I was SIG Board chair, we had limited help from ACM Headquarters.  One of the 
benefits of settling up on the issue of SIG overhead was the raising of funds to support a SIG 
area director.  The greatest of those whom I worked with was Fred Aronson. 
I am sorry that I cannot remember all the dates for these people.  They appear in my 
mental time line as bright stars but no specific dates. 
 
NORBERG:  Before you became editor of Communications, could you recount some of your 
experiences and exchanges with the Editorial Boards of ACM’s major publication?  “Boards” is 
not the right name now.  I am thinking of editorial panels and the editors-in-chief of other ACM 
publications from 1971 to 2000. 
 
DENNING:  Well, I certainly had a lot of interactions with previous editors of Communications, 
especially Stuart Lynn and Bob Ashenhurst, mostly because I was submitting papers all the time 
and went through the editorial processes with them.  I helped them with some special issues a 
few times. 
I published six papers in the Computing Surveys, which was founded by Elliott Organick, 
its original editor-in-chief; because of that Elliott recruited me to be one of his associate editors.  
When he became ill and left the position, he asked me to take over as editor-in-chief, which I did 
around 1976.  I didn’t hold that very long because I had to give it up when I became vice 
president in 1978. 
In the same time frame, I was also an associate editor of Computing Reviews.  I think Eric 
Weiss might have been the volunteer editor at one point (when Lee Revens was executive 
editor). 
As editorial committee chair (around 1982 until I was editor-in-chief of the 
Communications, I interacted with many people who were forming new transactions or 
upgrading existing transactions.  I remember John Rice as the editor of Mathematical Software, 
Dave Hsiao as editor of Databases, and Steve Zilles as prime mover for the transactions on 
Programming Languages and Systems. 
 
NORBERG:  What was the nature of these interactions?  Do you remember? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  They were editor-to-editor, helping them get their programs put together or 
helping them get started. 
 




DENNING:  Perhaps.  Or maybe a peer.  They knew I knew a lot about editing.  I had been 
around the ACM publications for long enough that I knew all the ropes.  I coached them on 





NORBERG:  All right, I’m going to return to one of your favorite topics.  In 1979 and 1980, 
there was a dispute concerning the chair of the Nominations Committee.  The dispute had to do 
with censoring of two ballot statements—the little blurb we receive for each of the candidates.  
Two of the candidates had theirs edited by the chair of the Nominating Committee.  While the 
members don’t seem to have thought about this too much, since this occurred in the year you 
were elected, do you remember anything about this dispute? 
 
DENNING:  I remember disputes involving Herb Grosch, but those were most intense around 
the 1976 election when he ran by petition.  I do remember an incident as you described, but I’m 
not remembering right now who was involved.  I remember that Herb was upset that the 
Nominating Committee chair had done any editing at all, as he thought candidates should be 
allowed to speak their minds and be as offensive as they chose, in their limited number of words 
for a campaign statement. 
I also remember an incident in which Herb said something, perhaps in one of his 
Computer World editorials, which was so offensive that it upset the imperturbable Bernie Galler, 
and Aaron Finerman thought Herb should be censored and thrown out of ACM.   Unfortunately, 
I don’t remember right now if these were all the same incident or were separate ones. 
 
NORBERG:  People have that reaction to Herb. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I remember an emergency session of Council to consider a motion to impeach 
Herb and strip him of his ACM membership.  Even Bernie Galler supported this motion.  Of 
course, Jean Sammet did too.  I remember Herb’s defense: “Hey guys, I was making a joke, and 
my accusers have no sense of humor.  You can’t throw me out just because they lack of sense of 
humor.”  He argued his case well enough that the Council did not pass the motion.  It took many 
hours of valuable Council time to argue it though. 
 
NORBERG:  I think he was beyond the pale when he started writing in Computer World about 
the innards of ACM elections.  That’s just not appropriate. 
 
DENNING:  He maintained he was exercising his free speech rights and in any case meant his 
comments humorously.  So, he irritated the hell out of a lot of people and I’m sure he knew 
exactly what he was doing. 
 
NORBERG:  At one point, you, George Dodd, and Raymond Miller wrote a response to a 
Grosch letter that had appeared in CACM, objecting to his accusations and to his policy 
recommendations that would prevent what he called “underhanded nominating.”  He was 
referring to forcing eligible people to run by petition.  I don’t know whether his accusations were 
true or not, but he brought them up in 1975/1976, again in 1979/1980, and still again in 1986 
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with Paul Abrahams.  So, Herb was really very conscious about something he thought was 
defective in the nominating process.  When he ran for President, he promised that one of his first 
actions would be to fire the members of the Nominating Committee. 
 
DENNING:  Right.  That was part of his campaign statement.  But after being elected, he 
relented and settled for using his presidential power to approve new members of the committee 
in the normal rotation. 
Behind all this was his sense that he thought that they should have nominated him instead 
of making him go through the petition process.  He was consistent and criticized the nominating 
committee on other occasions when he thought they denied candidacy to an obvious candidate. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, what’s a Nominating Committee for?  They are supposed to nominate the 
best qualified candidates and they are not required to automatically nominate a vice president for 
president. 
 
DENNING:  Herb thought that he had earned the right to be nominated, and when they didn’t 
nominate him, he was pissed off as hell.  He went through the petition process, and then his 
campaign statement said he was going to fire the Nominating Committee. 
 
NORBERG:  But Dan McCracken had to go the same route as Herb in that same year to be 
nominated as vice president.  Both he and Herb were there by petition, and both were elected.  
Dan suggested to me --  I haven’t interviewed him yet, but he suggested to me on the telephone 
that he was opposed to Grosch and opposed to Grosch getting elected.  And there was some 
correspondence about that that substantiates his comments. 
 
DENNING:  I think the Nominating Committee may not have been aware of the strength of 
Dan’s interest.  And Jean Sammet had strong views on who should be “next”; the Nominating 
Committee listened. 
Dan didn’t particularly care for Grosch.  On a certain level philosophically, they stood for 
the same things; but Grosch constantly fouled things up by creating confrontations where they 
weren’t needed.  Dan saw several of his initiatives get messed up because Herb started to 
champion them and would then offend someone in the process.  Dan would lose a supporter. 
 
NORBERG:  There was some correspondence between them that is in Dan’s papers at the 
Babbage Institute.  Grosch asked Dan to defend himself.  Dan defended himself in regard to 
nominations.  Grosch demanded to know, “Why didn’t you support me for president?”  Herb had 
the impression, either direct from Dan or from someone else, that Dan opposed his presidency.  
Herb was upset about that after they were both elected. 
 
DENNING: I wasn’t aware of those conversations. 
 
Human Rights Issues, Again 
 
NORBERG: I want to turn to another issue that was heating up in the 1976 to 1979 time frame: 
the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights.  This is another instance in which 
McCracken seemed to be in favor of such a committee and of social political action, and you 
seemed to be opposed.  I’m not after the reasons for your opposition so much as I am something 
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else.  You sent a letter in February 1976 to the Council about ACM involvement in political and 
social issues.  After you commented on the McCracken committee and the Social Policy 
Committee, you offered some ideas of your own about what could be done in connection with 
scientific freedom and human rights.  You proposed in that letter that you and Dan should work 
together to make this proposition more cogent and present it to the Council.  At that time, you 
were a member-at-large on the Council.  Were you pushing to get something else done that 
seemed to fit the scientific freedom area?  Or were you upset with the people who were dealing 
with the issue of scientific freedom, who wanted to send letters to Moscow and various other 
places to try and help some of the refusniks? 
 
DENNING:  I had the same discomfort as we discussed before -- that this seemed to be getting 
beyond the ACM charter.  I was taking a narrow interpretation of the ACM charter because I 
thought ACM needed to establish its maturity in its core, technical competency of its charter.  I 
also felt uncomfortable about trying to politically represent members whose political views were 
completely unknown to me.  When I wrote that Dan and I could cooperate, I probably meant to 
focus on the portions of his proposal where we did agree and could work together on.  I generally 
liked working with Dan.  It was always more productive if we could be on the same side of 
things than on the opposite side. 
 
NORBERG:  Of course, yes.  Always the way.  It seems to me that the consistency of your 
position here demonstrates that it was a principle not just to be nasty on something. 
 
DENNING:  Yes. 
 
NORBERG:  I have one more issue here that I’m sort of puzzled about.  The December 1978 
meeting of the Council has been referred to by at least one member of the Council as a decisive 
one in several areas.  Alteration of the membership dues and journals.  Changes in editorial 
position.  Delegation of authority lower in the organization -- for example to the SIG Board or 
the Publications Board.  Stronger support for ICCP to head off any state certification of computer 
scientists which might arise.  Copyright issues in the ACM film project.  Do you think this is a 
fair statement that that December 1978 meeting was a critical one for the organization? 
 
DENNING:  That would be when I was vice president and Dan was president for six months. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, indeed. 
 
DENNING:  I think that was when the Stuart Lynn committee had its final publications 
recommendations to the Council.  A bunch of the items you mentioned would have come straight 
from there. 
 
NORBERG:  Could be. 
 
DENNING:  I remember the film project.  Dan had a keen interest in that.  It was ACM’s first 
attempt to communicate its image to outsiders and young people.  It was a very difficult project 
because it was low budget and the filmmaker wasn’t very reliable.  Even Dan, who thought he 
knew how to manage the filmmaker, couldn’t manage him.  When, finally, they showed the film 
to Council, most members had a strong negative reaction.  They thought the film did not capture 
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the spirit of ACM at all, and what it did capture was in a childish way.  ACM had to trash it.  It 
wasn’t good.  It cost a lot of money.  Dan was really disappointed.  After he saw the film at 
Council, he said, “After I’ve seen this film, I can’t even support it.”  I don’t know whether that 
showing happened at that Council meeting. 
 
NORBERG:  No, Dan told Council he was disappointed in progress, but he thought it could be 
salvaged for another $4,000 or something.  The Council supported him. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  It ultimately didn’t lead to the conclusion that Dan wanted. 
 
NORBERG:  You know, this comment about this being a critical meeting had a resonance with 
me after reading the various minutes of meetings and proposals that were made to the Council or 
the Executive Committee.  It seemed to me that prior to 1978, ACM had been going through the 
throes of growing up, if we may use a quote reminiscent of that time.  And that somehow, around 
this time, things solidified in such a way that the basic structure of the organization settled, and 
the organization went on to attending to different kinds of issues within the computer science 
field, and having a more reasonable presentation of all these issues, and nobody like Herb 
Grosch around to keep up “the good anti-establishment fight.”  A new structure was established.  
The finances sound.  People were observing an orderly process to get items before Council for 
discussion or action.  It all seemed to come to a focus at the end of Herb’s presidency and at the 
beginning of Dan’s—and then are carried on by the subsequent presidents—you and Dave 
Brandin and Adele Goldberg and so on.  That’s why it seems to me to have been an important 
meeting.  I would agree with the writer in this case, who was a Council member.  Do you have 
any reaction to what I just said?  Is this a reasonable position to take?  That ACM came into its 
adult years during this period of time? 
 
DENNING:  I wouldn’t say adulthood, maybe late teenagehood.  My memories are that the ride 
was bumpy.  Yes, indeed, we had these moments of success; Dan got a whole bunch of things 
that had been cooking for a while pushed through and settled.  The publication issue finally got 
resolved and we moved forward on the implementation.  The discussion about dues structure and 
unbundling came to a close, and we had an agreement on dues structure.  Some new outreach-
type projects were under way, like the film project.  We had the satisfied feeling of having 
worked some difficult issues through to completion and agreement.  These were all good signs of 
maturity. 
But at the same time, we still had eruptions.  Herb Grosch and Jean Sammet hammered 
each other around election issues.  We had an eruption around the ERA (equal rights 
amendment), which I thought should not be on the ACM agenda at all.  That was a contentious 
time. 
I also had to deal with a personality issue in my administration.  It was very sad.  The 
ACM Secretary was Kathleen Wagner.  She was almost the equal of Herb Grosch in her ability 
to create confrontations.  She felt like a lot of people were neglecting various governance issues, 
and she would get very in-your-face about why you were not attending to these issues.  Her first 
inclination was to be in your face confrontational rather than to negotiate and try and come to an 
accommodation on an issue.  A lot of people would tense up and not want to deal with this lady.  
A couple of times, she made some pretty serious financial errors that got Treasurer Aaron 
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That motion and the rancor surrounding it hijacked the entire Council meeting.  A lot of 
Councilors were really ticked off that they had come all the distance to that meeting, and not get 
to a single one of the scheduled agenda items.  A lot of others in ACM were upset that their 
business got tabled for several months.  In the end, Council didn’t impeach her, as Finerman 
wanted.  I think she felt vindicated and did not get the Council message to back off. 
 
NORBERG:  Was she a volunteer? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  She was elected as the secretary.  She was a constant pain for me and Vice 
President Mike Harrison because she always had some other agenda besides whatever we were 
working on.  Her agenda was around the Equal Rights Amendment, or women’s rights, regional 
voting, and such.  To Mike and me, the issues on her agenda seemed to have nothing to do with 
ACM at all.  We could never find any common ground to work with her on, so Mike and I just 
used to outvote her.  A lot of the Executive Committee votes in our administration were two to 
one.  When it came time to vote, I would say, “Kathleen, just checking in with you.  What’s your 
vote?”  And she’d say, “You said yes, he said yes, I say no.  Make sure it’s recorded.” 
 
NORBERG:  What did she do?  Where was she located? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t remember exactly.  I think she was from Wisconsin or Minnesota.  She was 
a thorn, and not just for me.  I was willing to kind of ride with her.  As we noted a few minutes 
ago, at some point, she ticked Aaron Finerman off so badly that he wanted to have Council 
become aware what he saw as ethical breaches and have a chance to toss her out. 
 
NORBERG:  Wow.  That’s severe. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  As you can see we had some very productive meetings (as in December 
1978), and others that accomplished nothing.  That period might have been the beginning of a 
period of tranquility, but it was far from settled. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  That seems to negate what I tried to argue, though, that after December 1978, 
things had calmed down. 
 
DENNING:  Well, I agreed with you that there was an emerging trend of getting real business 
done in an orderly way.  In 1978, we set a publications framework which helped us find our way 
in the years after.  It was contentious getting to the framework, and it took skilled guys like 
Stuart Lynn to show us how to maneuver our way through the pretension and get to the 
agreement.  All that was mixed with contentious issues around whether the Nominating 




NORBERG:  What about Jean Sammet in the History of Programming Languages Conference 
#1?  Controversy swirled around that during Herb Grosch’s term as president because Herb 
thought he as President had the authority to oversee her project, and she thought otherwise.  Do 
you remember any of that? 
 
DENNING:  No, I don’t. 
 
ACM’s Council’s Decisions on Major Positions 
 
NORBERG:  All right.  Now, back to the organization again.  How effective was ACM in the 
1970s and 1980s in disseminating information about computers and computing? 
 
DENNING:  Well, it depends on what type of dissemination you’re talking about.  The SIGs 
were getting increasingly good about disseminating technical information through their 
newsletters and conferences.  The publications were getting progressively better about 
disseminating new research results through the expanded set of transactions. 
On the other hand, the process of developing positions on quasi-political issues was 
rocky.  ACM issued a position paper on social security numbers as universal identifiers after a 
contentious internal debate.  The executive committees often issued their own position papers 
rather than try to work things through Council. 
Early in his administration, President Reagan announced the so-called Star Wars 
initiative, which would build laser weapons to shoot down Soviet ICBMs.  This stirred a 
firestorm of protest among the ACM volunteers.  Many of them disagreed with Reagan on 
political grounds.  Others felt that the Star Wars initiative was getting way ahead of the state of 
knowledge in software engineering and could heighten the risk of war rather than diminish it.  
Dave Parnas published in CACM a famous paper denouncing the Star Wars initiative and 
arguing that its basic assumptions could not be met in the technology available. 
One of the constructive fallouts of that internal debate was the founding of the ACM 
Risks Form under the editorial guidance of Peter Neumann.  It was a bulletin board discussion 
about risks to the public from computer systems.  It became a popular, ongoing medium of 
expression about risks and provided a gold mine of material for later arguments about types of 
risks we had to deal with. 
I myself was conflicted in some of these debates.  I happened to like Reagan and some of 
the protests seemed ungrounded and ideological.  On the other hand, in the end I thought it was 
good to have the Risks Forum to discuss these kinds of issues in an ongoing way.  The Risks 
Form is still going strong today, under Peter Neumann’s able leadership. 
Over the years since that time, the ACM has gotten much better about organizing task 
forces to produce position papers on items where ACM has something substantive to say.  We 
did some of those in the 1990s about the architecture and policies of a digital library.  Moshe 
Vardi chaired a committee that produced a very good job mobility report around the time when 
so many people were concerned about off-shoring computing jobs. 
 
NORBERG:  Over the years, then, ACM went from a total focus on the field of computer 
science and matured so that it could make substantial contributions to the field and to the 
profession.  And then along the way, ACM became better at expressing itself on issues more 
relevant to the social structure of society, as you just said.  Did ACM play some role, too, in the 




DENNING:  No.  I don’t think there was a formal role in that.  Those reports were put together at 
a time when many ACM leaders were ambivalent about joining the HPC movement.  I know that 
the ACM people participated in some of the interviews that some of the Lax panels conducted.  
But I don’t remember ACM having a position paper on that one. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of ACM 
 
NORBERG:  What would you say the strengths and weaknesses are of ACM over the years? 
 
DENNING:  They’ve changed.  I think a lot of the stuff that I was in the middle of was in the 
adolescent period of ACM.  The teenagers argued with each other about who gets to drive the 
car.  We’ve largely moved past that now.  We work together a lot better than we used to. With 
respect to issues where we wanted to have a voice but didn’t want to spend full time on, we 
worked with other organizations like the CRA or ICCP, and let them represent our interests.  
We’ve gotten more involved with the public policy issues, where we have learned to speak from 
our special expertise in computing.  Those are all good changes.  In the technical areas of 
computing, we’ve demonstrated a long history of being able to generate and attract experts on 
lots of subjects.  All our journals have very high reputations for quality.  The SIGs and their 
conferences likewise have generally high reputations.  These are areas where the ACM has 
become very strong. 
 
NORBERG:  How about some weaknesses?  Does it have any? 
 
DENNING:  Oh, sure.  But some of the things I might think of as weaknesses I can’t say are 
unique to the ACM.   I think ACM’s penchant for the academic (and research) side of computing 
is both a strength and a weakness.  Most of the volunteer leadership positions are filled by 
academics. 
 
NORBERG:  Maybe they are the ones that have the time. 
 
DENNING:  Could be.  Still, we approach many issues with a strong academic orientation.  I 
think that limits the appeal of what we have to say.  I think that’s a weakness. 
Another weakness concerns the external image we have allowed to develop about us.  
That is, the image “We are programmers.”  Twenty years ago, I chaired a committee of the 
Education Board that warned about this in its report “Computing as a Discipline.”  We 
demonstrated in the report that the field is much broader than programming. 
Some people like to blame the external image on the media, which tends to dwell on 
things it understands.  There is probably some truth to that.  But I think we have “programmer” 
as a deeply ingrained self image.  We are always talking about programming and our greatest 
heroes in our field were professed programmers.  Unfortunately, our conception of programmer 
is quite different from the public understanding.  The word “programmer” means Dijkstra or 
Knuth to us, but “grunt coder” to the public. 
In my opinion, if we want people to take our field more seriously as a field of science and 
engineering, we need to shed our own self image that we are programmers.  A clever PR firm 
can’t help us do that. 
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I grew up in the generation of people who helped set the curriculum that we now teach in 
all the departments.  That was a heady time for computer science because we were discovering 
many deep principles of computation and computational system design.  It was cool to be 
working on virtual memory, operating systems, compilers, graphics, and databases.  We 
enshrined the new principles into our curriculum.  They’re still there.  You know, it’s a good sign 
of their staying power that they are still there.  Yet, our overall curriculum reflects a 1970s view 
of our field. 
 
NORBERG:  Even after the resulting three studies that ACM did, ending with Curriculum 2005? 
 
DENNING:  Curriculum 2005 actually surprised me.  It seemed like a great idea to go through a 
painstaking consensus process.  We had lots of workshops and town hall meetings and we took 
our time -- over two years.  The previous curriculum recommendation, 2001, was also a 
consensus process and took two years to develop.  The topics that were called the “required 
core” were basically those that garnered a 100% consensus.  Everything else was an elective. 
But, to me, this consensus process revealed the depth of the “we-are-programmers-and-
computing-building-technologists” perception.  Just look at the curriculum’s body of knowledge 
-- it’s imbued with this idea.  I think that if we took the idea that we are scientists and engineers 
into the curriculum process, we would see a different outcome.  We’d see much more emphasis 
on experimentation and hypothesis testing.  We’d see more emphasis on rigorous engineering 
process.  Programming would still be important, but it would be seen as a practice that supports 
us as scientists and engineers  
I think the outside perception that we are programmers is very challenging right now in a 
world where outsourcing a programmer is seen as a bad thing, and people who are thinking about 
careers say, “Why do I want to go into a career where my job may be outsourced?”  Bill Gates 
and others are trying to tell them that the number of jobs that get outsourced is 1% at most, and 
the really cool jobs are at Microsoft.  People don’t hear these things.  The reason they have 
trouble hearing them I think isn’t because Bill Gates doesn’t say them clearly.  It’s because when 
students actually engage with academic departments to pursue Bill Gates’s vision, they find 
themselves in a dry curriculum emphasizing programming.  They see programming as a way to 
control machines and not as a means of self expression. 
In some ways, it reminds me of when I was an electrical engineer.  When I arrived at 
Manhattan College, I told my teachers, “I’m interested in computers.  I want to take all the 
computer courses I can.”  And they said, “We don’t have any until senior year.  To prepare, you 
have to learn a lot of basic circuit theory, circuit analysis, and calculus.  Only then will you have 
completed all the prerequisites for our programming course.”  I’m a persistent guy and I slog 
through it, and I got to my programming course.  Given my background, I was less interested in 
programming than in computer architecture, but they had nothing about computer architecture. 
I see echoes of this in our computing curriculum.  We push our students through loads of 
prerequisites to get to what they see as the good stuff.  Many of them are not willing to make the 
long slog to get to new fields like biotech or Internet search.  Some departments have tried brand 
new approaches to circumvent this.  In the first term they teach media computation (as at 
Georgia Tech) or build a robot (as at Carnegie-Mellon University). 
 
NORBERG:  Is this a general characteristic of universities?  To form a new field you have to 
break off from an existing one and go a separate way.  The new field does not prosper as a subset 




DENNING:  A lot of universities created separate computer science departments in the 1960s 
and 1970s.   Many of them wanted to establish a presence in the new field and created a new 
department to give them visibility.  The departments were initially made of people from other 
fields that wanted to join the new venture. 
 
NORBERG:  How did you construct the computer science department here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School? 
 
DENNING:  It was here when I arrived in 2002.  I didn’t have to construct it! 
 
NORBERG:  Okay.  How is your program different from these other programs? 
 
DENNING:  The most notable difference is that we have all graduate students, no 
undergraduates.  All our graduate students do a major research project and report it in their 
master’s thesis.  At most other universities, something like 5% of the graduate students actually 
do a master’s thesis.  The students here are around 30 years old.  They’ve been out in their 
military careers for 5-10 years.  They’re very serious and disciplined students.  They work very 
hard. 
They’re also very challenging students.  They don’t accept any BS.  Instructors have got 
to stay relevant -- connected with what the students are interested in.  They’ll be all over you the  
moment you deviate.  They’re very demanding of their teachers. 
We love this environment.  It’s challenging and fulfilling. 
 
NORBERG:  I remember teaching naval personnel in the Naval Reactors Program. 
 
DENNING:  Some universities have awakened to the need to change their curricula so that they 
seem relevant in the world the students face.  Why do students find Google and Microsoft cool, 
but not the ACM curriculum?  A dozen universities have set up degree programs in computer 
games, aimed mostly at people who want design games for training and entertainment.  There are 
some critics who say it’s ridiculous to glorify games with degrees; but those programs sure do 
attract students! 
I myself loved all the computing principles we discovered in the 1970s and built into our 
curricula.  These same principles govern today’s computer systems.  Why do they not attract 
today’s students as they did us?  I think the reason is obvious if you look at the environment.  At 
the time we were taken with the dream of an internet and universal computer utility, and all the 
benefits those technologies could bring to the world.  Today the benefits are here and the 
technologies part of the background infrastructure.  The challenging problems are in other areas 
such as games, science grand challenges, and social networking.  These are the environments 
that turn today’s students on.  I wish we could find a way to connect our computing principles 
into those environments. 
 
NORBERG:  I was just thinking:  Where can I cite other programs—whether another discipline 
like physics or chemistry, or like sociology or social studies—I don’t see parallels between their 
histories and ours.  Computer science seems to have been self-conflicted right from the 
beginning.  Some of it is machinery, some of it is software programs, some of it is mathematical 
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models, and some is scientific experiment.  But we don’t know whether it is science or 
engineering, and therefore we can’t deal with the questions of relevance to other fields. 
 
DENNING:  My view is some of it is science, some of it is engineering, some of it is 
mathematics -- and I welcome all of it. 
 
NORBERG:  In education, at least from my perspective, we no longer talk about science and 
technology as separate entities.  We now see that in every science or engineering field, there’s 
something of the other.  With computer science, I don’t know whether we’ve reached that level 
of maturity. 
 
DENNING:  You’re right about the internal conflicts.  Some computer scientists say that 
computer science is basically mathematics and, like mathematics, serves all the other sciences 
and engineering.  Some say computer science is really engineering.  Some say it is science.  I 
hear many heated arguments that sound like: “It is science!” “No, it’s engineering!”  “Science!”  
“Engineering!”  No one wins, and no understanding is created. 
 
NORBERG:  When I talk about science and technology as categories, I refer to a very big 
categorical set.  When I try to apply it to computer science and engineering, it’s not as big a set.  
So why can’t we solve thit issue?  I don’t know.  I’m not expecting you to solve the issue this 
morning. 
 
DENNING:  I recently read a book written in 1971.  The author is political scientist Donald 
Schon, and his book was Beyond the Stable State.  His book hardly has a trace of 1971 in the 
writing and idea.  You could easily think he was talking about today’s problems.  His basic claim 
is that people desire that their organizations or social systems reach some sort of a stable 
configuration.  The equilibrium state seems to minimize uncertainty and relieve insecurities; if 
we could attain it, our society would work pretty well.  This is a very attractive view.  We dream 
about building organizations and social systems that last and sustain themselves. 
The fact of the matter is, the world is too full of unpredictable events.  Whatever system 
you set up is constantly being buffeted, and it is forced to respond to what’s around it.  A better 
way to think about this is: think learning, not stability.  A social system is constantly learning 
and adapting, trying to be the best it can in the environment it finds itself. 
Unfortunately, says Schon, a lot of organizations configure themselves to be stable.  They 
don’t actually like being adaptive and learning.  They resist learning.  They resist reconfiguring 
themselves to the current situation.  The biggest offenders in this category are governments.  The 
ideal government is supposed to constantly learn what’s most important to the public and offer it.  
Unfortunately, a lot of government organizations focus on maintaining their rules and procedures 
and resist whatever the public is interested in.  I think a lot of universities are this way.  
Paradoxically, they’re not really learning organizations.  I think that ACM has inherited some of 
that resistance to learning and reconfiguring because of all the academic members that it has.  
We’re not configured to constantly be trying to learn and change the organization. 
 
NORBERG: IBM is a good example.  In the middle 1980s, when IBM was beginning to fail for 
the first time in 85 years, that organization had to learn and be more cognizant of the user’s view 
and how the user is using the materials that IBM is selling.  It was a hard transition, forced on 
them by the severe threat to their survival.  They succeeded in remaking themselves into a 
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software development and consulting company in this learning process.  So, it does happen to 
some organizations, I guess. 
 
DENNING: Donald Schon was exhorting us to train our minds to think of organizations as 
constantly adapting systems rather than systems that enter stable configurations by following 
internal rules.  If ACM were to adopt this philosophy, ACM would be constantly shifting and 
changing to be maximally valuable and relevant to the environment it inhabits.   I actually think 
that over the years, ACM has gradually become more adept at this. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes.  I see your point about the constitutionally not configured. 
 
DENNING:  ACM is certainly not unique in this way.  The IEEE is the same way.  We have a 
lot of volunteers who have been around for a long time; they’re steeped in the older ways.  They 
dynamically resist too much change.  They want it to stay stable around the things they think are 
important.  However, much of what we grew up thinking was important, is much less important 
now.  I’m willing to accept that.  My early work on working sets and virtual memory is now a 
footnote in history.  The results are part of ubiquitous infrastructure and are invisible to most 





NORBERG:  Yes, tomorrow.  I would like to ask you another question about finances in the 
organization.  How was the budget developed each year?  What are the steps it went through to 
be a finalized budget for the organization to spend its money? 
 
DENNING:  Developing the budget was primarily the responsibility of the Executive 
Committee.  Working with the comptroller and treasurer, the Executive Committee would draft a 
budget.  As part of the drafting process, they asked the boards for input and requests.  The 
Executive Committee invited board chairs to visit with them to go over their budget requests, 
since it was usually not possible to give them everything they asked for.  In other words, 
negotiations!  The Executive Committee always had the final say.  Because there wasn’t enough 
money to do anything near what everybody wanted to do, a lot of board chairs (and others with 
budget requests) went away disappointed.  They understood there wasn’t any more money, but 
they were nonetheless disappointed.  The Executive Committee would present the draft to the 
Council, and most of the time the Council would accept it.  Occasionally Council members 
would make motions to amend the budget, but they often did not get their amendments because 
there was insufficient money.  Herb Grosch was a frequent proposer of budget amendments. 
 
NORBERG:  Many organizations face financial crises from time-to-time, with different levels of 
severity in each case.  Were there special challenges that you had to deal with in this respect for a 
financial crisis? 
 
DENNING:  When he was president, Tony Ralston advocated that ACM change its accounting 
system from cash to accrual.  He argued that we would have more financial stability under an 
accrual system.  Under that system, when a member pays dues, we set the payment aside into an 
account to pay for the future services promised; each month we withdraw one-twelfth of that 
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account and use it to pay for operations.  Under a cash flow system it is easy to grab the entire 
dues amount and spent it right away and not have the funds later in the year to pay for the 
services rendered. 
I remember a lot of debate about this, especially since it would put a crimp in Council’s 
spending habits.  But the logic was so compelling, and the encouragement from the accounting 
firm so strong, the Council adopted it.  And, indeed, ACM’s finances became much more stable 
after that. 
By the time I was president we no longer had cash-flow emergencies.  We usually didn’t 
have enough money to budget for all the good things we wanted to do.  The annual budget 
wrangles weren’t as severe any more, and definitely paled against the rancor of debates such as 
nominating committee issues and an equal rights amendment. 
 
NORBERG:  Was there any special program for raising additional money during your term as 
president? 
 
DENNING:  The only thing we tried to put together was an ACM foundation.  Vice President 
Mike Harrison was vice president took that on as his baby.  We did a lot of planning for it.  I 
remember spending an entire day in a retreat near Stanford University with Mike where we 
drafted up a charter and bylaw for an ACM Foundation.  I think Mike got Council to adopt the 
bylaw.  He and the executive director did some fundraising for it.  But it never really took off.  
The Foundation wasn’t able to raise any significant amounts of money.  I don’t think it exists 
anymore. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s very interesting, because the electrical engineers have done reasonably well.  
I can’t say it’s a great success, but it did reasonably well in raising money. 
 
DENNING:  A few years ago in 1997, and then again in 2001, ACM decided to try and do an 
industry strength conference.  Bob Metcalfe became the general chair of ACM 97 and worked 
hard to get major industry donations for this conference.   He also worked hard to develop a set 
of well known speakers from many fields impinging on computing, to help draw a good audience 
to the conference.  I helped out by editing the conference book, Beyond Calculation: The Next 
Fifty Years of Computing.  I think Bob wanted a couple of million dollars from industry sponsors 
to make the conference a success. 
He approached the big names of computing industry -- HP, Intel, IBM, Oracle, and others 
to make substantial contributions of $250K to $500K.  They were reluctant, partly because there 
was a recession going on at the time and partly because ACM was not a big name to them at the 
time. 
The ACM 97 conference attracted a good crowd, had a fantastic exhibit, world class 
speakers, and a wonderful book.  Yet, without that industry sponsorship, it lost $750K.  That was 
a lot of money for ACM.  ACM was able to absorb it but had to forego other things it wanted to 
do. 
ACM tried again in 2001, with ACM 1.  We hoped that our relations with the industry 
giants had improved and we would get the sponsorship we wanted.  I edited the book, The 
Invisible Future.  Still ACM lost about a million dollars on that conference, and the book sold 
only about half what the publisher (McGraw-Hill) expected.  ACM has not tried any more major 




NORBERG:  Where did this money come from to take care of such a debt? 
 
DENNING:  It had to come out of the general fund, and ACM had to forego other things.  By 
that time, ACM’s finances were strong enough to absorb such a shock.  That would not have 
been so in the 1970s. 
These experiences led ACM to have low confidence that they could raise any significant 
amounts of money, either for the foundation or a major conference. 
There are some exceptions to this pattern: ACM has been very successful at getting major 
industry support for awards.  ACM got Intel and Google to contribute $125,000 each to the 
$250,000 purse for the Turing Award.  ACM also got a lot of industry support for the annual 
programming contest.  Industry gets good publicity for the awards and the contest; maybe that’s 
what makes the difference. 
 
The Turing Award 
 
NORBERG:  When you say $250,000 for a Turing Award, is that the principal or is that 
expendable?  Or is that the award? 
 
DENNING:  The award winner gets a check for $250,000. 
 
NORBERG:  Is there a substantial endowment fund to take care of that?  That’s a lot of money. 
 
DENNING:  In 2008, Google and Intel are both putting up $125,000 each.  They repeat that each 
year. 
 
NORBERG:  And I would take it that the relationship between ACM and these two companies 
must be very good. 
 
DENNING:  Indeed. 
 
NORBERG:  Otherwise, you’d have a lot more companies in that.  Was there any discontent 
about going to the companies for this purpose among members that you talked to? 
 
DENNING:  No.  Not in my experience.  The support for a big-purse Turing Award is pretty 
strong.  It makes everyone feel that the computing field has its equivalent of the Nobel Prize, 
even though this is no Nobel Prize in computing. 
In spite of the enthusiasm, I wonder if such a big prize is good for the field in the long 
run.  I’m the first to admit I’m in a small minority with such a doubt. 
Behind the scenes, there is a lot of jockeying and politicking for the prize.  The selection 
process has become an “old boys club” -- you have to be nominated by the right people and 
obtain endorsements from several other Turing Award winners just to make it to the final cut.  
From what I’ve heard the nomination and selection processes for the Nobel Prize are even worse. 
All that aside, my deepest concern is the way the process assigns credit.  Like the Nobel 
Prize, the Turing Award singles out an individual for a seminal idea and credits that individual 
with starting the chain reaction that led to the idea being adopted widely.  If, however, you look 
more closely at any innovation, you usually find hundreds of people involved.  Many of them are 
entrepreneurs who built the businesses and found the customers.  The entrepreneurs do the real 
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work of adoption.  Having a great idea is not enough.  The award feeds the illusion that 
innovations are caused by a few gifted individuals having creative ideas.  I think that a lot of the 
real heroes in innovations that we all treasure go unrecognized by this process. 
Even the notion that a single person created an idea is suspect.  Most researchers I know 
report that their ideas came up in conversations with other people -- the ideas were a product of 
their interactions.  Many others besides the one who gets the award helped generate the idea, and 
they don’t get any credit from this process. 
 
NORBERG:  Like Project MAC. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, that is an instructive example.  Project MAC was a team of faculty and 
graduate students with visionary leadership.  They were full of ideas about the possibilities for 
the world if the computer utility and computer network would be brought to life.  It’s unfair to 
say that the big ideas there were the produce of any one mind.  They were the product of the 
“soup” in which all those great minds were stewing together. 
In 1989, I went down to UCLA, which was having a 20-year celebration of the 
ARPANET as activated there in 1969 by a team led by Len Kleinrock.  In 1989, Kleinrock and 
others located everyone who had anything to do with the planning and execution of the original 
ARPANET and invited them to a celebration.  It was very nicely done.  They lavished credit on 
everyone and remembered their specific contributions.  JCR Licklider was remembered for his 
vision of the Internet.  Larry Roberts was remembered for his design of the original architecture.  
Paul Baran was remembered for a set of papers in which he laid out the idea of packet switched 
architecture.  Frank Heart was remembered for leading the team at BBN that built the first IMP.  
Bob Kahn was remembered for an early ARPANET demo he had given, for teaming with Vint 
Cerf to design the TCP/IP protocol, and for his later leadership at DARPA in promoting the 
network and augmenting it with high performance computing.  Bob Taylor was remembered for 
being a great manager of the ARPANET program while he was in DARPA. 
Now another twenty years have passed and the story is starkly different.  Bob Kahn and 
Vint Cerf have been named the “fathers of the Internet” and many of the other names have 
disappeared from the history books.  There has even been a friendly fight over whether Len 
Kleinrock had the idea of packet networking in his 1961 PhD thesis, so he has been dubbed 
“father of the Internet technology”.  (Incidentally, he did have the idea but didn’t call it 
“packets”.) 
This process has upset me as an outside observer.  I was not a contributor to the early 
ARPANET and don’t have a stake in the story.  It bothers me that the contributions of so many 
good people have been forgotten, and the credit has been assigned to a few individuals.  There is 
no doubt in my mind that those honored individuals deserve their honors; what bothers me is that 
many others who ought to be honored have been forgotten. 
The mindset that innovations can be traced to the ideas of a few individuals is what 
bothers me.  It’s a question I’ll never resolve.  I don’t think it bothers many other people, so I 
don’t press it. 
 
NORBERG:  I remember that, on his Website, Kleinrock said he was “father of the Internet” 
technology. 
 
DENNING:  Right.  I think he did that in reaction to the growing belief that Kahn and Cerf were 




NORBERG:  Paul Baran and I have talked about this subject from time-to-time.  He concluded 
that the reason that my DARPA book didn’t go very far was that I was telling a story that 
differed from the perceived story; and I didn’t have the authority to be taken seriously.  I 
understand that.  We talked several times about the roles of giants like Donald Davies (from the 
UK), Bob Taylor, and Bob Kahn.   Paul really did give Kahn a considerable amount of credit for 
what went on at BBN, and then what he did when he was a program director in DARPA/IPTO.  
Paul encouraged me to look into this a bit more fully.  I went and got Kleinrock’s dissertation to 
see whether he did invent packet switching during his years at MIT, and I couldn’t find any of it.  
In contrast, I looked at your dissertation last night and everything you told me yesterday is there 
and organized in such a way that it can be told in a correct story. 
 
DENNING:  There is validity in Kleinrock’s claim.  You have to understand the math to see it.  
He built mathematical models that allowed him to calculate flows of messages within the 
network, and queueing delays of messages at congestion points.  A message was a discrete unit 
of communication in his model of a network.  Just change “message” to “packet” and the same 
mathematics works for the ARPANET.  Kleinrock used that math in his analytic work on the 
ARPANET at UCLA.  It was powerful and successful. 
 
NORBERG:  Is that right?  I’ll have to look again then. 
 
DENNING:  From a mathematical point of view, his model doesn’t make sense if you don’t 
assume discrete message units.  He just never said the word “packet.” 
 
NORBERG:  Well, this suggests independent discovery, or whatever we want to call it, just 
different names, and that they’re all doing the same thing. 
 
DENNING:  Given my familiarity with the history of the ARPANET, it struck me as odd that 
Kahn and Cerf would be singled out and assigned all the credit in the public mind for the 
Internet.  I love those guys.  But they weren’t the original leaders and conceivers of the network.  
I want those others to get the credit they deserve. 
This is what bothers me about a process that tries to identify someone as the originator of 
an idea that led to an innovation.  The process rewrites history and causes many important 
figures to disappear. 
When I first got involved with ACM, ACM had two big awards.  They were both 
considered co-equal, ACM’s highest awards.  One was the Turing Award for technical 
accomplishment, and the other was the Distinguished Service Award for professional 
community-type accomplishment.  These awards were considered peers; they were just in 
different dimensions.  Originally, there were no purses with those awards.  The technical award 
drew sponsors of purses, who gradually built it up to today’s $250,000.  ACM still gives the 
Distinguished Service Award, but it is the only ACM award without any purse at all. 
The money matters!  The Turing Award is a big deal and gets big media attention.  The 
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Part VII: Changes to Strengthen ACM’s Major Roles 
 
Session 3, Tape 1, Side A 
 
NORBERG:  You said you had a few things you’ve been thinking about overnight, in connection 
with the questions that we mulled over yesterday.   
 
More on The Denning Administration 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  One of your questions was what I thought were the highlights of my 
“administration”.  And as I said, a lot of the things were handed to us and we didn’t get to choose 
everything on the plate.  I think this is true in most organizations -- a candidate has ideas about 
what the president can change that cannot be realized in the framework of realities in which the 
president must operate.  The president and “administration” have to deal with these realities as 
best they can, and occasionally insert some new realities into the mix.  As you can see from the 
historical record, there were a lot of public policy issues starting to demand space on the ACM 
plate.  Some of these included things that I definitely disagreed with having on the ACM plate, 
like political freedom in Russia, or the ERA [Equal Rights Amendment] in the United States.  On 
the other hand, there were other public issues on which our scientific perspective, drawn from 
our expertise in computing, could definitely contribute to.  Examples include the control of 
scientific information or the risks of using social security numbers as universal identifiers. 
In my time as president, we did take positions on public cryptography, experimental 
computer science, composition of computer science faculties, and federal regulation of scientific 
publication.  These were all issues on which ACM could offer expert or authoritative opinion by 
virtue of its charter in computing. 
You can see from my writings at the time that I saw these as examples of the way ACM 
could be productively involved in public policy issues.  There was a definite technical 
component where we could analyze the technical feasibility of various options and include those 
in our commentary. 
 
 
The ACM President’s Letters 
 
NORBERG:  I was going to ask that of you.  I looked back over your Communications 
President’s Letters and I brought a few with me this morning that I want to discuss specifically.  
It seemed to me that the nature of the President’s Letters changed during your administration.  
Now I see why, you were setting out some sort of adjustment to issues like the House Resolution 
109 about the export of technical information, even to friendly countries.  Another was what you 
called the “seed corn eating” issue, which picked up on a hot issue before the National Science 
Foundation.  So I see a definite difference, with you looking outwards and most of your 
predecessors and many successors looking inward.  The typical President’s letter of your 
predecessors was concerned about some latest problem within ACM.  I have looked at David 
Brandin’s President’s letters to Communications.  It seemed to me that they viewed the ACM 
issues as a sort of an aside; even in some cases a snide aside.  When I interviewed him, he told 
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me that he always likes to put a little twist on the language.  For myself, that’s fine; but how does 
that convince your colleagues that something is an important issue?  Your writings made clear 
why you thought the issues you discussed were important. 
 
DENNING:  That sounds right.  You remember also that, at the same time, we were dealing with 
instances of immature behavior of the organization -- for example, the many disputes over 
election procedures and Aaron Finerman’s question about whether the secretary was doing her 
job well.  These distractions were very common.  You can see from many of my editorials, I was 
trying to get ACM’s discourse to a higher plane.  I dealt with issues that concern the profession 
outside our council chambers, and I used the president’s letter as a way to demonstrate there are 
higher-level issues that we can be involved in that and bring our expertise to the table and 
provide value for people. 
 
NORBERG:  I looked at the ACM forum.  There were frequently follow-up letters that always 
seemed to be positive.  I don’t think Ashenhurst was tampering with the mail! 
 
DENNING:  Ashenhurst generally published all the letters that he got. 
 
NORBERG:  I see, okay.  But you got a positive reaction.  Even Herb Grosch found positive 
things to say, and stimulated other positive letters. 
 
DENNING:  So there was a method to that madness, even if I wasn’t fully consciously aware.  I 
was trying to say by example, that while I opposed ACM getting involved in purely political 
matters, I supported ACM’s involvement in issues where our scientific and technical expertise 
could make a definite contribution.  I wrote about higher level issues such as how to manage 
junk mail, electronic publishing, and the science in computing.  There were numerous issues of 
this kind that we could actually be concerned about -- and which other people would welcome us 
to be concerned about.  That was the unarticulated theme behind my letters. 
 
NORBERG:  It certainly comes through.  As you can see, to me, a stranger to that period, and 
suddenly I can see the difference.   
 
DENNING:  I hadn’t looked at the forum letters since that time, but the fact that you were able to 
see in the forum letters that people were generally reacting positively to those letters was a 
vindication of the urge behind this. 
 
NORBERG:  And a positive reinforcement. 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  As I said, it was a bumpy ride, and a lot of what was put on the executive 
committee’s plate was not of my choosing.  I was able to make choices about ACM’s agenda, 
and more choices about our operating style.  While we couldn’t control what events we had to 
react to, we did have a choice about how we react.  I chose a higher road, as it were.  People 
seemed to respond to that, and I think later administrations tried to copy pieces of that and it 
became more normal in the ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, there were fewer presidential letters in the early years.  You issued 24 




DENNING:  Previous presidents used the letters to report on internal association business, as in a 
newsletter. 
In connection with my ACM service, which has continued since I was president, I think 
that my best work as an ACM volunteer was with the ACM Digital Library project.  That project 
began about ten years after my presidency.  Perhaps I laid some seeds then. 
I was also proud of what we accomplished with revitalizing the Communications starting 
in 1983 just after my administration.  Remember that the Council wanted to transform it from a 
stodgy research journal into a lively magazine, and they didn’t give us the budget to do it as 
planned.  We didn’t get anywhere near the number of editors needed to do the job Council 
envisioned. 
Nonetheless, I think we did a pretty good job.  We definitely achieved a magazine style; 
we developed a very good stable of authors; we had good reviewers, good columnists, good 
artists. good copyeditors, and good freelance journalists such as Karen Frenkel.  The new 
Communications achieved its own style and received a couple of industry awards.  The member 
surveys indicated a higher level of satisfaction than before. 
Despite the successes, President Dave Patterson started receiving complaints about the 
lack of research papers in the Communications.  He was sympathetic to those complaints as he 
himself is a researcher.  He formed a Communications review committee chaired by Moshe 
Vardi.  After a lot of fanfare and investigation, the Vardi committee came up with basically the 
same recommendation for Communications as we had in 1983.  The big difference was that (with 
lots of help from John White) they sold the idea to Council that ACM ought to fully finance the 
proposal.  Moshe Vardi was subsequently appointed editor-in-chief; he will have all the editors 
he needs! 
 
NORBERG: John White’s name has come up several times. 
 
DENNING:  He’s the executive director now.  I like John White, because he instinctively 
operates on the higher plane all the time.  He keeps reminding us about the bigger purposes that 
we’re serving; and he keeps pulling us away from activities that don’t serve the larger purpose.  
So John has been very helpful in helping the Council appreciate the need to do things well.  He 
said, “Okay, we’ve tried several times to reform the Communications and we never put the 
budget behind it.  Maybe this time we should put the budget behind it and find out once and for 
all if we can do this right.” 
 
NORBERG:  Where did he come from before he was at ACM? 
 
DENNING:  He was in the ACM for a long time with SIGs.  He was at Xerox PARC as a 
research manager for a long time.  He’s been good for the ACM.  Yesterday, by the way, you 
and I talked about possible limitations on ACM actions imposed by ACM’s configuration; I said 
I thought one limitation was ACM’s inability to be a learning organization.  I think John has 
done more than any other executive director to push ACM in the direction of being a learning 
organization and adapting to what’s happening out there in the world.  So I give him a lot of 
credit for that. 
I have to add that his predecessor, Joe DeBlasi, was also very good at that and 
bequeathed John an electronic community around the Digital Library.  John used that as a 




NORBERG:  When did John come in, roughly? 
 
DENNING:  Five to six years ago. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s a short time.  
 
DENNING:  For an executive director, that’s a long time.  That puts him through three or four 
administrations now.  I’m sure he’s found that a large part of his job is what Joe DeBlasi said -- 
managing the executive committee, making sure that previous commitments given to 
headquarters for implementation continued to be honored and supported by the current executive 
committee. 
Major projects require considerable steadiness to bring to full realization.  The Digital 
Library had to go through many design, policy, and business plan issues before it was viable for 
members.  It took me two terms as Publications Board chair (1992-1998) to guide it.  Joe 
DeBlasi as previous executive director was a key steadying influence, and John picked up from 
Joe.  John declared that the full value of the library would not be realized until every item of 
ACM literature, back to its founding in 1947, was scanned in.  He convinced Council to put up 
the money for that.  He also felt that ACM needed to work with Web service professionals to put 
up proxy servers around the world so that members anywhere could access the library easily.  He 
strongly supported the licensing of the library to libraries and corporations.  As a result of these 
actions, John got the Digital Library to be ACM’s crown jewel for publication services.  It also 
generates a lot of income that keeps ACM solvent. 
 
NORBERG:  Let’s go back to your President’s letters.  Do you remember how you selected the 
topics for these letters?   
 
DENNING:  Many of them, as you can see, were inspired by events of the day.  ACM was 
involved in public cryptography; I wrote a letter about that.  ACM was involved in “seed corn” 
issues; I wrote letters about that.  Some letters expressed my sense of big changes happening in 
the field.  For example, I sensed that something important was happening with electronic 
publishing and I chose that as a topic -- well before the Digital Library. 
 
NORBERG:  You wrote a President’s letter about electronic publishing?  I don’t see it listed 
here. 
 
DENNING:  The essay was about how the publications process could be supported by the 
emerging technology.  Come to think of it, my essay about electronic publishing was for 
American Scientist a few years later.  It wasn’t part of the President’s letters. 
 
NORBERG:  OK, I’ve picked out five President’s letters that I thought were particularly 
poignant.  Computer Architecture was one; it appeared in September 1981.  And then 
Performance Analysis in November 1981. 
 
DENNING:  I’m sitting here thumbing through the copies you have.  The first couple of these 
are tutorials about how ACM is organized and how it does its budgets.  They were formulated 
from a higher-level view, emphasizing how ACM sets up its business processes to help it achieve 
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its mission.  Here’s an essay about experimental computer science, which was part of that whole 
discussion in the early 1980s, including the Snowbird discussions, seed corn, NSF, and improved 
U.S. Productivity.  Here are two reports on council meetings.  Here’s one that talks about throw-
away programs. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, I was struck by two sentences, and I will bring those up in awhile.  
Government classification and things. 
 
DENNING:  In the process of trying to draft position papers for ACM, I took my ideas into these 
columns.  Here’s one on the “seed corn”.  Here’s one about HR 109, the bill that was attempting 
to control the flow of scientific information by defining cryptologic information as “born 
classified”.  Here we switch back to technology issues with “smart editors”, which was about a 
new generation of context-sensitive editors; it’s now virtually the only kind of editor.  Here’s one 
about computer architecture. 
 
NORBERG:  I noted that one.  This one was peculiar to me; I didn’t know what to make of it, 
actually. 
 
DENNING:  Here’s one with the funny title “$$?&SS!”  This was intended to resemble swear 
marks from the comics.  It was an acerbic commentary on how the Council conducted its 
business. 
 
NORBERG:  I didn’t note any reader reaction to that one.   
 
DENNING:  Here’s one about “experimental computer science at it’s best”, in which I described 
how the performance evaluation field had evolved into a true science.  I thought that beat the 
idea of “tinkering” present in other definitions of experimental computer science.  Oh, here’s a 
New Year’s prediction, “A Pasquinade of Peccant Predictions”.   
 
NORBERG:  I love that.  The alliteration there is really perfect.  
 
DENNING:  I remember sitting there with a thesaurus [chuckles]. 
 
NORBERG:  [Laughs] You didn’t have to disclose that piece of information! 
 
DENNING:  And here’s “On Spending our Time Wisely,” another commentary for Council, 
imploring them to spend our time on larger issues.  Here’s another one on the issue of 
information on scientific publication.  Here’s a fun one, “electronic junk”; this is when I started 
sensing there was going to be a big issue about information overload, so I commented on how we 
might avoid overload. 
 
NORBERG:  The next one struck me in a very strong way. 
 
DENNING:  Oh yes: “Are Operating Systems Obsolete.”  
 




DENNING:  Mm-hmm [yes].  And then “Computer-Based Predictive Writing,” an April Fools 
spoof. 
 
NORBERG:  That one I don’t think I looked at.   
 
DENNING:  It was whimsical -- an imaginary story about a machine that would predict the 
future. 
 
NORBERG:  Oh, yes, yes! 
 
DENNING:  I wrote it in the style of the JIR, the Journal of Irreproducible Results.  And here is 
my final essay as president … 
 
NORBERG:  It’s called “Four Reforms”.  It’s one of the ones I wanted to bring up. 
 
DENNING:  I wrote about the four main things that I thought the ACM should do to become a 
better ACM; I modeled it after Bill Buckley’s book called Four Reforms, which of course was 
about the U.S. political system and had absolutely nothing to do with ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  I don’t recall seeing anything about digital libraries. 
 
DENNING:  True, I didn’t write about that subject.  It wasn’t on ACM’s radar. 
 
NORBERG:  I picked out seven essays that didn’t seem to fit my idea of president’s letters.  I 
was interested in asking about their purpose.  You’ve already described the purpose, so that 
question has been answered.  I read them carefully.  Their lessons are succinct and conclusions 
well drawn; but the topics do not seem to be the type the president of ACM should be writing, 
when there are equally important ACM issues to be conveyed to the membership.  And I put a 
little note here: “I apologize if you think this presumptuous of me.” 
 
DENNING:  Mm-hmm [yes]. 
 
NORBERG:  But now that that you talked about where these ideas, in some cases, came from in 
responding to what was going on both in ACM and in the rest of the world, it’s very clear to me 
now what the purpose was of all of these.  But did this purposeful set of actions, in writing these 
essays, play a role in the future essays you wrote, such as the education series.   
 
DENNING:  Keep in mind that I wanted the President’s letters to be interesting as well as 
suggestive of issues about the computing environment that might attract ACM interest in the 
future.  Some of the topics were admittedly in the interest of particular SIGs; but I thought it was 
good to try and communicate some of their issues to an audience outside. 
This experience opened an important door for me.   In 1984 or 1985—I don’t remember 
the exact date—Michelle Press, who was the editor of the American Scientist, called me up and 
invited me to be a columnist for the American Scientist, writing about what she called “The 
Science of Computing”.  She had seen those President’s letters and liked the questions raised and 
thoughts provoked.  She wanted somebody who could explain the science behind computing to 
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her audience and thought I could do it.  I thought this was a great opportunity and accepted her 
invitation.  So, yes indeed, the president’s letters opened that door for me. 
 
NORBERG:  I didn’t look at the essays in American Scientist, can you elaborate on them?  
 
DENNING:  It was a very productive period.  For the next eight years I wrote about six columns 
a year, one for every issue of American Scientist.  It was called the “Science of Computing.”  I 
wrote a total of forty-seven columns before retiring from the post in 1993. 
 
NORBERG:  Brian Hayes did a computing column for them -- but I think that’s after your time.  
 
DENNING:  Yes, he followed me.  He was a brilliant editor for Scientific American, and was 
recruited to replace Michelle Press when she stopped working for American Scientist.  In 1990, 
the parent society, Sigma Xi, moved their offices from the Yale campus to Research Triangle 
Park in North Carolina.  Michelle and her editorial team didn’t want to move and they quit.  
Sigma Xi had to pick up and restart at their new location.  Brian did a yeoman job of making the 
transition smooth and barely noticeable. 
Brian soon decided that he much preferred the role of a journalist to that of a manager.  
He helped recruit a new editor, Rosalyn Reid.  Rosalyn decided that she would rather work with 
Brian as the computing columnist, so we concluded our arrangement.  Brian took over the 
column with a new name.  Many of the topics he likes to write about are more like mathematical 
games augmented by computers, rather than about computing itself.  I don’t think some of those 
topics exemplify computing very well. 
 
NORBERG:  Interesting to read, but not always. 
 
DENNING:  I find most of Brian’s columns interesting.  He’s a good writer.  His style is to focus 
on puzzles in applications.  He likes to create and run simulations and often comes up with 
interesting results.  My charter was different.  Michelle Press wanted me to write about the 
science behind computing and not the coolness of applications.  Rosalyn did not want to go in 
that direction any more.  She frequently pushed on me to be more like a journalist and go out in 
the field to interview scientists about how they use computing.  That was not my style.  I did not 
want to quote other people to convey understanding; I wanted to understand it myself and write 
in my own voice.  I have to admit that was often more work than simply interviewing others. 
Well, that is what she wanted, and Brian was willing to do that.  He’s a professional 
journalist.  He visits people and talks to them on the phone.  He gathers his findings and 
integrates them into his articles. 
She gave me my chance to go in the new direction, but I didn’t want to go in that 
direction.  Brian wanted to go there, and so we parted company on good terms. 
 
NORBERG:  There wasn’t a whiff of the staff loss in American Scientist.  I didn’t pick up any 
hidden hints that would show that there was a debate. 
 
DENNING:  On the occasion of Michelle’s departure in 1990, I wrote a column “The Changing 
of the Guard”, in which I discussed as much of the situation as Michelle would allow.  I did say 
that I didn’t see why Sigma Xi would be willing to give up such a good staff.  They could 




NORBERG:  Well it’s certainly cheaper in North Carolina than in New Haven. 
 
DENNING:  I was sorry to see Michelle go.  She went on to become the senior editor at 
Scientific American, where she is now.  When she asked me to be columnist, she wanted me to 
constantly search for topics that would show off intellectually interesting and challenging aspects 
of computing.  We agreed that I would stay away from the programming, algorithms, and data 
structures aspects of computing, because those topics are really well-covered by a lot of other 
writers.  Programming and algorithms did not exemplify what Michelle was looking for.  She 
had an intuition that there’s some really good science behind computing, and she wanted me to 
expose it.  Among scientists in her reading audience, the attitude was that algorithms, data 
structures, and programming are either mathematics or engineering, but not science.  It was my 
job to answer the question, “Where is the science?” 
 
NORBERG:  You did that for eight years.  
 
DENNING:  Yes.  And some day I’d like to pick the best of them and publish a collection as a 
book.  I’ve sounded out a few publishers, who are actually wary.  They would be interested if I 
picked the best of the columns, added commentary to each to bring them up to date, and added a 
few unpublished columns.  They can market that better because it has new content. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you get any feedback from the community?   
 
DENNING:  Oh yes.  A lot of people loved those columns.  The readers of American Scientist 
loved them.  They felt like they were learning new things about computing.  They saw many 
aspects of computing that they hadn’t even appreciated.  They hadn’t realized that there were 
areas where there is some really good science going on, and now they found out about them.  
They learned that computing has deep principles and intellectual challenges that are the equal of 
things that are found in other sciences.  They found out about surprising results that have been 
discovered in computing.  They found out that computing is not shallow and makes predictions 
that can be surprising.  Over the years, I explored a lot of areas, some of which were even new to 
me.  One of my last articles was on neural networks, which I didn’t know a lot about.  By that 
time it was a big field and actually it was a lot of work for me to dig up enough that I could put 
together my own coherent story about what’s going on in that area.  Once I did that, people in the 
area told me, “You did a good job of summarizing a complex field.  Thank you.  I enjoyed 
having it promoted in this venue.” 
 
NORBERG:  Which is a large distribution.   
 
DENNING:  In 1989, CRA, the Computing Research Organization, gave me their computer 
research award, which is their annual award.  The citation of it specifically mentioned those 
American Scientist columns as works of communicating our field to other fields of science.  So 
yes, these columns were appreciated; we got lots of fan mail. 
In many ways the column was the result of Michelle Press’s vision, and not just my 
writing.  When she and her staff resigned, I suspected my days as columnist would be numbered.  
I was doing a job I liked and that fit her vision.  It was hard to imagine the next editor would 
have the same set of goals for this column. 
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The CACM Transformation 
 
NORBERG:  You were writing several different types of columns at that time, weren’t you?  
Some of them appeared in CACM. 
 
DENNING:  I occasionally wrote viewpoints and columns for the ACM Communications.  When 
I became the editor of the Communications in 1983, Stu Lynn, who as publications board chair 
was the appointing official at the time, enjoined me, “Please don’t try and write too many 
columns taking advantage of your prerogative as editor; please give other people a chance.  We 
love your columns, and we know that you like writing them, but you’ve got to give other people 
a chance!” 
 
NORBERG:  Did that amount to eleven columns instead of twelve? 
 
DENNING:  No, it was actually a pretty busy job being editor of the Communications, so maybe 
I did two or three a year. 
 
NORBERG:  What kind of a job was it to be the editor of a CACM magazine?  It’s not a highly 
technical area, like say the Journal of the ACM, but it’s also does not go as far toward magazine 
as IEEE Computer.  What’s it like to edit such a journal?  What sorts of decisions do you have to 
make about the submissions? 
 
DENNING:  The CACM is a magazine, not a journal.  A journal specializes in refereed research 
papers.  The journal editor is the manager of a process of finding referees, sending manuscripts 
to them, collecting reviews, and making decisions to accept, request revision, or reject based on 
the reviews.  The accepted papers go into the publications queue at ACM, where they receive 
very light copy editing before being published. 
A magazine is different.  It contains a mixture of departments.  The CACM had 
departments for news, letters, articles, interviews, columns, and computing practices.  While 
some articles were unsolicited, others were invited by the editors.  Most everything received 
moderate to occasionally heavy copyediting.  Professional graphics designers laid out issues, 
prepared illustrations, and chose typography.  There was also an advertising department that sold 
ad space. 
I saw my job as managing the conversations that produce issues on time every month.  
We had an executive editor who focused on all the operational processes needed to get all the 
departments to meet their schedules.  Typically the content of the next four to six issues is 
mapped out and shown in the schedule.  Farther in the future there are more blank spots in the 
schedule.  Out past a year the schedule would show mainly the special issues planned. 
Most everything was reviewed.  Therefore, the staff editors had to get manuscripts 
reviewed and make sure the authors made the requested revisions.  The staff editors got help 
from the volunteer editors on the editorial panel. 
We also had scouting operations going on.  The executive editor and the more senior staff 
editors, along with members of the CACM advisory panel, were always on the lookout for good 
articles and special issues.  They especially visited conferences and talked to prospective authors 




NORBERG:  It sounds similar to budgets for the ACM organization as well.  The executive 
committee would be doing the same thing, looking two years out and catching up with two years 
behind.  The National Science Foundation does essentially the same thing.  
 
DENNING:  Well obviously anything I’m talking about here has to be done within budget.  In 
those days, the portion of our budgets for the actual, physical issues were translated into page 
counts.  We had to manage to target page counts. 
 
Life at Purdue 
 
NORBERG:  Let me go back for just a minute to a publication in CACM in July 1977.  At that 
time there were many internal discussions about privacy, and growing external interest in 
security with computer systems.  You and your wife, Dr. Dorothy Denning, wrote about 
compilation methods for secure information flow in the July 1977 CACM.  What were the 
respective contributions to this highly technical paper between you and her? 
 
DENNING:  Well, why would you ask this question?   
 
NORBERG:  I have a reason. 
 
DENNING:  Okay.  We co-authored several papers in that era, but discontinued the practice of 
co-authoring in 1979.  That paper contained one of the main results from her PhD thesis, which 
she completed in 1975.  She was the lead author of that paper and I contributed a number of 
improvements and did most of the writing. 
My research interests at the time were operating systems and performance evaluation.  
Dorothy’s was computer security, which at that time was a subfield of operating systems.   
(Today it’s a field of its own.)  When I became department head of Purdue CS in 1979, the 
faculty began to ask the same question you did -- What was her contribution?  Was I really the 
brains hiding out in the background?  Several senior faculty told her that her chances for tenure 
would be much better if she wrote her papers on her own so that it would be obvious she was her 
own thinker.  Dorothy and I then made an agreement that I would stop working in the security 
area and leave it to her.  This was fine for me because there was so much to do with operating 
systems and performance evaluation.  That turned out to be a great agreement because she went 
on to become one of the world’s leading authorities in computer security and cryptography. 
 
NORBERG:  In most universities there is a big concern about spouses in the same field, even if 
they are not in the same specialty.  The concern remains even if the spouses are in different 
departments, such as one in computer science and the other in computer engineering.  The other 
faculty always raise a question about who spearheads the discussion -- as your colleagues 
pointed out.  But I was curious if you would say, “Well, we discussed these issues around the 
breakfast table every morning, and we found common ground.  It was a natural thing to write 
together about our common interest.”  That would give you both an equal opportunity theory to 
contribute to the research—whatever percentage we won’t say. 
 
DENNING:  It’s true that we discussed computing issues all the time.  We always seek advice 
from each other about technical issues we are dealing with.  Sometimes these conversations will 
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occur in the car going to work.  Sometimes they’ll occur around the dinner table, or with friends.  
Sometimes they’ll happen in our evening study periods.  I value Dorothy’s opinion on many 
things.  She’s a great skeptic.  She is really hard-nosed about scientific evidence for things.  
Sometimes I’ll get carried away with my own lofty ideas and she’ll just say, “I don’t get the 
grounding.  This seems ungrounded.  You need more compelling evidence.”  It’s always useful 
to bounce things off of her. 
Our agreement to segregate our research areas did not stop these spousal conversations.  
We just didn’t write papers together.  That quieted down all that colleague-faculty questioning, 
“Who did what?”  
 
NORBERG:  The evaluation process for promotion and tenure especially asks that question 
about every co-authored paper. 
 
DENNING:  Our agreement did not completely quiet the concern.  It came up in 1981 when she 
was up for tenure.  Some faculty said, “Well you know, we think that Peter may feed her ideas 
during nighttime pillow talk.  We’re not sure that this is 100% her work.”  I insisted, “I have not 
helped Dorothy since 1979, this is all her work.”  She insisted likewise.  Some of the faculty  
didn’t believe it.  So she had trouble getting tenured at Purdue, even though she had a stellar 
record. 
 
NORBERG:  Maybe they just didn’t want a woman. 
 
DENNING:  If there was such a prejudice, it was not overt.  Purdue had pretty strong rules; you 
had to have 2/3 of the votes to get through the tenure process successfully. 
 
NORBERG:  Is that a special rule for spouses?  
 
DENNING:  No, just anybody.  All candidates had to have 2/3 of the votes to get through the 
committees.  Some of the faculty opponents were very candid when they said, “We just don’t 
like the idea of spouses being in the same department.” 
 
NORBERG:  Well, yes, I never did.  I was in only one department that had a spousal pair.  They 
were very careful in faculty meetings not to express the same opinions, so it wouldn’t seem like 
they were a voting bloc … 
 
DENNING:  We did all that stuff in our faculty meetings.  When I became department head, we 
restructured the reporting relationship chains of command with the Dean so that there were no 
conflicts of interest.  She did not report to me; she reported to the Dean.  Everybody was satisfied 
with those aspects.  But there were just some faculty in the department who as a matter of 
principle felt uncomfortable with spouses being in the same department, and that’s why they 
voted against her tenure.  They said her record is good, they’re not challenging her record; it’s 
just the principle of the thing they don’t like. 
 
NORBERG:  Often principles come down to prejudice. 
 
DENNING:  I suppose that’s what it looked like.  When she learned that her tenure case failed to 
get 2/3 in the department, she was devastated.  It felt like prejudice to her.  The dean and provost 
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both encouraged her to apply again the next year and said they would watch the process carefully 
to make sure it was free of prejudice. 
By the next year, her record was so good that the faculty couldn’t ignore it.  The dean 
told the department evaluation committee, “How can we not promote somebody with this 
record?  She’s better than a lot of the other promotions that come through here.  If we don’t 
promote her, we’re going to look like we’re practicing sexual discrimination.”  He also told 
them, “If you decide to turn her down again, you’d better give me a darn good reason I can take 
forward to the school and provost committees.  If you really feel that it’s not right to have 
spouses in the same department, we’ll find her another department.  That is not a good enough 
reason to deny tenure.” 
 
NORBERG:  My department saw me as the Dean’s boy in the meetings because I had so much 
contact with the Dean.  I didn’t have such private information, but I never let them know that.  I 
figured, “Let them be afraid—they’ll treat me better!”  I came in with tenure.  I told the search 
committee that without tenure I wasn’t interested in the position, because I can’t serve two 
masters -- doing the things needed for tenure and building a research institute from the ground up 
at the same time. 
 
[break]   
 
 
Session 3, Tape 1, Side B 
The ACM Digital Library 
 
NORBERG:  All right, I have a set of questions on other roles within ACM.  But when you gave 
me this time-line diagram yesterday about your positions in ACM and education and 
administration management, the questions now don’t seem quite as focused as I would like them 
to be.  So I thought last night that maybe I would change the set of questions.  Of these items you 
listed here -- your time-line of ACM activities from editorial boards, to digital library and the 
rest -- what did you feel was the most important and why? 
 
DENNING: I think the one that’s had the most effect on the way ACM works and the way ACM 
is perceived, has been the digital library.  I led that project when I was chair of the Pubs board.  
Shortly after the library was launched, ACM gave me the Outstanding Contribution Award in 
recognition of accomplishment.  The digital library is called by all the ACM presidents “the 
crown jewel” of the ACM community, the center of all ACM offerings.  It has helped define a 
whole new family of “electronic community” services for the ACM members -- for example, the 
professional development center, the email service that gives you an ACM.org, and personal 
portfolios of interests.  ACM is constantly offering new web services.  The digital library has 
also become a model that a lot of other societies have imitated.  The ACM copyright policies for 
cyberspace have been imitated.  They’re actually a lot like what’s today called the “creative 
commons” license. 
The creative commons license puts things into the public domain and stipulates that if 
you use it in some other work, you give a complete citation to the original from which you 
borrowed it.  We designed a new copyright policy for cyberspace in 1994, seven years before the 
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Creative Commons organization was founded.   I don’t know whether the ACM policy 
influenced the founder, Larry Lessig, but at least that form of sharing was “in the air”. 
The open software movement, started in the 1980s by Richard Stallman, created a 
predecessor concept, which they called “copyleft”.  Open software was copylefted instead of 
copyrighted.  Same idea -- you can reuse it with credit to the author -- and you can’t remove the 
copyleft notice. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s fair, that’s what we insist on in the Babbage Institute. 
 
DENNING:  Our new ACM copyright policy did that, but it also dealt with numerous other 
issues that arise around electronic publishing.  A big issue among ACM authors was preprints.  
Under what conditions can an author post a preprint of an article queued for ACM publication?  
And what about the various free versions of a paper posted on the web before the version that 
was accepted by ACM for publication?  Our policy took care of that. 
 
NORBERG:  How?  
 
DENNING:  We basically said that there’s one paper existing in multiple versions.  Some of the 
versions may be stored in ACM, some stored in the author’s personal web server.  But they 
should all be marked or tagged as versions of the same thing.  
 
NORBERG:  What about the problem of authors writing essentially the same paper in different 
venues? 
 
DENNING:  The copyright policy provided that authors could reuse any portion of their prior 
published work in a new work, provided that they cite the ACM publication.  That ensured that if 
a derived work is offered in a different venue, there is a citation to the original.  Lots of authors 
thought that was a good policy. 
The author support was crucial to the success of the digital library.  We were able to 
forge a policy that was much less restrictive than the old print copyright policy, but not so loose 
that ACM loses control of the things it publishes.  We spent a lot of time thinking that policy 
through and vetting it with authors.  Other societies imitated the ACM plan and the ACM library 
when they put together their own libraries. 
We also spent a lot of time on policies for access to the digital library.  We considered all 
the options, from open access to everyone to access for members only.  ACM wanted there to be 
a value in being a member, so full access was given to members who subscribed.  The 
subscription price was kept affordable.  The tables of contents of ACM publications were freely 
available to the public; the content was restricted to subscribers. 
Many libraries, companies, and consortia bought annual subscription licenses for the 
digital library, that would allow full access to the library to everyone in their organization.  
Someone who was not inclined to be a member could still get full access to the library through 
their library or their employer.  These licenses have become a big revenue source for ACM.  
They are very popular. 
 




DENNING:  And as I said, not long after the library was launched, John White came in as 
executive director and made it a priority to scan in the entire ACM literature.  It was an 
expensive project, but when it was done everything the ACM had published since its founding in 
1947 was in the library.  It made the library a tremendously valuable resource.   That was one of 
the best investments ACM ever made. 
 
NORBERG:  Are there different kinds of licenses?  For example, the University of Minnesota 
doesn’t have everything that ACM is currently publishing. 
 
DENNING:  I believe so, but I don’t really know the range of license types ACM offers now.  
 
NORBERG:  But was that allowed for in the beginning?  Or did that just happen to come up 
later, to your knowledge?  
 
DENNING:  ACM always had a couple of packages for libraries and institutional members to 
receive print publications.  Some of the variations may have been preserved into the digital 
library licenses.   I haven’t been following that.  Those licenses became popular after I left the 
publications board. 
 
NORBERG:  When I looked in the digital library, I saw no SIG newsletters, and some of the 
transactions didn’t seem to be there either.  
 
DENNING:  The SIG newsletters have always been problematic for the digital library because 
they were never copyrighted by ACM in the first place.  Because ACM always considered the 
SIG newsletters to be informal, it never asked authors for the copyrights.  In every other 
publication, ACM always gets the copyrights from the authors.  When the question came up, 
“Should we put the SIG newsletters in the digital library?” we didn’t know how to do that.  We 
needed a copyright release from the newsletter authors.  Locating the authors of most items, 
especially the older items, was a near impossibility.  We decided that the best we could do is start 
getting copyright releases from authors of SIG newsletter items, and include the SIG newsletters 
in the library after that date.  In some cases, I think the SIGs helped and got copyright releases 
for older materials.  I remember seeing in the library a copy of a 1971 special issue of SIGPLAN 
notices about concurrent run time environments.  I think you’ll find materials from SIG 
newsletters in recent years, but the older stuff is spotty. 
 
NORBERG:  The Babbage Institute has tried to acquire newsletters wherever it can.  We started 
out of course with the older ones, the digital computer newsletter, and carried up from there.  I 
don’t remember that we ever went earlier than 1975, but we could have.  The old copies were 
hard to come by. 
 
DENNING:  ACM probably has a collection of all the newsletters somewhere in headquarters; it 
would be on a shelf somewhere but can’t be scanned in because of the copyright issue. 
 
NORBERG: I tried to get access to that material but Richard Snodgrass [ACM history 
committee] told me it just wasn’t possible because that stuff hadn’t gone through appraisal and 




The CACM Transformation, Again 
 
DENNING:  Anyway, your earlier question concerned which things were most influential of the 
things I’ve done.  After the digital library, the next most influential thing would be my being 
editor of the Communications and guiding it through its revitalization in the years after 1982.  I 
think we did a pretty darn good job given the limited budgets we had to work with.  We did 
produce a transformation and a new identity for Communications. 
The main complaints about the new Communications came from researchers who thought 
a venerable venue for research publication had been lost.  These complaints were from a 
minority of readers.  The majority told us through regular surveys that they liked the magazine.  
Interestingly, no one has proposed to scrap the Communications or unbundle it from the 
membership package.  It’s clearly a staple of the ACM membership, and even the sharpest critics 
want to make it even better. 
I think that was another major accomplishment. 
 
 
The SIG Organization, Again 
 
NORBERG: Anything else? 
 
DENNING: Gosh, well, I think our work organizing the SIGs into strong sub-organizations has 
had a big payoff for ACM in its technical depth and credibility. 
When I was education board chair (1998-2004) I helped revitalize the board and we 
completed the first major curriculum revision in a decade.  It was an incredibly complex revision 
because there were five major computing-related subfields that had to be accounted for. 
And maybe the pressure I exerted, which we already discussed, to maintain a high road 
for ACM in engaging with public policy issues helped the ACM along toward maturity.  It 
wasn’t as if we turned a switch and ACM became more mature.  Maturing was a gradual process.  
I think ACM has become a mature organization today. 
 
 
The Transformation of ACM’s Style 
 
NORBERG:  Do you think the role you played—not in the digital library now but in the 
Communications and various other publishing activities like the presidential letters, viewpoints 
and so on—do you think that these helped you to acquire a broader understanding of the 
computer science field over time? 
 
DENNING:  Oh yes.  Look at my research history.  At the beginning, I was an operating systems 
and then a performance evaluation guy.  I spent from 1965 to around 1980 on this.  So, for the 




 And then, for reasons we can go into more in a little while, I felt it necessary to start 
broadening out.  I began to see the need for broadening when I became department head at 
Purdue in 1979.  Suddenly I had to represent all parts of my department, not just my own.  I had 
to learn what the other departments were up to so that I could interact with them.  When I 
became ACM president in 1980, I had to broaden in a different way, especially learning how to 
interact with those outside on public policy matters.  These things brought me to a much bigger 
understanding of computing than I had at the beginning, and of the relation of computing to 
many other fields. 
My desire for broadening was one of the reasons I went to NASA in 1983: to immerse 
myself into a different environment and widen my horizons. 
Part of the reason I dove in and wrote monthly president’s letters was that I wanted to 
learn to tell the stories of different parts of ACM and the field it was in.  That helped to open a 
new stage of interaction between ACM and others.  It also got me an invitation to American 
Scientist, where I got to tell the stories of computing to a wide audience of scientists.  I think 
those stories helped build more respect for the science in computing. 
All this happened over another long period of around fifteen years.  I found myself with 
an unusually broad view of the field of computing.  By drawing on my broad perspective, I am 
now able to do things that many others cannot.  The Great Principles of Computing project is like 
this. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you participate in any other volunteer opportunities after your presidential 
years?   
 
DENNING:  As I said, ACM has been my volunteer thing.  After I was president, I was editor-
in-chief of the Communications, then chair of the publications board, then chair of the education 
board, then director of the IT Profession Initiative, then a member of the Education Council, and 
the senior volunteer editor for ACM Ubiquity.  I’ve been continuously involved with ACM for 
forty years. 
I’ve received a few invitations from others like AAAS and IEEE to run for office.  I just 
turned those down because I was too involved with ACM.  I could probably have won those 
elections, but I didn’t want to go there. 
 
NORBERG:  All right.  I have two more issues on ACM, if you can bear with me.  To your 
knowledge, did the manner of ACM’s origin leave any imprint on the organization?  Or was 
there a major turning point that changed the character of the organization?  Like the 1978 
questions I asked.  
 
DENNING: I’ve always had the impression that the ACM has evolved in a way that has fulfilled 
the dreams of the founders of ACM.  They wanted a professional organization for people to get 
together to discuss and advance computing, and it’s certainly been that.  Those discussions have 
led to advances in research and advances in technology.  ACM has grown into a large 
organization with increasing public visibility, credibility, and influence in the last few years.  I 
think our founders would all be very proud of that. 
 




DENNING:  The founders wanted a society that would bring computer people together and help 
them advance the field and the public understanding of computing.  They created a learned 
society rather than a professional union.  They got us started early on the path of publishing 
research papers.  They encouraged special interest committees to form.  All of this is still with 
us. 
 
NORBERG:  The founders like Ed Berkeley and Franz Alt had a way of generating interest in 
the field and bringing all the computer types together.  They were all talking to each other.  Over 
time, as you have pointed out, the special interest groups developed a strong identity, and some 
of them eventually wound up at odds with the ACM leadership.  That didn’t feel like the original 
idea that “We’re in the ballgame together.”  I’m willing to venture that the special interest groups 
are more independent than you’re giving in your answer and that the original founders probably 
wouldn’t have liked that. 
 
DENNING:  I think the special interest groups were a natural consequence of the seeds the 
founders originally planted.  It seems entirely natural for affinity groups to form inside the larger 
community of computer types talking together.  I can’t see the founders objecting to that. 
 
NORBERG:  You think that’s a natural evolution. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, indeed. 
 
NORBERG:  Because why couldn’t timesharing, and whatever specialized topics that people 
wanted to discuss, be discussed by all computer scientists and not just in this special group? 
 
DENNING:  Let’s pursue your example.  As a guy interested in timesharing, I’m delighted when 
I can find other experts with whom I can learn and discuss issues.  I’m grateful to ACM for 
providing the means for us timesharing people to find each other.  But we are not insular.  We 
put out a newsletter that any ACM member can read and we interact with other committees on 
shared conferences.  All this sounds like the sort of interchange our founders wanted to 
encourage. 
It’s harder for me to evaluate how our founders would react to allowing the strongest 
committees to become semi-autonomous SIGs with their own bylaws and elections.  But they 
would certainly like the results the SIGs have achieved for ACM -- the technical depth and 
breadth of SIG conferences and publications is amazing. 
I would imagine the founders would not have liked all the internal disputes that arose in 
the times when I was fairly new to ACM.  I think the ACM finally outgrew that and has evolved 
to a strong, mature organization today. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you think that the founders based their model of ACM on another society, the 
AAAS maybe? 
 
DENNING:  I do not know. 
 
NORBERG:  As you well know, AAAS is divided into many groups, many of which have little 




DENNING:  ACM is much more cohesive than AAAS.  There are obviously some people whose 
view of ACM and the field is almost entirely what they see from inside their SIG.  Their SIG is 
their world.  The fact is that the SIGs offer a lot of technical depth, interact a lot, and identify 
with a strong ACM.  The oneness of ACM overwhelms any tendencies in the SIGs toward 
separateness.  I think that would please the founders. 
I do believe that the electronic community, digital library, and Web-based ACM changed 
the style and character of the organization.  I don’t think the founders envisaged a day when 
ACM would be many virtual communities.  But even so, the seeds they planted enabled ACM to 
transition smoothly into the age of electronic services and business. 
 
NORBERG:  What was ACM’s relationship with computer manufacturers?  Was there any?  
 
DENNING:  ACM has had few formal relationships with manufacturers.  The only ones I can 
think of in the earlier days were sponsorships of conferences.  In those days, formal relationships 
had to be approved case by case by Council.  Many of the larger SIG conferences today have 
regular contributions from computer and software companies.  ACM now has regular formal 
relationships with some companies to support awards -- for example, Prentice-Hall supports the 
Karlstrom educator award, Intel and Google support the Turing Award, and Infosys will support 
a new award for information systems.  IBM has been a long supporter of the programming 
contest. 
Despite our having few formal relationships with industry, we had considerable contact 
with industry through our volunteer leaders.  Our founders came from the main manufacturers of 
the day.  Many of our presidents have been from industry.  As I scan the list of past presidents I 
see Stu Feldman from Bell Labs, Steve Bourne from Bell Labs, Chuck House from HP, Gwen 
Bell from the Computer Museum, John White from Xerox, Adele Goldberg from Xerox, Dave 
Brandin from SRI, Jean Sammet from IBM, Walter Carlson from IBM, Dick Hamming from 
Bell Labs, and John Mauchly from Univac.  I may have missed a few.  All these people gave us 
many informal relationships with industry. 
The publication enterprise is, of course, going to receive most of its support from 
academics, whose primary job is to teach and write.  Our founders wanted a strong publication 
enterprise.  When he started the CACM, Alan Perlis didn’t want just a newsletter; he wanted 
something with juicy content.  He didn’t want to hear about tea at the Armory last Tuesday, he 
wanted to hear about the future of artificial intelligence.  While industry benefits from what is 
written in the publications, they are not the main providers of material. 
The initial commitment to a strong publication with good technical content was a 
commitment to head down a path with lots of academic participation.  I do believe that the early 
leaders of ACM also wanted strong chapters, where the many members from industry could 
come together once a month to exchange professional ideas and experiences.  When I first came 
on board, the chapters were getting as much attention as the publications. 
 
NORBERG:  You’re talking about grass roots participation; information flowing from members 
into the organization.  How about the other way?  What about information flowing from Council 
to the members and other contributors? 
 
DENNING:  There wasn’t much.  No surprise there.  The Council is a governing body that sets 
the budgets and strategic directions of the association.  Everybody expected Council to do its job 
and keep the organization going and ethical.  Nobody expected Council to offer much to the 
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computing discussions of ACM.  Occasionally the Council commissions a task force to prepare a 
report, for example the job mobility study led by Moshe Vardi.  When the report is out, it is 
known for its topic and possibility its leader -- thus the Vardi report on job mobility -- and is not 
seen as a communication from Council. 
 
 
Reforms for ACM 
 
NORBERG:  I want to take up one last question with respect to ACM, and that’s succession.  
When you were leaving office and you wrote that final presidential letter on the four reforms, 
how did you think about this topic with respect to your successor, in this case, David Brandin?  
And maybe beyond that to Adelle Goldberg.  
 
DENNING:  You have to remember that, of course, I think every person going out of the office 
is going to have suggestions for successors.  You pointed out the final column that Dan 
McCracken had written leaving me a bunch of suggestions.  We agreed that some of them were 
works in process and got completed, and others, especially on the public policy issues, I didn’t 
pursue as aggressively as Dan would.  So my final president’s letter continued a tradition of 
bequeathing suggestions to one’s successor.  Obviously, I was not much in a position to do 
anything anymore except propose reforms or propose suggestions.  But I wanted my final letter 
to make a strong case. 
By the way, my title “four reforms” was borrowed from the title of a book that Bill 
Buckley wrote in 1973.  As he did for American politics, I looked for simple statements that 
could be enacted quickly but would have profound effects for ACM. 
 
NORBERG:  Your first proposal is to get ACM into the computer age.  Apparently the 
headquarters and volunteer communications were way behind the state of the art in industry.  
Your second proposal was to require the Council to spend at least one-third of its agenda time on 
issues outside of ACM, such as public policy issues or professional issues. 
 
DENNING:  It took ACM a long time, but they finally developed Headquarters computing 
support that is second to none for managing the business, providing member services, and 
supporting volunteer communications.  The ACM electronic communities and digital library are 
culminations of that success.  The reform itself was to provide a fund to support computing in 
ACM operations.  This was eventually accomplished.  Not in the next administration but over a 
long period of time. 
The second proposal was motivated by my persistent frustration with Council over how it 
spent its time.  I wrote several president’s letters about that previously.  I thought that a forced 
change of behavior might eventually lead to a change of heart.  Over the years, as ACM matured, 
Council did implement that reform and now regularly spends significant time on strategic, 
external issues. 
 
NORBERG:  The third proposal was to reduce the internal bureaucracy.  You noted that at a 
typical ACM conference, there would be more committee meeting hours than conference session 
hours scheduled.  You thought that ACM would do better with fewer committee meetings and 
more people at headquarters implementing things.  You wanted to cut the volunteer travel budget 
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in half, limiting it to 3 percent of the total budget, and divert the difference to the support of 
ACM headquarters staff. 
 
DENNING:  Remember the context.  At the time there was a lot of contention around 
governance issues.  The executive committee tried to keep up with new policy and procedure 
rules, but those piled on top of one another and sometimes seemed to stunt growth.  It seemed 
that we had to go through lots of approvals and consensus processes to get simple things done.  
In an absolute sense, our internal bureaucracy then was much less than today. 
 
NORBERG:  You raised five points under that goal, and the last one was that often nothing gets 
done because too many committees must be consulted.   
 
DENNING:  Yes.  It seemed that way.  I advocated that all standing committees should 
automatically go away in five years unless renewed by Council.  I also advocated a lot more use 
of ad hoc task forces for special projects. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, that makes a lot of sense.  Your last goal was just improving internal 
cooperation.   You didn’t offer a reform for that goal. 
 
DENNING:  That’s right.  I saw a lot of “territorial” disputes between committees.  I saw 
volunteers getting turned off because they got involved in political disputes rather than the 
project they volunteered for.  But I didn’t see an easy reform to change people’s attitudes toward 
working together better. 
Those were my suggestions to the next administration.  I think Dave Brandin, who was 
my successor, agreed with their spirit and did what he could with them.  He had to deal with his 
own set of eruptions with Grosch and others. 
 
 
Advice to Successors 
 
NORBERG:  Did you expect Dave Brandin to be your successor?  Mike Harrison was also 
running, and he was vice-president when you were president. 
 
DENNING:  As I recall, Dave surprised Mike (and me) by beating him.  Mike thought, and I 
agreed, that Mike was the natural guy.  Somehow Dave came across as a stronger candidate to 
the electorate. 
In those days, I had become very good about predicting elections simply by reading the 
statements of the candidate.  I imagined myself as an ACM member and watched how I 
responded at an emotional level to what I was reading.  I had a good response to Mike’s 
statement and expected him to win.  But I was undoubtedly biased because I helped Mike write 
his statement, so I couldn’t evaluate my own response dispassionately. 
 
NORBERG:  Can you give a couple of examples, or is it too far in the past?   
 
DENNING:  Sure.  I used to tell people, “As much as you dislike Herb Grosch, who writes better 
campaign statements?”  Herb wrote eloquently on topics that people seemed to care about and he 
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appealed to many voting members who did not know what it was like to work with him.  He 
frequently portrayed himself as anti-establishment, even though he was a leading figure in the 
ACM establishment!  I told people, “Read Herb’s statements and imitate them.” 
One of the favorite forms of campaign statements was the “resume recital”.  That seemed 
to be a fast road to defeat.  Despite its bad track record, it was a popular form of statement.  
You’d see statements that would sound like this.  “As the chair of the SIG board, I gained 
considerable experience that will help me be the president.  And as the chair of the chapters 
committee, I gained other contacts and experience that will also help me be president.  And as a 
member of industry, I bring an industry perspective.”  Boring stuff.  Nothing offered but a series 
of dreary committee appointments. 
In contrast, Herb seldom talked about himself.  He pointed out a problem and told you of 
his determination to fix it.  For example, he said, “ACM, supposedly the leader in computing, is 
not in the computer age.  We are surrounded by smart people who run computing in their 
businesses; we don’t have one-tenth their capability in our headquarters.  If I’m president, I’m 
going to tap that expertise and do something about that.”  Then he says, “If I get to be president, 
I’m going to fire the nominating committee because those suckers made me jump through too 
many hoops!” 
Herb gave a very clear picture of what he was interested in and what he was going to do.  
That was attractive to people.  He didn’t say, “I’m the right guy because of all my experience,” 
he said, “This is what I’m going to do.”  I told aspirants that they didn’t have to like his policies 
to imitate his style.  Don’t talk about yourself and how great and experienced you are; talk about 
what you are committed to, and make sure it aligns with what voters care about.  Herb made it 
very clear what voters were going to get.  They were going to get a guy who would bring ACM 
into the computing age, fire the nominating committee, and campaign for scientific freedom in 
Russia.  Voters liked that clarity. 
In the election for my successor, Dave Brandin wrote a statement more like that than 
Mike Harrison. 
 
NORBERG:  I didn’t read it actually, because it’s very difficult to get copies of those things. 
 
DENNING:  They’re in old print issues of the Communications.  For some reason, they weren’t 
scanned into the digital library.  That’s too bad, as the campaign statements are very revealing 
about the issues of the day. 
 
NORBERG:  When Brandin became president, do you think he followed through with your 
program, or did he start out in a new direction for ACM? 
 
DENNING:  As we have discussed, the bulk of what I was doing was trying to cope with all the 
stuff that was being thrown at us.  I found that I had few real choices; my best strategy was to 
pick on the one or two top items on my list and keep pushing people along in those directions.  
One of my top items was to exemplify the kinds of public policy issues I thought we should be 
involved in and the kinds of position statements we could issue on them.  My “four reforms” 
would, in my opinion if enacted, have enabled me to pursue more of the important conversations 
I wanted to pursue. 
I’m sure the world was a lot like that from Dave Brandin’s perspective.  A lot of 
incoming items that required attention and weren’t on the agenda.   I think he agreed with the 
gist of the big issues -- such as getting ACM into the computer age and focusing on important 
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external issues -- and he worked on those things.  I doubt that he thought my procedural reforms 
would do much good, although he could see why I might advocate them.  I didn’t have any beefs 
with the strategic directions he chose. 
 
NORBERG:  You got to sit with the executive committee and Council for two years as past 
president, giving you a vantage point to watch what was going on. 
 
DENNING:  True, and I don’t recall any beefs with Dave’s directions.  We all had very limited 
resources of time and money to work with; it was very hard.  In those days, ACM was always on 
the verge of being broke. 
 
NORBERG:  How did you leave it financially?  Was it healthy?  
 
DENNING:  We were okay.  We had barely enough revenue for our expenses.  And thank God 
for those NCC distributions from AFIPS. 
 
 
Roles of Past Presidents 
 
NORBERG:  Is there a role to be played by past presidents of ACM collectively? 
 
DENNING:  I think we’re a resource of people who have broad perspectives.  The main aspects 
of the job are to represent the entire membership, and to maintain an appreciation for the entire 
field as a whole.  Most of the other ACM jobs don’t require that or put you in the middle of that.  
So the past presidents are a resource of people who had the experience of having to look at the 
bigger picture and having to think about the whole of the membership and of the computing 
field. 
 
NORBERG:  But it might take two years to gain that sort of knowledge, and then suddenly 
you’re out of office. 
 
DENNING:  That’s okay.   
 
NORBERG:  Why is it okay?   
 
DENNING:  People should be in office for five years?  Or they should be reelected? 
 
NORBERG:  Perhaps.  If it takes two years to learn the job, you’re leaving just when you have 
the knowledge and information that would carry through some aspect of a program or a program 
individually.  You’re sitting there as past president, you have all these thoughts behind your 
work and the work of the people before you, but there really is not much you can do. 
 
DENNING:  I disagree that there is not much I could do as immediate past president.  I had a 
vote on the executive committee and on the Council.  I could continue to press my points of view 
and make action proposals.  There is a lot you can do with that. 
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All these positions are part-time volunteer jobs.  I was a volunteer leader of all the other 
volunteers.  I’m supposed to represent the interest of the members to the rest of the volunteers 
who work with me.  I’m responsible to make sure the executive director and headquarters staff 
follow through on all the services we promised to the members.  The executive director and his 
staff provide the corporate memory to the ACM continuity. 
The turnover of volunteers was a conscious choice by the founders to make sure there is 
always freshness, turnover, so that we don’t get stale.  There are always new people coming 
along to represent the members.  As members grow and age and mature, new people come up 
through the ranks and the older people retire, and that’s the way our founders wanted it.  I think 
that’s a well tested, reasonable model.  If we didn’t have a solid, reliable, professional 
headquarters, we could be flopping around all the time.  In comes the next president, with a 
different set of interests, everything gets topsy-turvy.  Denning tells the headquarters to go one 
way, Brandin another.  How would ACM get anything done in such an environment? 
The fact of the matter is, Denning comes in and pushes some mild influences on the 
system.  Some of Denning’s proposals get adopted as headquarters programs, which they provide 
to members after Denning is gone.  Others of Denning’s proposals are not adopted.  Some of 
what Denning does achieves a lasting influence, and some does not. 
The same thing happens with the next president.  Some of his influences change the 
headquarters and some do not.  The turnover of the volunteers gives constant new inputs to the 
headquarters about priorities and programs.  The headquarters is like the machine that keeps 
everything going; the headquarters delivers the services to the members, does all the 
coordinating of member interests, and provides information to all the members.  This is a 
perfectly viable model, and I think it serves ACM well. 
As you know, it is the philosophy of the US political system that you have to become a 
senior member of Congress to have the power and experience to get things done.  A bunch of 
people thought this system also engenders cronyism and corruption and so they advocate term 
limits on elected officials.  The officials resist, and the term-limiters press for turnover.  ACM 
does not need a term limit movement: all its elective offices are limited to two years.  With all 
the turnover, ACM has been able to make itself more like a learning organization, constantly 
adapting to the times and to member interests, instead of a plodding bureaucracy. 
Yesterday you asked, “What’s a weakness?” and I answered, “I think ACM can be better 
as a learning system.”  The more I think about it and look back over the ways ACM has changed, 
the more I think the ACM model promotes ACM being a learning system pretty well.  Maybe it 
could be better, but it could also be a lot worse.  The system even knows how to deal with guys 
like me who keep hanging around, taking new jobs.  Over the past 40 years I was able to hold a 
lot of offices.  But eventually the others had had enough of me, and they stopped appointing me.  
But I still have a post, on the Education Council. 
 
NORBERG:  I thought you were going to challenge my statement with a rejoinder like, “If the 
president has been previously vice president, he actually has four years to train and develop 
relationships that allow implementing new programs.”  But you didn’t say that.   
 
DENNING:  We have already noted that some vice presidents ran and did not get elected, and 
others wanted to run and were not nominated.  The ACM members don’t see a natural chain of 
succession from vice president to president.  They look at each person’s promises in their 
campaign statements and go with them.  So in my opinion your proposed argument is not very 




NORBERG:  I don’t think you fully answered my question about whether there is a role to be 
played by the past presidents of ACM collectively. 
 
DENNING:  Sorry, I thought I did.  The past presidents are a unique group who have cultivated 
broad perspectives on the computing field and an understanding of its deepest concerns.  ACM 
gives them a special status, such as a web page listing them, lifetime inclusion in the key people 
roster, and getting their oral histories.  (I don’t think they do the same for Turing Award winners, 
who have numerous other perks.)  ACM sees its past presidents as a cherished resource.  It’s a 
mark of honor to have been the ACM president.  While ACM doesn’t make concerted attempts 
to draw on the past-presidents’ resources, I can say that, in my own case, ACM welcomed my 
continued participation.  As we have discussed, I’ve served in many roles since being President. 
 
NORBERG:  I looked at some other presidents to see what they did after finishing their 
presidency.  Dan McCracken, for example, was gone after his term was up as Past President.  I 
believe he told me that he did not participate afterwards. 
 
DENNING:  I don’t think he was completely gone.  He participated on spot projects that 
interested him.  If someone invited him, he’d help out, but I don’t think he volunteered for 
anything. 
 
NORBERG:  Others, like Jean Sammet and Bernie Galler, were indefatigable.  They were 
always available.  I liked Bernie a great deal, but I did not care for my interactions with Jean.  
Both of them continued to provide whatever support and comfort they could. 
 
DENNING:  Opinions! 
 
NORBERG:  [Laughs]  Now, I wasn’t going to say that, Peter! 
 
DENNING:  Jean was very active for a long time, and always available to help out with any 
administration that wanted her help in any way.  She’s very kind-hearted.  I just saw her two 
months ago [June 2007] at the awards banquet.  Sharp as a tack.  Up to date on what people have 
been doing.  Well informed.  Always ready to give advice. 
 






Part VIII: Research on Working Sets and Locality, NASA/RIACS 
 




NORBERG:  I’d like to return to your research career and pick up a loose end.  In 1978 you 
published a joint paper in CACM with Donald Slutz, called “Generalized Working Sets”.  Can 
you comment on your roles?  What was he doing that attracted you and him to collaborate? 
 
DENNING:  Remember, Don and I were office mates at MIT, so we had been in many 
conversations since MIT. 
Don had been working with some colleagues at the IBM San Jose Lab on memory 
management and analysis techniques that could be used in relational database systems.  Around 
1970 he and his colleagues discovered that a large subset of page replacement algorithms for 
virtual memory fit inside a single model, which they called the Stack Model.  These were all the 
paging algorithms that consulted some sort of memory-independent priority list to decide which 
pages to retain in main memory.  Those policies all had the property that if you allocated more 
memory, they generated fewer page faults.  The “stack” was a list of pages that represented the 
potential memory contents – for example, the first 5 pages of the stack would be the contents of a 
5-page memory using that paging algorithm. 
The stack property was very important to designers because it ensured predictability and 
controllability.  Some years before, Les Belady [IBM] discovered that the popular FIFO paging 
algorithm had an anomaly – sometimes you could allocate more pages and wind up increasing 
the amount of page faults.  The uncertainty about such anomalies made it difficult to design 
feedback control systems that would dynamically adjust the amount of memory allocated to a 
task in order to maintain a target paging rate. 
The Stack Model included the popular LRU [least recently used], LFU [least frequently 
used], RAND [random], and even MIN [optimal] paging algorithms.  Knowing that these were 
free of anomalies was a big help in designing stable virtual memory systems. 
When Don and his colleagues published their paper on stack algorithms, I was 
immediately smitten with the elegance of the idea.  It was like a “unified field theory” for the 
paging algorithm work I had done for my PhD thesis.   I stayed in close touch with Don and 
speculated with him about applying the same idea to the working set policy that was the 
centerpiece of my PhD thesis.  The working set policy dynamically adjusted the memory 
allocated to a task to always maintain the task’s internal locality set in memory.  Because it was 
dynamic allocation, it did not fit the assumptions of the stack model, which applied only to tasks 
occupying a fixed size memory area. 
In our conversations Don and I discovered a way of unifying the dynamic working set 
algorithms with the fixed space algorithms of the stack model.  We said that each replacement 
policy works with a cost function that represents the cost of retaining the page until the next time 
it was used, contrasted with removing the page from memory before it was used again.  In the 
latter case, it would incur a page-fault cost on the next use.  We defined cost functions for all the 
stack algorithms, the optimal fixed-space and variable-space algorithms, and the working set 
algorithm.  We thus had one model that explained all the paging algorithms (except FIFO) and 
was able to predict paging rates and memory sizes of tasks managed by those algorithms.  We 
even extended the cost functions to cover variable-size segments as well as fixed-size pages.  
The Generalized Working Set truly was a “unified field theory” for all virtual memory 
management policies. 
 




DENNING:  Cost was a mixture of space and time.  We defined retention cost for the measure of 
the cost of holding an object in memory since its most recent reference until the present time.  A 
typical retention cost would be space-time.  For example, a segment of size 5 retained for 100 
time units would generate retention cost 500.  The other component of cost was recovery cost.  It 
was incurred if the object was not retained until its next reference.  It was the cost of reloading 
the object at the next reference.  We stated the policy followed by all algorithms in our unified 
family as follows: if the retention cost is less than the recovery cost, retain the object in memory 
until the next reference; otherwise, replace it. 
Don and I had independently sketched out this idea in separate technical reports.  When 
we discovered this, we decided to merge them and offer the result for publication. 
 
NORBERG:  Where was Don at the time? 
 
DENNING:  He was at IBM Almaden Lab in San Jose, California. 
 
NORBERG:  In some of your writings about working sets, you refer to the Semi-Markov Model?  
What’s that? 
 
DENNING:  Those would be other writings that didn’t involve Don. 
My students and I were interested in trying to validate our intuition that the working set 
policy would be optimal or near optimal.  Our approach to that was to model the mechanism by 
which programs generated page references.  We thought that if we could say exactly how 
programs generate references, we could then say what was the optimal memory policy for those 
programs.  Then we could compare the optimal and working set policies.  We thought that they 
would be very close together. 
The models we studied represented the locality sets of programs.  We knew from many 
experimental studies that programs tend to concentrate their references into subsets of pages for 
extended intervals of time.  We called the subsets “locality sets”.  Mathematically, we could 
represent the execution of a program with a sequence of pairs (L,T), where L is a locality set of 
pages and T is the virtual time interval over which L holds.  The working set was defined simply 
as the set of pages observed in a window looking backward from the current moment.  If that 
window were small compared to the locality holding time T, the working set would be identical 
to L for most of the holding time.  So the working set could potentially give us near-perfect 
knowledge of the locality sets.   Clear so far? 
 
NORBERG:  Yes. 
 
DENNING:  Now to the Markov model.  A Markov Model is simply a state machine model for a 
system, allowing for each state to have one of several successors with a probability distribution.  
The model assumes that the holding time in a state is the same constant for every state.  Thus, at 
every tick of a clock, the system moves to a new state.  The model is named after a Russian 
mathematician. 
A Semi Markov model is a Markov model where the holding times in the states are 
random values chosen according to a holding-time distribution. 
The Semi Markov model is attractive for locality modeling.  The states are the locality 
sets the program can enter.  The holding times are the durations of those sets during the 
program’s execution.  Thus the operation of the model can be represented as a series of (L,T) 
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pairs, just like the locality description of a program.  We can model a program by observing what 
locality sets it occupies and measuring the distribution of holding times in each locality set. 
 
NORBERG:  How do you get randomness of the page references inside a locality set? 
 
DENNING:  When the model says that the program is in state L, we can use a sub-model to 
account for the probability of referencing each page in the locality set L.  With this model I can 
generate a page reference trace that closely resembles the actual program.  Given that I’m in state 
L for time T, I use the sub-model to generate a trace of T references.  Then I transition to the 
successor of state L according to the probability distribution for choosing the successors of L, 
and repeat this process. 
 
NORBERG: Which pages of those locality sets are in memory?  The locality sets seems to be 
constantly shifting back and forth? 
 
DENNING:  The Semi Markov program model only accounts for how a program generates its 
references.  Given a program’s reference sequence, the memory management policy determines 
which pages are in the available memory.  To predict which pages are in memory and from that 
deduce the page-fault rate, I have to map the Semi Markov model to a virtual memory system 
model that accounts for the memory contents under the system’s memory policy. 
My students tested these Semi Markov models extensively.  They showed that the 
reference traces generated by the model statistically matched the actual reference traces of the 
program whose parameters were used in the Semi Markov model.  That convinced us that the 
Semi Markov model was a reliable means to model program behavior.  Having a single model is 
much easier than trying to instrument a large number of programs, one by one. 
Once they had a validated model for the programs, they ran simulations to find out how 
well the various memory policies worked.  They could easily compare the performance of a 
working set policy with that of the optimal policy.  They learned, as we suspected, that when the 
working set observation window (T in the above notation) is short compared to the locality 
holding time, the working set policy was almost as good as the optimal policy.   That gave us 
experimental validation of our hunches about working set near-optimality. 
 
NORBERG:  I take it these results and the working-set model are being used in all operating 
systems now, as you note in your later paper on virtual memory. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, the working set model has been widely accepted and is the basis of memory 
management subsystems in common operating systems today including Windows, Mac OS X, 
OS/2, and Linux.  The working set model itself is considered to be an ideal that virtual memory 
should shoot for.  The ideal cannot always be attained because the actual implementation may 
deviate slightly from ideal working set.  But as long as it responds to the changing locality sets of 







From Purdue to NASA 
 
NORBERG:  I’d like to change to another topic and possibly return to more locality questions in 
a while. 
In 1983 you decided to go to NASA Ames Research Center in Mountain View, 
California.  That is quite a change from Purdue in West Lafayette, Indiana.  You changed from 
an academic to a government institution, and you changed to a radically different part of the 
country.  What was the attraction, and why did you want to leave Purdue? 
 
DENNING:  By that time I’d been at Purdue since 1972, so I had been at Purdue 11 years.  As 
you may have noticed from my career, I seem to get itchy to make transitions about every 10 or 
11 years.  So neither Dorothy nor I can be accused of being tree huggers.  We enjoyed our years 
at Purdue and did not leave there with any sort of bad feelings about them.  We have remained 
good friends with the CS department there ever since.  Earlier this year, they awarded Dorothy 
one of their distinguished alumni awards and welcomed her back for the ceremony and a special 
lecture. 
Around 1981 we started to get itchy for a change.  We had visited California frequently 
for conferences and vacations and we really liked California.  Of all the states we’ve been in and 
all the states we’ve visited, California is our state.  There is something about the energy and 
spirit of the land that attracts us.  One the other side, the bleakness of Indiana winters was getting 
to us.  During the winter months, it seemed to be dark and cold all the time.  It was dark when we 
headed for work and dark when we returned home.  The coal strike -- remember the coal strike? -
- was an awful winter.  We had to seriously conserve electricity by turning down the heat in the 
house.  All the street lights in town were shut off for the duration.  We also found that getting to 
conferences was always a project.  Lafayette had a small commuter airport, but the flights were 
frequently delayed or cancelled by weather.  The only reliable airport was Indianapolis, which 
was about 65 miles away.  These environmental things were becoming stale. 
In 1979 I became department head of computer science.  When that happened I found 
myself in a new world.  I was a very successful researcher in operating systems, and suddenly as 
head of the department I have to be concerned about everything in the department, not just 
operating systems.  One of my poignant memories was the cocktail parties held by the provost 
for the department heads.  It was an opportunity for the department heads to meet and get to 
know each other.  I had always felt uncomfortable going to cocktail parties, and Dorothy was 
more uncomfortable than me.  At the parties, I felt it was my job to talk about computer science 
with the other department heads.  Someone would ask, “What’s going on in computer science?” 
and I’d discuss operating systems, programming languages, complexity theory, and the like, only 
to observe in horror that the asker’s eyes glazed over and he or she excused himself fairly 
rapidly.  I observed that the head of the physics department always had a crowd as he weaved 
fascinating tales of physics research.  His stories were much more engaging than mine.  This 
bothered me.  I could speak eloquently about my research on queueing networks  -- but no one 
else seemed interested.  They mostly didn’t know what I was talking about!  It was much more 
interesting to talk about the physics of black holes. 
 
NORBERG:  Everybody is fascinated with astronomy; you have to admit that. 
 
DENNING:  At first, I thought the problem was my story-telling ability.  I spent a lot of time 
studying how Scientific American articles are put together.  I even got an article published in 
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Scientific American so that I could experience the editorial and story telling process first hand.  
But this had only a marginal effect.  Even the Scientific American story about queueing networks 
did not gather a crowd at the cocktail parties. 
Eventually, after a year or so of this, I started to wonder whether the problem was not my 
communication style at all but the work I was doing.  There is no interest outside of my 
immediate circle of research colleagues.  And it wasn’t just me; I was unable to find much 
interest outside computer science in what the other faculty were doing. 
 
NORBERG:  What an awful conclusion to reach! 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I studied the art of telling the story and that didn’t make much difference.  I 
was not able to tell stories that brought out the value in the listener’s world.  Exceptionally clear 
explanations of how computers or algorithms work don’t do that.  It seemed as if I found my 
work interesting, and a few others too, but we were the only ones.  Could it be that I’m not 
working on anything that most people find interesting?  This question weighed on my mind. 
 
NORBERG:  Did you think that the other faculty were simply rude or self-absorbed?  Could it 
have been that simple? 
 
DENNING:  No, I didn’t consider that possibility.  Self-absorption doesn’t explain why the 
physicist’s story of black holes is so interesting, even if told by a supercilious physicist, but mine 
of operating systems and queueing networks were not.  I wound up in the question of whether 
my work was interesting to others. 
That led me to be open to ideas about expanding my world.  How do I enter a different 
“soup” or come in contact with different problems?  When the opportunity to interview for 
RIACS at NASA-Ames popped up, I said, “I’m going to check this one out.”  Dorothy said, “I 
support that.  It’s in California.  Please check it out.”  She’d had enough of Lafayette.  We got 
some good stuff done there, but we’ve accomplished everything we could there. 
At NASA-Ames, they were looking for a director for a new research institute to be called 
RIACS: Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science.  The institute was to be hosted by a 
consortium called University Space Research Association (USRA) under a contract.  That was 
even more appealing because I would not have to completely sever my ties with the university 
community. 
The purpose of the institute was to bring computer science into the thinking and solutions 
of NASA problems in aerodynamics and aerospace.  RIACS would jointly determine the projects 
and find top computing researchers to join the teams. 
During the interview, the search committee asked about my ideas for allocating the 
institute’s resources.  I drew up some sample budgets using my ACM and Purdue experience to 
guide me.  They liked that I had some visions about how computer science could work together 
with NASA and enough practical experience to manage the budgets.  A few days after the 
interview, the chair of the search committee called to say they wanted to make an offer. 
 
NORBERG:  Just like that? 
 




I persuaded two students from Purdue to come and be part of the initial team.  One was 
Bob Brown, a wizard programmer and systems guy from our CS department, and the other was 
George Adams, a computer engineer from the EE department.  Both were very capable, very 
enthusiastic, and gung-ho interested in the US space program. 
NASA had a guy named Gene Levin who was a computational chemist under a contract.  
We brought him on the initial team as well.  He was instrumental in connecting us with the right 
NASA people and in helping us speak the language of science with NASA people.  A few years 
later, he became my deputy director. 
We started in June 1983 with a team of five: four scientists and also an administrative 
assistant.  We grew from that small start to our peak about six years later, when 60 people came 
through RIACS, about half as visitors and the rest as full time scientists or engineers. 
One of our project areas in NASA parlance was numerical aerodynamic simulation, 
which we came to call “flying airplanes inside supercomputers”.  We brought in some of the 
nation’s leading computational algorithmists and they made some significant contributions to 
that effort.  Our second main project area was artificial intelligence.  Our centerpiece project was 
called “sparse distributed memory”, it was a model of human long term memory based on 
distributing the imprint of a pattern over many memory cells sparsely distributed in the address 
space.  It was very good at speech and handwriting recognition and was a good alternative for 
many applications of neural networks.  Another artificial intelligence project was in Bayesian 
learning; a program named AutoClass made some interesting discoveries in astronomy.  Our 
third main project area was networking.  We called it “telescience”, the ability to operate 
instruments and robots at a distance and integrate the information they were sending back. 
You can see, even at this distance in time, I can talk about these projects and they still 
sound interesting! 
 
NORBERG:  Back to Purdue! 
 
DENNING:  We even had a triumph for queueing networks.  One summer we brought in Ken 
Sevcik, who did some excellent modeling of supercomputer systems and helped them 
reconfigure their systems for significant improvements in performance.   They really liked that.  
Queueing networks were interesting when they produced tangible value for someone. 
 
NORBERG:  I think you’re being a little hard on yourself about this, though.  Queueing network 
models are indeed not as sexy as the space program, or at least how the space program used to 
be.  Do you remember ever giving a presentation, or someone in your group, to the NASA 
Advisory Council?  That’s twenty-six individuals who give advice to the NASA administrator. 
 
DENNING:  I don’t think so. 
 
NORBERG: They visited Ames one time, and I remember there was a discussion on computers 
that caught my attention. 
 
DENNING:  RIACS became successful and I learned how to communicate our projects well to 
people outside our field.  The collaborative projects we worked on produced value for their 
customers and I was able to article where the computer science value was coming from.  It was 
clear that computer science added value and that the NASA people alone could not have 
accomplished as much. 
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In the late 1980s I got some lessons about the value of a patron.  When I came in 1983, 
Bill Ballhaus was the director of the NASA division to which we would report.  He was very 
keen on computational science and opened many doors for us.  A few years later he had risen to 
be the Director of NASA-Ames and he continued to speak about the value of RIACS and 
encourage NASA people to collaborate with us.  In the late 1980s, Bill left government service 
because he was unable to support his growing family with his government salary, and within a 
few years he became the president of Aerospace Corporation (he still is). 
The next director was less keen on RIACS and viewed us less as a collaborator than as a 
body shop.  We frequently heard him say, “When we need to get a computer science researcher 
in here we can use RIACS to hire the person.”  We didn’t like that game because it lumped us in 
with service support contractors, such as Sterling Software, whose sole job was to find bodies to 
fill positions.  Sterling Software listed their overhead at 6%, compared to USRA’s rate of 23%.  
So it would look cheaper to bring a scientist in through Sterling. 
It actually wasn’t that simple because Sterling didn’t offer retirement benefits and had a 
very limited health benefit compared to either NASA or USRA.  Under government accounting 
rules, we had to bundle in a portion of our staff overhead into the total overhead, and that added 
to the rate.  This became a constant battle.  The scientists didn’t want to be hired through Sterling 
and NASA didn’t like USRA’s overhead rate.  When we pointed out that Stanford and other 
universities had overhead rates of 70%, the NASA people said, “That’s right, they are way too 
expensive, that’s why we don’t deal with them very much.” 
Another fallout of this body-shop mentality was that NASA wanted us to hire visitors 
who would come for a few months, for example in the summer, and work on very focused 
problems.  They didn’t want us to set up long-term research projects any more.  They wanted to 
see results in six to twelve months, but projects like sparse distributed memory needed more like 
three to five years. 
 
 
Research at RIACS and NASA 
 
NORBERG:  Can you tell me a little something about the sparse memory? 
 
DENNING:  Sure.  But mind you this will be a bit complex.  Start by thinking of a regular 
memory, which consists of a set of storage locations with addresses.  With an N-bit address, the 
memory could contain 2N memory cells.  In such a memory, we read from (write into) a single 
cell given by its address.   This does not mimic our brain structure.  Our memories are patterns 
stored across many neurons and accessed by association with other memories.  Our memories do 
not have addresses. 
The associative memory is an old idea in computer science that more closely resembles 
the way the brain links information.  In an associative memory we don’t worry about the 
addresses of cells.  Instead we focus on their contents.  We present a pattern of 0s and 1s in 
parallel to all the cells; the ones that match the pattern are selected; and a result is computed from 
the cells in the selection.  Associative memory was an early model for human memory because 
we store information as patterns from sensory input and look up memories based on patterns we 
know about. 
There is one major problem with designing an associative memory using conventional 
memory as the substrate.  The sensory patterns we want to store contain large numbers of bits.  If 
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we had sensory patterns of 100 bits -- which is a small example -- we would require 2100 memory 
locations to allow a unique association with each possible pattern.  That is completely infeasible 
because there are not that many electrons in the universe.  We need a way to have a sensory 
pattern interact with the relatively small number of memory cells we can actually afford. 
Sparse memory, which was invented by Pentti Kanerva, addresses this problem.  Each 
memory cell has two fields: a set of bits to hold an address pattern and a set of counters to hold a 
data pattern.  I’ll come back to the data counters in a minute. 
Let’s say you wanted to store and retrieve 100-bit patterns.  In sparse memory, we would 
implement as many real cells as we can afford.  In each cell’s address field we would place a 
100-bit random number.  But we can’t use the 100-bit patterns as conventional addresses because 
the probability is almost zero that any given input pattern is identical to an actual address.  
Kanerva designed the sparse memory to look for all memory cells whose addresses are in a 
radius from the input pattern.  For example, if we chose radius 40, we would say any memory 
cell whose address is within 40 bits (Hamming distance) of the pattern is selected.  Think of a 
“sphere” of radius 40 surrounding the input pattern and capturing the selected cells. 
Now we can talk about those counters.  When we write a data pattern, we want it to affect 
all the cells in the sphere of cells selected by the address pattern.  We don’t want the new data 
pattern to obliterate the stored contents, but only to modify them.  The counters give a simple 
means to do this.  They represent the cumulative effect of storing patterns in the memory cells.  
To write, a data pattern increments, in every selected cell, the counters corresponding to each 1 
bit, and decrements the counters corresponding to each 0 bit.  A nonnegative counter means that 
over all prior writes, 1s are in the majority of that bit position.  A negative counter means that 
over all prior writes 0s are in the majority of that bit position.  To read, the memory aggregates 
the counts in all bits positions of the selected cells, then outputs 1 if the aggregate counter is 
nonnegative and 0 if it is negative.  The output pattern thus represents the cumulative effect of 
many previous writes, but does not have to equal any of the previous patterns written. 
I’m sure all this sounds complicated.   It’s what Kanerva had to do to write and read with 
groups of memory cells that were associatively selected.  It turned out to be really easy to 
program simulators of the memory and run experiments on them.  Pure hardware 
implementations could come later if the experiments showed the memory to be promising. 
This memory had some very interesting, powerful properties.  Handwriting recognition 
gives an example.  You could encode handwriting samples as bit patterns.  Thus a bunch of 
samples of handwritten “A” produce a set of similar but not identical bit patterns.  You train the 
memory by writing each of these patterns.  Then you read the memory.  You’ll get back a pattern 
that looks like “A” but is not identical to any of the training “A” patterns.  The memory has in 
effect constructed an abstraction of “A”.  Now you can present it with new samples of 
handwritten “A” and it will retrieve that same abstract “A”.  Not only can you recognize new 
“A” samples, you can find an idealized “A” form.  This is what the brain does.  You can also 
present the memory with a corrupted “A” pattern and it will retrieve the clean abstracted “A” 
pattern.  Thus the memory also removes noise through its ability to abstract. 
NASA was very interested in the sparse memory as a trainable device, for example as an 
auto-pilot.  You would train it by showing it a set of pilot responses to particular sensory input.  
With enough training, it would take new sensory input and retrieve a response very close to what 
a pilot would do in the same situation. 
 




DENNING:  No, we were only doing experimental work.  We had to find out how reliable a 
sparse memory would be to mimic the responses of a real pilot.  Even before we got to the 
complex experiments of testing an auto-pilot, we did simpler things like recognizing handwritten 
letters.  Even that was a hard problem.  The Post Office was struggling with machines that would 
read handwritten addresses on envelopes. 
 
NORBERG:  Why should NASA be doing that kind of work? 
 
DENNING:  It was a little quick test, that was all.  We found in these early tests that the sparse 
memory had about the same accuracy level as the standard OCR (optical character recognition) 
software.  At that point, the sparse memory didn’t have enough of an advantage to make anybody 
want to throw out the OCR software.  NASA was much more interested in whether the sparse 
memory could do well with the auto-pilot application. 
 
High Performance Computing 
 
NORBERG:  That is pretty technical!  Let me return to an earlier issue that I wasn’t completely 
clear about.  What position were you hired for?  What was your relation with NASA? 
 
DENNING:  I was the Director of RIACS. 
 
NORBERG:  OK, the Director.  Within RIACS was there someone above you? 
 
DENNING:  I was top man at RIACS; everyone else there reported to me.  RIACS was formally 
an institute of USRA.  USRA had a contract with NASA to operate RIACS at Ames center.  
NASA put up the space and provided a technical monitor and a contract monitor.  NASA left it 
to USRA to select the director, of course with advice from NASA.  USRA had a group called the 
Science Council that visited Ames a couple of times a year to provide reviews and feedback.  
They visited with NASA people who told them what they liked or disliked about RIACS, and we 
made adjustments based on the feedback.  It was another way to stay in touch with the customer. 
 
NORBERG:  Sure. 
 
DENNING:  Within the USRA, I reported directly to the President of USRA.  Within NASA I 
interacted frequently with the technical monitor, who was the Ames Chief Scientist. 
 
NORBERG:  Pretty high level. 
 
DENNING:  Yes, that was a sign of the importance they attached to RIACS.  I interacted with 
him frequently.  We made it a point to make sure he was a happy customer. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you recall whether other computing activities at the time were NASA programs 
that had nothing to do with an outside contractor? 
 
DENNING:  NASA had a lot of in-house work.  They had a division called Numerical 
Aerodynamic Simulation (NAS) which was an in-house supercomputing facility for numerical 
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simulations of air flow around aircraft, replacing wind tunnel testing.  They had a big staff of 
NASA scientists.  They also used support contractors (such as Sterling Software, mentioned 
earlier) to bring in additional personnel.  A lot of the other areas were similar -- AI, robotics, 
computational chemistry, telescience -- a strong staff of in-house NASA people and support 
personnel from a contractor. 
I think one of the motivations for RIACS is that they wanted a world-class group of 
computer scientists on board to collaborate.  They could not hire enough computer scientists at 
government salaries and the support contractors could not get them.  USRA/RIACS provided a 
means to get the right people at competitive salaries. 
 
NORBERG:  My next question was going to be about the high performance computing review 
that was going on at that time, toward the end of your stay at NASA Ames, leading up to the 
President’s message in 1991 for high performance computing. 
 
DENNING:  NASA was heavily involved in the high performance communication and 
computing (HPPC) initiative from the very beginning.  We were too.  They involved us in 1983 
as soon as RIACS got started.  The proximate reason was the NAS supercomputing facility, 
which we discussed earlier, and all the research to be able to completely design an aircraft 
without a wind tunnel. 
NASA Ames is like a Disneyland of technical facilities, including a series of wind 
tunnels that go back many years.  The biggest of them all was a huge facility on the north end of 
the Ames grounds.  It was capable of testing full size aircraft.  It used incredible amounts of 
electric power -- there was a joke that the city lights in Palo Alto dimmed when they started the 
wind tunnel.  It was also quite dangerous because of the size of the turbine blades -- if one flew 
loose, it would destroy a large chunk of the facility.  NASA looked to the supercomputing 
facility as a way to make the wind tunnels obsolete with a technology that cost a small fraction of 
the price of a wind tunnel.  Even though Cray supercomputers were expensive, they were 
nothing compared to the cost of a wind tunnel. 
This quest turned out well for NASA.  Boeing, one of NASA’s main partners, was able to 
completely design and test its 777 aircraft using supercomputing facilities and algorithms 
mirroring those developed at NASA Ames. 
Back to your question.  NASA was one of the original members of a Federal Computing 
Coordinating Committee on Science and Technology (FCCST).  I went to some of the FCCST 
meetings with some of the NASA people.  They were trying to frame the hardest research 
problems as “grand challenges”.  They created glossy pamphlets full of descriptions of grand 
challenges and the progress on them to date.  They made the case that further investments in high 
performance computing would pay off from the economic gains when the grand challenges were 
met.  This concept for selling supercomputing was incredibly effective.  NASA and DARPA 
produced some fascinating stories of grand challenge problems.  That got the attention of 
Congress and in particular of Senator Al Gore, who became a champion of a HPCC act that was 
passed into law in 1991.  By the time the initiative was passed into law, it was actually 
celebrating what NASA and DARPA had been doing for ten years. 
 




DENNING:  Of course not, it was an interagency program.  That’s what helped sell it to 
Congress. DARPA got some of it, NSF got some of it, NIH got some of it, DOE (Department of 
Energy) got some of it.  
 
NORBERG:  My recollection is that NASA stitched together a number of its own activities, 
which took up something like two-thirds of the aim that the White House was trying to achieve.  
And the White House was really only asking Congress for about one-third of what the cost was 
projected to be; it was in the high millions.  I remember the education number much better than I 
can remember the high performance computing number, but it seemed like the White House was 
behind this almost from the beginning. 
 
DENNING:  I think FCCST was running out of the White House. 
 
NORBERG:  That could be, out of the Science Advisor’s office. 
 
DENNING:  I think the science advisor got high marks for shepherding a bunch of agencies into 
the HPCC cooperation.  It was one of those rare moments when Congress was satisfied with 
something the executive branch did. 
As I said, we at RIACS were big players in the NASA teams on HPCC.  We viewed 
ourselves as an HPCC research center.  In approaching prospective faculty to join us, we said, 
“Come, consider working here for a while, maybe part-time or on sabbatical leave.  Come!  We 
are a High Performance Communication and Computing research center.”  We were saying that 




Session 3, Tape 2, Side B 
The RIACS Environment 
 
NORBERG:  I wasn’t aware of that, actually.  Can you comment on the computer resources 
available to you?  Machinery, programmers if you needed them, and so on, at NASA-Ames? 
 
DENNING:  When we set up RIACS we insisted on establishing a high quality, interactive 
research programming environment.  NASA Ames was strong on supercomputing but weak on 
interactive computing.  We had a lot of expertise on interactive computing. 
NASA-Ames people readily agreed to help us create our own state-of-the-art computing 
facility, fully Internet connected.  It would be an opportunity for Ames to test out some of their 
ideas about networking as a way to develop programs for their supercomputing facility.  They 
endorsed our facility and watched over our shoulders as we put it together and upgraded it.  They 
developed a large respect for the networking and operating systems capabilities of our staff, who 
helped them frequently with their own network configurations.  At the time, local area 
networking was a lot flakier than it is today. 
One of the first things we did, even before I was officially on board in June 1983, was to 
work a deal with Digital Equipment Corporation for a VAX.  At the time, that was the gold 
standard Unix machine.  DEC basically donated a VAX to USRA for installation at RIACS.  It 
was a very impressive donation, worth about $250,000. 
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As part of the project, NASA kicked in an Internet port from their IMP (Interface 
Message Processor, which connected to the Internet).  At the time, the rentals of parts were about 
$120,000 a year.  So that was a sizable contribution from NASA. 
A couple of years later, our guys learned about a new company, Sequent Computer 
Corporation, which was putting together multiprocessor Unix machines.  They had an excellent 
design.  It was essentially a parallel supercomputer.  We purchased a Sequent system and 
replaced our VAX.  NASA was very interested in this because they were expecting the next 
generations of supercomputers to be parallel multiprocessors.  Our system gave them an early 
look at how to do program development for parallel systems. 
We became such good friends with Sequent that Sequent eventually asked me to be a 
member of their technical advisory board.  I served on the board with luminaries including Bob 
Kahn, Ed Feigenbaum, and Jim Browne for a few years.  Eventually Sequent moved out of the 
parallel processing area and into the database area.  I think IBM bought them at some point. 
I mentioned earlier that RIACS grew to 30 full time and 30 part time people in its sixth 
year.  We could not accommodate them in our original office space.  We put our three major 
research subgroups into different office clusters around the Ames campus.  We developed some 
very good local networks so that all RIACS people saw the same computing facility no matter 
where they logged in from.  Our state of the art facility, state of the art Unix, and state of the art 
networking staff was a big resource for NASA; they liked it. 
 
 
From NASA to George Mason 
 
NORBERG:  When the high performance review council visited NASA-Ames (I think it was 
1988 but I can’t be sure), one of the things it was interested in was seeing these facilities and 
understanding what the computing power was at NASA-Ames and could compare it with 
Johnson [Space Center] and with various others, such as Goddard in Maryland. 
I’m tempted to pursue that a little bit more, but in the interest of completeness I’d like to 
hit a couple of other things.  In 1991, you and your spouse decided you didn’t care for California 
much anymore.  (I’m just being facetious now.)  You went back to the East Coast.  Why? 
 
DENNING:  Our decision resulted from a confluence of factors.  I suggested before that after 
Bill Ballhaus left Ames, the new leadership of Ames had different ideas about how RIACS could 
serve them.  Unlike Ballhaus, they weren’t interested in the longer range research projects we 
had put together.  They were interested in short term visits by leading faculty researchers.  Could 
we get the well-known professor from Stanford down here for three months in the summer to 
help us with fluid flow algorithms on parallel supercomputers?  This was all body-shop stuff.  
My core team told me, “This is not what we came here for,” and they started to look for other 
employment.  On top of that, we had to start letting people go in our telescience area because 
NASA completely lost interest in that area.  They also wanted out of the sparse distributed 
memory project because the useful results were still three or more years off. 
I agreed with the assessments of my core team that I had not come to RIACS to lead a 
body shop.  In 1990, I stepped aside as the director and became a research fellow in RIACS, 
while USRA followed NASA’s bidding by dismantling the old way and replacing it with the 
body shop way.  Then I began my own job search. 
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At the same time, Dorothy also began a job search.  She had joined SRI International in 
Menlo Park when we first came in 1983.  Although she was enormously successful there -- she 
never was turned down on a research proposal and made a big mark for herself with a ground-
breaking intrusion detection project -- she just didn’t enjoy the process of landing new contracts.  
She had many friendly colleagues at the nearby DEC (Digital Equipment Corp) lab headed by 
Bob Taylor, and in 1987 switched over to them.  That was initially very satisfying for her, but 
before long she realized that she didn’t fit in very well.  She was still interested in computer 
security but most of the lab was focused on collaborative software development of interactive 
environments and networked computing.  She had no colleagues there in security, as she did at 
SRI.  She frequently traveled to DEC’s facilities on the east coast, where they had teams working 
on computer security problems.  But airplane trips were an unsatisfactory method of 
collaborating.  Eventually, Bob Taylor noticed that she was not fitting in and suggested she 
might be happier elsewhere.  She finally said “Okay” and went on the market, too.  She told me, 
“The DEC I thought I was going to wasn’t there.” 
There we were, both on the market together.  We wanted to return to the university, but 
unfortunately California was in a big recession and there were no openings at any of the major 
universities.  We decided to look in the Washington, DC, area because we both had many friends 
in that area and being near the nation’s capitol sounded like it might be fun.  Moreover, we had 
to deal with the “two-body” problem, which is that most universities won’t hire a husband-wife 
team; we would need to be at different universities.  Washington, DC, had many good choices. 
Dorothy got invitations from George Mason and Georgetown to interview for open 
department chair positions.  She fell in love with Georgetown and told the search committee 
chair at George Mason, “You should talk to Peter.”  In the meantime, I had been looking for a 
dean’s job.  There was an open dean of engineering job at George Washington University.  I 
made it to the short list and received an invitation from the president and provost to have 
breakfast with them at a local club.  It soon became clear that the president wanted the dean to 
solve a difficult funding problem that would involve laying off faculty and sending others to a 
branch campus location.  He said there was no new money and he would hold the dean 
accountable for reducing the costs of the engineering school and generating a surplus for the 
university.  Got to do it in one year or I’m out.  This didn’t sound like a boss who was committed 
to my success.  At the time, George Washington University was teetering on the edge of 
bankruptcy because of runaway costs of their hospital facility (DC forced them to treat 
emergency indigent people for free).  I asked them what the future prospects for the university 
were.  The two of them looked at each other, winked, and said, “By the time we know the answer 
to that question the both of us will be retired from this place.  Har har har.”   That completely 
turned me off. 
 
NORBERG:  Oh, I wouldn’t have liked that either. 
 
DENNING:  That was real “gallows humor”.  If the university goes under, they’ll be retired and 
safe.  I said, “Holy cow.”  I was just coming out of an atmosphere where I didn’t feel like my 
USRA bosses and the NASA leadership were supporting me, and I really wanted to be in an 
environment where my boss was committed to my success.  After that breakfast, I withdrew 
from that search. 
Then I followed Dorothy’s advice and talked to the search committee chair, Carl Harris, 
at George Mason University.  By that time she had a firm offer from Georgetown and said she 
intended to accept it -- so I’d better nail a deal at George Mason.  I said, “Wait a minute, don’t 
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you have two weeks to accept it?”  “All right,” she said, “I’ll take two weeks and then accept it.”  
Fortunately, George Mason looked very good and their president, George Johnson, told me at the 
end of my interview, “Your coming here would be a marriage made in heaven.”  That felt like a 
supportive environment!  I made a deal with them and went there.  Dorothy was happy; I was 
happy.  Later we told friends, “The Denning team has two of Washington’s three Georges 
covered!” 
 
NORBERG:  That was in the period when George Mason was really expanding, wasn’t it? 
 
DENNING: I came in at the end of the period of expansion.  Just after I arrived (summer 1991) 
the State of Virginia hit a severe budget crunch because there was a recession.  Tax revenues 
dropped off, and the University had to take a 20% cut in its general fund from the state.  The 
trustees raised tuitions by enough so that the effective cut was about ten percent, but ten percent 
is still significant.  In my first year as department chair all the hiring slots were cancelled, the 
department’s budget was ten percent less than the year before, there was no travel money. 
 
NORBERG:  How did you deal with these things? 
 
DENNING:  I was optimistic.  I told the faculty, “This will blow on by.  We’ll be okay.  We 
won’t be in a recession forever.” 
 
NORBERG:  How did your faculty feel about that? 
 
DENNING:  They seemed to be fine.  They had just gone through several years of growth, so 
having no growth for a year was okay. 
 
NORBERG:  The crunch came late for George Mason.  Other universities had their crunches in 
the middle 1980s, like ours. 
 
DENNING:  It turned out that we never really got out of that recession.  It was two years before 
any money was allocated for faculty raises.  Then we saw a raise pool around five percent.  
Virginia’s budget problems persisted; we saw one percent raises the next year, then two percent, 
and a couple more zero percent years.  I think that by the time I left in 2002, the total raises had 
accumulated to about ten percent from when I started.  Our deans and president thought we were 
losing our competitive edge relative to other universities. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, and the opportunity costs that that did not provide. 
 
DENNING:  The faculty average salary actually fell behind the CRA’s Taulbee survey data.  
There was nothing we could do about it because the money wasn’t there. 
 
NORBERG:  Those are the years when Minnesota was trying to hire four or five people and 
couldn’t find them because they didn’t have enough money.  What was the size of your CS 
department? 
 




NORBERG:  Did the faculty provide education to working people? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  George Mason is a heavily commuter campus.  At that time there were 26,000 
students; I think they are close to 30,000 now.  At the time, about 60 percent of first-year 
graduate students were from local industry.  Among the undergraduate seniors about 45 to 50 
percent were full-time employed somewhere.  Among the juniors it was about 30 percent, and 
sophomores about 20 percent.  Even in the lower divisions there were substantial numbers of 
students who were employed while coming to George Mason. 
 
NORBERG:  Did it take them longer to get a degree? 
 
DENNING:  For many, yes, because they couldn’t be full-time students.  The bulk of George 
Mason’s schedule was actually two big evening time slots: 4:30 and 7:30 once a week.  Students 
came one day a week for a three-hour-long class. 
 
NORBERG:  Had they been able to keep up with computing equipment for students and faculty? 
 
DENNING:  No, it was always a battle trying to find enough equipment.  We used to go down to 
Richmond (the state capitol) a lot to argue with the state officials that computer science is really 
a lab science not a mathematical science and, therefore, we deserve a share of the state allocation 
for lab equipment.  That was always a tough sell, so we never really had the amount of lab 
equipment that we thought we needed.  When I was finishing my second term as chairman, we 
finally won the argument and the state sent Mason a significant allocation for lab equipment.  
The dean allocated it to all departments, leaving computer science with only a fraction.  When 
we objected, he said that the funds were not earmarked for CS when they came and he thought 
they were for the school’s general lab equipment needs.  Sorry. 
 
NORBERG:  Who were the other people in the department?  Any names I might recognize? 
 
DENNING:  I don’t know who you would recognize.  In the CS department some of the senior 
people included Ryszard Michalski in AI, Ken DeJong in evolutionary computation, Harry 
Wechsler in Vision, Dave Rine in software engineering, Henry Hamburger in natural language 
processing.  A year or two later we brought in Mark Pullen in command-control systems, and 
Danny Menascé in performance analysis of systems.  At the school level, the dean Andy Sage 
was well known as a systems engineer.  Carl Harris, a past president of the OR society, was chair 
of the OR department.  Ed Wegman, a computational statistician, was chair of the statistics 
department.  These guys were all well known in their respective areas, and have been successful 
in raising a lot of grant money for their projects.  It’s a very respectable department and school—






Part IX: Computing: Theory and Practice 
Computing as Experimental Science 
 
NORBERG:  All right, I’d like to return to some of your published ideas.  Over the years you’ve 
written several commentaries on computer science as a science published in the CACM.  Three 
struck me as particularly significant.  One of them was your 1980 essay, “What Is Experimental 
Computer Science?” which we talked about yesterday.  The second is your 2005 article, “Is 
Computer Science Science?”.  And the third is your 2005 article, “The Locality Principle”.  In 
some ways these resemble the presidential letters that you were publishing in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
 
DENNING:  The common thread among these three is that they explore how our field is actually 
doing science in its best traditions.  There is also a stylistic theme of trying to explain the work of 
our field in terms that scientists in other fields can “get”.  As we have reviewed the different 
phases of my life, I see that these themes trace all the way back to those Fairfield days when I 
was a member and then president of the Science Club. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s a reach, isn’t it?  Going back that far would seem to have at best tenuous 
connections to your writings from the 2000s. 
 
DENNING:  I’m not talking about the specific issues I wrote about in the 2000s, but the 
tendencies that led me to be interested in those issues and the style in which I approached them.  
The seeds were there a long time ago.  You noted this the other day, when you said that I showed 
a clear interest in understanding the fundamental principals behind things. 
 
NORBERG:  I did say that. 
 
DENNING:  My interest in principles was already apparent at Fairfield Prep.  I thoroughly 
enjoyed preparing a series of lectures for the science club on the principles of electronic circuits.  
At that time there weren’t very many known principles of computing so my interest manifested 
in other fields such as electronics or astronomy. 
My sense of being a scientist, rather than a pure electrical engineer, was strong when I 
began my faculty job in the EE department at Princeton in 1968.  An insurance salesman came to 
my office to sign me up for life and house insurance.  As we were filling out the forms, he asked, 
“What profession should I put down for you?  Shall I call you a computer scientist based on what 
you’ve been saying?”  Since I had heard that term around MIT, it seemed not only fitting but 
legitimate, and I said, “Yeah, that’s okay.” 
 
NORBERG:  What profession did you record on your tax forms? 
 
DENNING:  Computer scientist.  Today I list myself as a computer science professor. 
Even though I was minted as an electrical engineer, I still felt like I was a scientist as well 
as an engineer.  I could see myself as a scientist because I was interested in experiments and the 
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search for basic principles.  I could also see myself as an electrical engineer because I built 
computers and designed new computer architectures.  I have to admit that I also found it a little 
odd that electrical engineers would call what they do “computer science” rather than “computer 
engineering”.  So I did write about that question from time to time since finishing up at MIT. 
 
NORBERG:  Why did you feel you needed to cover the topic once again in 2005? 
 
DENNING:  John Gehl, editor of Educom Review, liked to ask me that question.  Within 
computer science, it’s been a bone of contention for many years as to whether or not the word 
“science” in our title is deserved.  In fact, scientists of other fields also question that.  They used 
to tell me, “We don’t know why you have the word science in your title.  You look like 
engineering and technology to us.  Sometimes you also look like math.  But you don’t look like 
science.”  There’s a standing joke that says that any field that calls itself a science can’t be a 
science; thus political and social science are not real sciences, according to this quip. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, I’ve heard that many times. 
 
DENNING:  So therefore, computer science is seen as trying to gain membership at the table of 
science simply by declaring itself to be a science, rather than earning that right by its actions. 
 
NORBERG:  Well, you have to have some name. 
 
DENNING:  Right, but that’s the argument.  The very existence of the argument tells me that the 
field has attained sufficient importance for people to worry if it is properly named.  If we said, 
“We’re an engineering field,” I doubt that we would meet many objections.  But when we say 
we’re a science field, other fields of science look for us to work around an experimental method 
seeking new discoveries.  When they don’t see that, they take shots at us. 
 
NORBERG:  Do they really do that, take shots at you? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, I’ve been called naïve for accepting the argument that we are a science when 
we are “really” engineering.  To circumvent the charge of naïveté I appealed to the well known 
writings of Nobel Laureate Herb Simon.  In this book Sciences of the Artificial, he argued that 
computer science and economics (his field) were sciences in every way but for studying natural 
processes.  My friends in physics told me that Herb Simon was wrong and was trying to get 
people to accept economics as a science.  They felt very strongly that to be a science, a field has 
to deal with natural phenomena.  Computer science and economics look like they deal with 
manmade artifacts and systems. 
As we have discussed, my American Scientist columns (1985-1993) were an exploration 
of computing as a science.  When I was done with that series, I found that many more people 
accepted that we have deep and often surprising principles.  But they still saw us as a science of 
the artificial, not a real science -- after all, computers are manmade objects. 
A lot of computer scientists wanted to be recognized as legitimate scientists but were 
unwittingly undermining their own cause by allowing the impression “computer science equals 
programming” to develop over the years.  Dispelling that notion was a strong motivation for my 
putting together the ACM/IEEE task force that produced the report Computing as a Discipline in 
1988.  We wanted the outside world to see the richness of computer science, but all they could 
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see was programmers.  While we freely admit we are programmers, we also say we are much 
more than programmers.  We were concerned that this narrow characterization would block 
collaborations and would turn off new young people who are interested in more than 
programming. 
When I was at RIACS trying to foster collaboration between computer scientists and 
NASA scientists, I found that the perception that computer scientists are programmers was a real 
stumbling block.  The NASA people wanted computer scientists on their teams to do the 
programming.  Our people wanted to participate in the scientific investigation itself; 
programming was an important tool in that process.  The NASA scientist attitude grated on them 
and in return they grated on the NASA scientists.  So I had first hand, up-close experience that 
this misperception about computer science was a real stumbling block.  The attitude was not 
limited to NASA, by the way; I saw it among many industry scientists and engineers as well. 
All this rubbed me the wrong way.  My ideal of a scientist was someone who 
collaborated with other scientists in pursuit of answers to interesting, fundamental questions.  I 
didn’t like it one bit when I was told that I was to be a programmer only. 
I also encountered this attitude before going to NASA.  When I was a department head in 
the school of science, I often found the other department heads wondering why computer science 
was in their school.  From what they could see, we would be a better fit in engineering. 
These are the kinds of seeds that stimulated me to want to take action to dispel what I 
thought were uninformed perceptions about computer science.  That’s what our ACM/IEEE 
committee set out to do. 
I thought we did a great job of reframing the field away from programming, away from 
pure engineering, pure science, or pure math, into a field of our own.  We recommended that we 
use the term “computing” as shorthand for “computer science and engineering”, a term that was 
fairly common at the time.  The simpler term also drew attention to computing rather than 
computers or programs.  We got warm reactions to our report.  ACM even issued a new 
curriculum recommendation in 1991 based on that report.  But aside from more people calling 
our field “computing”, we didn’t dispel the notion that we are programmers.  In fact, that notion 
kept getting stronger. 
Starting in 2001, enrollments in computing began to decline sharply and have fallen 50 
percent by today (2007).  I remember that Bill Gates got so concerned that he’s been going 
around the country telling students that computing careers are so much more than programming.  
He and many others were no longer getting enough students to fill all the jobs, and they blamed 
it on an unfounded perception among young people that all we do is program. 
In the past decade the US Bureau of Labor Statistics has defined “programmer” to mean a 
low-level coder.  This is far from what we mean when we use the term “programmer” for the 
epitome of computer science as in Edsger Dijkstra or Don Knuth.  Who wants to be a coder?  
Unfortunately, prospective students considering computer science don’t know the likes of 
Dijkstra and Knuth.  All they saw was endless news reports about programming jobs being 
outsourced to countries like India and Pakistan.  If they were not already citizens of India or 
Pakistan, they did not want to enter a career where their hard-won job would be outsourced in a 
few years. 
The enrollment crash after 2001 seemed to me the chickens coming home to roost.  We 
had warned thirteen years earlier that the perception “computer science equals programming” 
would come to haunt us unless we acted to change it.  I had no illusions that changing this 
perception would be easy.  It was deeply ingrained into our thinking.  Just look at a typical 
computer science catalog in a university.  Our first course is usually called “programming I”, 
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followed by “programming II” and “programming III”.  Much energy is devoted in faculty 
meetings and education symposium on what programming language should be used in the first 
courses.  The what-language-to-teach conversation has been going on for as long as I can 
remember.  Many of us find it hard to conceive of a computer science where programming was 
not at the heart of the field.  When Dijkstra challenged that notion by suggesting that 
introductory courses not include any programming, he ran into a firestorm of opposition. 
To unwittingly add fuel to the fire, in 2001 many of us endorsed the plan of Educational 
Testing Service to upgrade the Advanced Placement (AP) curriculum in computer science to 
focus on object oriented programming.  This turned out to be a disaster.  The Java language, 
which was the basis for teaching object oriented programming, is really quite complex and is 
really intended for expert programmers.  Beginners have enormous troubles with Java.  The high 
school teachers assigned to the new AP curriculum were beginners in software design 
themselves and could not answer many questions about Java.  So the AP curriculum and exam 
became a failed Java teaching project and turned off many teachers and prospective students.  
Now there is a movement to replace the AP curriculum and exam with something more 
representative of computing, but it easily takes seven years before anything is enacted. 
One of my conclusions was that the perception “computer science equals programming” 
was self-generated.  It is so deeply ingrained into out thinking, and now into our institutions, that 
we give outsiders little basis to think anything else of us.  But this also seems to be the path out.  
If we can change our own self perception, our actions will change and others will see us 
differently.   We don’t need an expensive public relations campaign to do that.  But it will take 
years to expunge all the misimpressions from our literature and practices (like the AP). 
In recent years one of my major quests has been to provide the basis, in the form of the 
great principles of computing, for changing our self perception. 
 
NORBERG:  To use a word you used two days ago, isn’t this just a question of marketing? 
 
DENNING:  Well, yes and no.  When you say “marketing” I think you’re referring to the 
business of telling our stories and making professional offers.  We absolutely have to market 
who we are and what we have to offer.  That’s the “yes” side of my answer. 
The “no” side comes from my belief that what we have to offer is not selling well, and 
therefore we need to develop a new offer.  We cannot continue with the present offer.  The 
present offer seems to be “We are programmers and we are proud of it.”  In the academic world, 
this notion organizes many of our curricula -- just look at our catalogs.  It was endorsed by many 
of our most famous heroes such as Edsger Dijkstra, Don Knuth, and David Gries.  They had a 
majestic view of programming that included all the very best computer science. 
That view of programming was contravened when the US Department of Labor defined 
programming as a coding category.  The perceptions in the outside world of what programming 
means are closer to the Labor Department’s than to Knuth’s.  We have a 1970s self-image, “I am 
a programmer”, playing in the context of the 2000s where programming is not a noble word and 
does not mean what it meant then.  We need to change our self-image now. 
In an attempt to outgrow that old image, some of my colleagues have tried proposing 
alternatives.  The most popular new proposal is: “We are masters of abstraction.”  That reflects 
our movement from procedure-oriented programming to object-oriented programming.  Object 
oriented programming is about building abstractions.  Unfortunately, this new articulation does 
not sell well in Peoria.  The average person does not even know what we are talking about.  The 
statement is too abstract for them to understand!  When we say, “We build abstractions on 
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computers, which put them into action.”  They respond, “I don’t get it.  I think I’ll go over and 
work for Google.  I understand what they do.” 
When we try this formulation on representatives of other science fields, they say, 
“What’s so special about working with abstractions? In physics (chemistry, astronomy, etc.) we 
work with abstractions.  Everybody does that.  How does it make computing special or 
different?”  We respond, “It is different because we automate abstractions.”  To which they 
respond, “In physics (chemistry, astronomy, etc.) we automate our abstractions too.  We call 
them mathematical models and we run them on supercomputers.  We call that computational 
science.  How does that differ from what you’re talking about?”  I consider calling ourselves 
“masters of abstraction” to be a blunder.  It’s less distinctive than programming. 
That’s why I believe we have to get back in touch with our fundamental principles and 
how they bring value to people.  We’re so much broader than programming.  It’s so much easier 
to talk about the field that way.  If we could convince ourselves that we are a principle-based 
science, not just an engineering technology field, our interactions with the outside world would 
begin to change.  It would change the kind of offers that we make.  I think we’d finally find that 
people understand computer science as a much bigger, more fundamental field than the Labor 
Department notion of programming.  Insiders know this, but many outsiders don’t. 
So, this is the fire behind my backing of the Great Principles Project.  I want to find, 
articulate, and write down the fundamental principles of computing; not the mathematical 
theories, which are well understood, but the scientific theories.  If I can sell this to many within 
our field, I think we collectively will have a new way of presenting ourselves, a new identity.  
That’s what’s really behind this whole thing. 
 
NORBERG:  All right, let me pull on that thread some more.  What you say suggests to me that 
the various ACM curriculum studies, and proposals, are not getting rid of this controversy at all.  
Now, why do you think that is? 
 
DENNING:  I agree with that.  Our self-image is linked to a deep belief that algorithms are the 
heart of computing.  It’s a widely accepted notion.  Programming is seen as the means to produce 
algorithms.  It seems inconceivable to many that we can formulate our field in any other way 
than around algorithms and programming. 
When I was chair of the ACM Education Board and we undertook the curriculum 
revision released in 2001, we gave a good deal of weight to running a consensus process so that 
the results would be widely accepted.  The process consisted of developing a list of topics to be 
included in computing.  The ACM and IEEE participants voted on the list, eliminating some 
topics, and dividing the rest into “core” and “extensions of core”.  The resulting body of 
knowledge has a lot of programming (including programming-in-the-large) and algorithms topics 
in it.  It also reads like a list of technologies -- algorithms, programming languages, data 
structures, operating systems, databases, networks, graphics, artificial intelligence and the like.  
In my opinion, we wound up with a consensus view of the past of computing.  The fundamental 
principles, which we will need to deal with all the changes coming in the future, do not show 
prominently in the list.  I am thinking of changes like computing in the sciences, computing in 
the Web, computing in art and expression, computing in law, and so on.  Computing is 
penetrating deeply into every aspect of life and work.  And we are having trouble articulating its 
principles in a way that makes obvious how we will deal with these changes. 
The heart of my concern about the consensus view of the body of knowledge was that it 
looked like a list of technologies, not scientific principles.  I have nothing against technologies; I 
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love technologies.  But the message to outsiders is that our field is a technology field.  Our 
rhetoric that “We’re a science,” or “We’re bigger than that,” rings hollow to an observer who 
sees us endorse a list of technology topics.  Not only do they wonder if the programming jobs 
will disappear to outsourcing, they wonder if all those technologies will soon become obsolete 
and the whole field will disappear. 






Session 3, Tape 3, Side A 
The New Engineer 
 
NORBERG:  I have a few more questions associated with this.  I’ll defer questions about Great 
Principles for later.  You have a written a number of commentaries on education.  You have a 
written a couple of commentaries on the social relationship between the professional and the rest 
of the society.  You have written about educating an engineer; what should they be learning now 
versus what they were learning 30 years ago.  Which strikes me as a major change in the 
approach to educating the engineer, similar to the one Fred Terman was promoting back in 1948, 
after the experience of World War II.  Do you think your commentaries in these various articles 
have had any impact, or what is the noticeable impact on your colleagues? 
 
DENNING:  The article you’re referring to, “Educating a New Engineer,” wasn’t just a 
commentary; it was a manifesto.  From the point of view of changing action, not much occurred.  
Things are much the same.  I think the way we are trying to educate engineers is not effective 
any more.  The world has changed; we need to take another look and make corresponding 
changes.  That’s true of engineering and it’s true of computing.  As a result of that essay, I 
received many invitations to come talk to various universities at seminars and conferences as 
keynote speaker.  I spent a week at one university (University of Richmond) as a distinguished 
fellow talking to faculty about the new engineer.  I think many people found these ideas resonant 
with the times and intellectually provocative, but not enough to inspire serious curriculum 
change. 
 
NORBERG:  It seemed like that now that you say it. 
 
DENNING:  I wrote it intentionally as a manifesto—a big declaration.  It was a declaration about 
my own future path as well as a declaration about how the engineering community needed to 
change.  It was a declaration that I will not remain silent on engineering and computing 
education.  The Great Principles principle project is a piece of that larger picture.  The other 
piece is about innovation, which we can discuss later. 
My approach on the Great Principles project has been more than a declaration; it’s a 
project that has built a following.  It is taking its time, as any of these new things do, but it’s 
starting to gain a lot of traction.  I received an NSF Distinguished Educator award to pursue this 
and see if I could leverage it for innovation in the way we present computing and teach it.  With 
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the NSF peer review process behind it, it has more visibility and credibility.  We may well 
produce some change here. 
 
NORBERG:  But this sounds like a delayed impact rather than a direct impact from the 
commentaries that you wrote. 
 
DENNING:  The purpose of a declaration is to create a new possibility.  If people buy the 
possibility, they will do work to make it happen.  I made the new engineer declaration in 1994.  
That changed a whole lot of things about the way I taught, and the directions of my thinking.  It 
elevated one of my old questions -- what is the science of computing -- to a new stature in my 





NORBERG:  Okay, you pushed that out a little too far for me, but that’s all right.  An aside: NSF 
two years ago started an investigation on how to build a program about the science of software.  
Did you participate in any of their workshops? 
 
DENNING:  No. 
 
NORBERG:  I didn’t either, but one of my colleagues did and he came back talking to me about 
what we might be able to do.  They seemed to be interested in the same point as you, in defining 
what the science is.  As I read the papers that were given at these closed workshops, and as I 
interpret my colleague about what they’re trying to do, it seems to me that that program is trying 
to do something similar to what you’re trying to do with the Great Principles.  They’re not 
writing Great Principles, that’s not the issue.  But the issue is: are there themes or issues in the 
software area that we can “principle-ize”, and therefore make it easier to do subsequent 
software?  But is it just making the programming easier?  I’m building on your comment. 
 
DENNING:  The first time I came across the term “software science” was at Purdue.  When I 
arrived in 1972, I met Maurice Halstead, whose research was around something he called 
“software science”.  He had developed some formulas to predict the size of a program in terms of 
the number of operators and operands.  It actually looked like an entropy formula.  He said, “Just 
go through the program, count up the number of operators, things like plus/minus and 
if/then/else; count up the number of operands, like the variables X, Y, Z.  Plug them into a 
formula that estimates the size of the program by computing the product of the number of 
operators times the log of number of operators, and adding the product of the number of 
operands times the log of number of operands. 
 
NORBERG:  It seems like Greek to me.   
 
DENNING:  Well, he wrote his formula in Greek letters.  None of us could understand quite 
where he got this idea from, but he said, “I want to find a science of programming that’s based 
on measurable propositions that we can prove or disprove, and this is a start.  My formula seems 
to work fairly well when I test it.  I would welcome students to come up with a better explanation 
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than I have for why this formula might work.”  He called his research software science.  I think a 
lot of software engineers reacted to it like it was a little wacky.  First and foremost, they didn’t 
understand what mechanism, information theoretic or otherwise, might be at work in a program 
that would actually make that formula work.  It resembled the entropy formula from information 
theory, but was not quite the same.  Moreover, the experimental results were not conclusive.  
Sometimes it predicted program size quite well, other times it was far enough off to leave doubt 
about its validity. 
Another question Maury’s colleagues had was, “OK, let’s suppose this formula is correct.  
How will it change the practice of software engineering?  Can we estimate the number of man-
hours to construct a software system if we can estimate the number of operators and operands 
they will need to make the system?”  I don’t think Maury answered these questions to the 
satisfaction of many of his colleagues.  There was just enough agreement with his hypotheses 
that they couldn’t throw everything out, but not enough to put it to practice. 
I applauded the science approach but was puzzled by the formula, which I could not 
invent an explanation for, and the fact that it worked fairly well for a fair number of cases.  I did 
not get involved in the research.  I wished Maury well, and knew that getting new results in the 
software area is always hard.  He wanted to ground software engineering in software science. 
Maury was taken from this earth by a heart attack in early 1979, so he never got to see his 
software science through to maturity.  One of his students, Stu Zweben, went on to become 
ACM President in 1994. 
That’s the story of my first contact with “software science”.  I haven’t followed the area 
much over the years.  I recall some later work in the area by Les Belady and Manny Lehman of 
IBM about the growth of the size of systems and the number of bugs they contained, which could 
also be called “software science” and had a solid empirical base.  Halstead, Belady, Lehman, and 
others were interested in discovering the relationships, if any, between observable elements of 
programs, such as their syntactical components, and gross measures of their size, programming 
time, or error counts. 
When I was putting together the Great Principles framework, I concluded that I had to 
include design as a category.  In that framework, design is the category of principles that guide 
the development of dependable, reliable software systems.  I noticed that design principles are 
different from principles in the other areas of computing.  Design principles are formulated as 
guidelines for behavior (of software engineers) whereas most other principles are formulated as 
cause-effect recurrences.  The recurrences allow us to make predictions.  The design principles 
are less cause-effect and more correlations.  They aren’t, “Do this and you will always get that 
outcome.”  They are, “Do this and you will tend to get that outcome.” 
An example of a design principle is modularity.  It advises to modularize software and 
develop it as a set of simple functions interacting by well-defined interfaces.  Some software 
developers follow the principle of modularity religiously, others write spaghetti code.  The 
principle is more like advice.  This puts “software science” at a disadvantage because its 
principles may not be laws but rather conduct guidelines.  That does not rule out a purely 
empirical software science. 
 
 




NORBERG:  I want to follow up on that in a slightly different way, while returning to your array 
of published papers concerning education and computer scientists and engineers.  In these 
papers—half a dozen or so—you were trying to encourage faculty, it seems to me, to develop 
new ways of teaching according to a model of listening, completing, and learning.  That’s a 
statement right out of the conclusion of your 1992 manifesto, “Educating a New Engineer”.  
What led you to analyze the basic research university presuppositions, assumptions, and 
practices, and the relationship among them?  I’m especially interested in the pieces that called for 
a new social contract for research, which goes beyond computing and affects every discipline I 
should say.  The superconducting super collider was undertaken as public support for a facility 
and experiments that would ultimately fulfill the social contract.  They wanted more than $11 
billion to do basically the same experiment over and over again.  There was not a lot of public 
support for that expenditure.  I’m pretty sure the public did not know what the collider was.  And 
therefore, it seemed to me that you were trying to say that we need a new social contract that 
doesn’t fall back on the old Vannevar Bush model that builds everything on top of basic science 
and avoids applied research.  And I don’t see that most of our faculty in United States who are in 
the sciences and engineering would not be very sympathetic to that idea that we need a new 
social contract.   
 
DENNING:  I understand.  So what do you want me to talk about?  The interpretation of social 
contract?  Or do you want to talk about how I got to making these sorts of declarations? 
 
NORBERG:  I’m interested in the new social contract first.  
 
DENNING:  While at NASA-Ames, I had heard many statements of dissatisfaction from NASA 
people and members of Congress about the cost effectiveness of the university research program.  
Some of the sharper critics called basic research support for universities “money down a 
rathole”.  At the 1992 Snowbird conference of CS department chairs, Lehigh University 
president Peter Likins introduced the term “social contract” for the implied set of mutual 
expectations between the government and research community.  He offered an interpretation that 
made sense from the amorphous comments I had picked up from NASA people.  His speech 
seemed to resonate with the majority of the Snowbird attendees.  It was published in the 
November 1992 CACM as “A breach of the social contract”. 
Peter’s comments came at a time when there was a lot of public dissatisfaction around 
university education and the expenditures on university research.  Many of my university 
colleagues wondered, “How come in Washington all of our former friends in Congress and 
various agencies are now trashing us?”  The critics were saying that science is not working and 
the universities are a mess.  That the faculty has been promising stuff over the years and haven’t 
delivered.  That public money in university research hasn’t returned our investment.  That it’s a 
sinkhole.  In addition to news reports that sounded like that, there were at least half a dozen 
books intent on showing what a mess the university system was in. 
Peter made sense of this by revealing the hidden model behind the unmet expectations.  
He said that the current model for research was articulated by Vannevar Bush around 1950 and is 
built into the operating assumptions of the National Science Foundation.  He said that the 
essence of the social contract negotiated between the government and research community is 
this: “The government will give researchers money with very few strings attached to follow their 
curiosity in any direction they want, provided that on balance, they provide observable, positive 
benefits to the national security, to health, and to economic prosperity.”  That’s the deal.  This 
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deal has been very successful for us.  In recent years, however, some public officials were openly 
wondering whether we have delivered on our end of the bargain.  Can they look at national 
security and say, “As a result of the billions of dollars we have been putting into NSF, national 
security has improved.”  Can they look at the healthcare system and say, “As a result of the 
billons of dollars that have gone into the NIH and health research programs, the quality and 
efficiency of health care has improved.”  Can they say, “As a result of the billions of research 
dollars that have flowed into the US economy, the national economy has been more productive 
beyond what it would have been if we had stayed out.”  Peter said they cannot find data to prove 
that the public investment has paid off.  They thought it had become a one-sided deal – 
benefiting the research community but not the whole US community. 
The congressional critics saw support of basic research as welfare for researchers.  They 
were starting to demand that we deliver on the investment made in us.  Peter was pretty blunt 
about this, and he got a standing ovation because I think this was one of the few times that 
someone had talked to them in blunt terms and made sense of what they saw going on but they 
couldn’t make sense of.  I liked his articulation, because he was basically saying to us, “You 
guys have customers.  Your customers are unhappy, they’re dissatisfied.  The deal that you 
struck is not going to survive if you can’t figure out how to satisfy your customer.  You’re going 
to wind up with the deal collapsing or you need a new deal.” 
 
NORBERG:  This is far broader than just the sciences or engineering, isn’t it, because 
universities began in the 1990s to talk about students as customers, a term that I abhor because of 
the implication that we’re just passing things on to them. 
 
 
Students as Customers 
 
DENNING:  I myself have said that my students are my customers, but I found out that the 
definition of customer that I was using was totally different.  The word “customer” meant one 
thing to most of my colleagues, and something different to me.  My understanding of a customer 
is someone that I made a promise to -- that person is expecting me to fulfill a promise.  When I 
go into a classroom I say, “Students, I promise you that by the end of the course you will be able 
to perform all the learning objectives I have set out before you. On the way, I’m going to bust 
your tails and at the same time do everything in my power to support you and get you there.  In 
return for this you do the homework and come to class.  That’s our deal. You have a right to be 
dissatisfied with me if you do your part and I don’t deliver on this promise.” 
The typical faculty members hear the word “customer” differently.  They think of 
shoppers who come and buy baubles by looking at their glitzy packaging without looking at their 
intrinsic value.  They think of slogans like, “The customer is always right,” and remember that 
their students are not right about course material much of the time.  They think that “customer 
satisfaction” means that the students are happy and well entertained, which does not fit what they 
do in their classrooms.  They see students trying to wiggle out of homework assignments for all 
sorts of reasons and don’t believe students have a right to claim they should be let out of 
homework that makes them feel dissatisfied. 
Of course, some of my colleagues have a deeper issue than these stereotypes of 
customers.  They actually don’t want to make a promise of delivery of the learning objectives.  
They believe that some students won’t achieve the learning objectives and as instructors they 
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don’t want to be held responsible for students who don’t.   It looks to them like an impossible 
promise to guarantee the learning objectives.  So instead they say, “I’m here to present the 
material and grade tests that tell students how well they have mastered the material.  It’s not my 
job to chase after everyone and make sure they turn in their homework or get the extra tutoring 
they might need.”  There is where we start to get a disconnect.  The written learning objectives 
will be worded like a promise (“by the end of the course you will be able to …”) but they are not 
actually a promise.  They are good intentions.  If you said to your wife, “I intend to be faithful 
but do not promise it,” how long do you think your marriage would last?  She wants a committed 
promise, not a statement of good intention.  I think our students want committed promises from 
us, and they understand that they have to do their end of the deal or the promise won’t be 
fulfilled for them. 
I finally gave up on using “customer” in this way.  It took me too long to make my 
definition and clear away the misunderstandings.  Now I talk about making committed promises 
to achieve learning objectives and avoid the word “customer”. 
 
NORBERG:  In order to get around this problem of getting around the understanding of the word 
customer, the University of Minnesota, I suppose among many, has begun to talk about a 
contract between the professor and the student, and that the syllabus should be so detailed that 
there is nothing the students can say they didn’t have an opportunity to learn about. 
 
DENNING:  This is the lawyer’s game.  A contract is another form of a promise.  But a contract 
leaves little room to adapt to a student’s learning style, respond to slow students and to fast 
students differently. 
 
NORBERG:  I don’t know about that, but let’s get back to the higher plane here and educating 
the engineer.  Did this get picked up anywhere?  For example, did a summary of it appear in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education?  Were there commentaries there, which would have been built 
on your article?  
 
DENNING:  There was definite interest.  There was a magazine, Educom Review, that went to 
all educators.  John Gehl, the editor, loved this stuff.  He commissioned new articles, follow-up 
articles, and interviews with me.  He promoted the ideas of “Educating a new engineer” quite a 
bit.  I got mail, inquiries, and speaking invitations. 
But you have to remember that I’m challenging some deeply held traditions of education.  
I’m speaking about changing some fundamental assumptions and practices.  A typical response 
might be, “Your ideas are interesting.  But I’m not seriously considering changing anything 
because I don’t see what the value is in doing so. We have a venerable tradition of doing things a 
certain way in the university, and it seems to be working pretty well—our students are getting 
jobs.  What’s the problem?”  My manifesto sounded like there is a big problem and provoked the 
response, “I don’t agree that there is a major problem.” 
Today, many people associated with K-12 systems say that education there is in a 
shambles.  It’s poor at science and math and US students are well down the world list of student 
achievement.  That level of dissatisfaction was not as strong in 1992 as it is today.  The 
breakdowns I pointed out then are having their consequences now.  That problem is moving into 




NORBERG:  That’s too bad, because there is a major problem, and the major problem to me has 
to do with the understanding by students of what they are obligated to do if they want to exit the 
university with an education, and not just a degree, and I don’t see that happening at all.   
 
DENNING:  That’s why I put “educating” in the title instead of “education”.  It includes the 
humanities, social interactions, and design.  Its not just rote engineering anymore.  There is a lot 
of art there. 
 
 
Great Principles of Computing, Again 
 
NORBERG:  So where does that leave us as an education field?  Are your Great Principles going 
to help to solve that for computer scientists?  
 
DENNING:  The Great Principles framework is an interpretation of the body of knowledge of 
computing.  It is not a plan for a degree program.  I’d love to see someone create an education 
program of the kind suggested in “Educating a new engineer” with the body of knowledge for 
the computing part organized by the Great Principles framework. 
I think the Great Principles framework has more of a chance of being adopted than some 
of the broader frameworks that are suggested for education.  Right now we do have a crisis in 
computing and many people are looking for new ways of thinking.  There are enough people 
who are open to this that I think we’ll at least get acceptance as an alternative way of 
representing this computing body of knowledge.  Our body of knowledge would then have at 
least two perspectives: a list of technologies and a great principles framework.  Our field has 
both aspects.  On the Web site (greatprinciples.org) there is a page with a two-dimension matrix 
with technology topics going one way and principles the other.  It’s the same knowledge space 
with multiple perspectives. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you expect that this will end up in a general computer text? 
 
DENNING:  Yes, my colleague Craig Martell and I developed a course at NPS, and we have 
enough material that we can put it into one or two books.  There will be a book.   I don’t know 
when. 
 
NORBERG:  I read your commentary in Robert Glass’s book In The Beginning, and I noted that 
he also had a series of commentaries in CACM on similar subjects as you --the education of the 
engineer.  It was not that high a level, so I don’t want to make that claim.  But he also began 
talking about software engineering.  What is your view of his commentaries?  Do you remember 
them at all, or are they unmemorable? 
 
DENNING:  Robert Glass has been around the field for a long time looking at software 
engineering and I’ve always enjoyed what he has written, but I’ve never studied this book in any 
depth, so I can’t go any deeper than that now. 
 
NORBERG:  Do you agree with Glass’s critique of some aspects of software engineering, as 




DENNING:  I can’t tell you that without looking at the critique.  One thing that I know is that 
Glass is aware of who the customers are of software and software projects, and he believes a lot 
of designers try to design without that awareness.  As a result they make blunders—their stuff 
that doesn’t work very well and doesn’t satisfy the customers—and that’s an unnecessary waste.  
I agree that, if I can’t put myself in the shoes of the guy who is going to be using my stuff, I’m 





NORBERG:  But hasn’t that always been the case?  When I think back to the 1950s, for 
example. 
 
DENNING:  There were numerous cases in our field, and similar cases seem rampant in the 
business world, of people getting so engrossed in their own idea about something, that they don’t 
look for the concerns of the customer.  All they can talk about is the wonderfulness of their idea.  
They believe that good ideas sell themselves.  Then they get totally baffled and surprised that 
nobody is picking their idea up. 
We find this all the time in our students, we found it at George Mason.  We state our 
philosophy: ideas don’t sell themselves, they need some help.  It seems like an innocuous and 
obvious statement, but you’d be surprised how many arguments it creates. For example, one of 
our class nerds will say, “Yes, I know that.  I’m a nerd.  I’m not very good at social interactions.  
I accept that about myself.  I know I’m very good at generating ideas, and I’ve generated some 
pretty clever stuff.  And it just pisses me off that people won’t listen to me. The idea that gets 
adopted is some piece of trash from some other guy.  I just don’t understand how that happens. 
Good ideas should be sold on their merits.  The way the guy dresses shouldn’t matter; the guy 
who thought it up shouldn’t matter.  The idea itself should count.”  Many of our students have 
been willing to stand up and defend such a proposition.  We ask them to give examples of bad 
ideas that trumped good ones; they find many.  They say the bad ideas prevailed because they 
were pushed by good sales people.  They themselves are engineers or scientists, not sales people. 
We find that there is a lot of the “good idea sells itself” thinking in software 
development.  Many developers think of themselves as innovators because of the clever ideas 
they embedded into their software.  They wind up wondering why no one picks up their 
software. 
 
NORBERG:  It seems to me that this has been a problem for a long time with universities.  Many 
universities moved in the late 1980s and early 1990s to establish offices of technology transfer.  
Those offices were supposed to help transition technology from the university research lab to the 
market, and find commercial partners to do the market work.  Is that an answer to what you’re 
puzzle is about, or not?  
 
DENNING:  No, to me that’s all in the same paradigm.  Vannevar Bush’s model is based on a 
paradigm (belief system) about innovation.  I call it a pipeline model.  In Bush’s description of it, 
ideas are generated in research and then move through a series of stages that transform them into 
products in the market.  After idea generation, the stages are prototyping, test marketing, 
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production, full marketing, and sales.  This model places the researcher in the key position -- 
without their ideas, nothing would flow into the pipeline.  In my studies of innovation, I 
concluded that the pipeline model is pretty much completely defective. 
 
NORBERG:  Historians of Science have pointed this out in terms of technology. 
 
DENNING:  The problem is that the model does not describe what really happens in innovation.  
All the work that goes into securing adoption is not represented in the model at all.  The pipeline 
idea has a certain appealing logic to it: if you pick a product in the market and trace backwards, 
you can see the stages.  The problem is that the cause-and-effect links from each stage forward to 
the next are pretty weak or missing.  This trace-back idea often winds up at someone’s research 
paper that is deemed to be the first paper on the idea.  That person gets huge social credit for 
coming up with the innovation -- even if there is no connection between the paper and the work 
of the entrepreneurs who actually produced the innovation.  Stephen Kline of Stanford told me 
that even under the most favorable interpretations, no more than one quarter of all ideas in 
research have any influence on marketed products.  The notion that research-generated ideas 
seed the pipeline is wrong at least three quarters of the time.  That’s a pretty dismal track record 
for a model, and yet many people can’t let it go. 
The pipeline model has a big appeal to researchers, not only because it places them in a 
central role but because it lets them off the hook to work for adoption of their ideas.  They 
assume that the pipeline out there will suck up their ideas without their having to do any work at 
all other than publish the papers.  It’s the job of industry to pick up ideas and turn them into 
products.  The researcher’s job is simply to produce ideas. 
 The world of scientific publication has actually made the link between research ideas and 
the next stages even more tenuous.  Most researchers do not have a prototyping lab available to 
them, as they might in some of the older research labs.  Their only means of communicating with 
prototypers is publication.  They publish their idea and throw it out into cyberspace, where it 
floats around until picked up by an entrepreneur.  This model is defective.  Peter Likins was 
trying to tell us that when he told us about the breach of social contract. 
Here again we encounter the issue of customers -- people who will actually accept your 
offer, take your idea, and put it to work.  There is no external customer for research papers.  
They go into the vast literature.  The only discernible customers are other researchers who cite 
the papers.  There is very little feedback telling us that anyone has adopted the idea and found it 
useful. 
I am putting this into simplistic, stark terms on purpose, to make the point about how we 
have an inflated view of the role of research in producing innovations. 
As a result of the misunderstanding of how innovation works, embodied into the pipeline 
model, the casualty rate for research-generated ideas is enormous. 
 
 
Core Practices of Computing 
 
NORBERG:  In every field, I would assume.  Does that suggest that you no longer believe that 




DENNING:  No.  I believe computing is robust in spite of the researcher view that they cause 
much computing innovation.  In fact, it’s a sign that we have many entrepreneurs who 
understand the work of innovation and take the appropriate actions to secure adoption.  These 
entrepreneurs do not rely on the research literature for their ideas. 
In  developing the Great Principles model, I went to considerable effort to point out that 
the computing space has two dimensions: principles, which we have already discussed, and 
practices.  Most of these practices are skillful practices; people display varying degrees of skill, 
from novice to expert.  I identified four practices at the core of the computing professional’s 
practice: programming, systems, modeling, and innovating.  Outside observers expect computing 
professionals to be competent at all four.  Programming practice is the one we are most proud of, 
as you and I have already discussed.  Systems practice is the ability to think in terms of large 
systems and not just individual programs.  Modeling practice is really a scientific method of 
creating a hypothesis about the world and testing it to determine if it works or not.  Finally, 
innovating practice means the process of getting communities to adopt new practices.  One of the 
reasons I made the practices explicit was that I wanted to counter the notion that programming 
practice alone defines a computing professional.  You need to master four practices, not one, 
before others will accept you as a full-blown computing professional. 
 
NORBERG:  Say the fourth one again? 
 
DENNING:  Innovating.  Computing technologies have enabled numerous innovations and many 
people look to computing professionals for innovation leadership.  I can see why you might ask 
about it.  After all, innovation is a concern in many fields.  The reason I listed it explicitly is that 
computing professionals are often seen as innovators and I wouldn’t want us to lose that. 
 
 
Computing as Science, Again 
 
NORBERG:  Let me play devil’s advocate for a moment and ask whether this makes computer 
science even more of an engineering discipline?  Moreover, couldn’t a physicist use the same 
ideas with different names and therefore say, “Well, this is why we’re a science?” 
 
DENNING:  I did not say that these practices uniquely characterize computing professionals.  I 
said that others expect computing professionals to be competent in these practices.  An electrical 
engineer might say that the systems practice is the most important, followed by modeling, 
programming, and innovating.  A physicist might say that the modeling practice is most 
important, followed by systems, programming, and innovating. 
In our field, there is lack of clarity about what practices a computing professional needs 
in order to be judged competent.  Programming alone is not sufficient. 
People in other fields have become competent at these practices, which has helped them 
be good collaborators.  Josh Lederberg, for example, made joint contributions in both biology 
and computing.  David Baltimore did likewise.  Richard Feynman made contributions in physics 
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NORBERG:  Do you think that computer science is becoming more robust as a result of all the 
searching and curriculum development? 
 
DENNING:  Yes indeed.  That’s why it’s easy for me to be enthusiastic about the Great 
Principles project.  I think it adds to the robustness of the field.  Remember that I said that 
scientists in other fields (for example, David Baltimore) are claiming that they are discovering 
information processes in their own fields.  With the Great Principles framework, that claim adds 
to the richness of computing.  In the more traditional pure technology framework, that claim 
seems irrelevant. 
 
NORBERG:  True, bioinformatics and things of that kind seem to add to the understanding of 
computing. 
 
DENNING:  Notice what they are saying and not saying.  They are saying, “We have discovered 
natural information processes.”  They are not saying “Computing has helped us.”  I think it’s 
pretty astounding that someone has claimed to find information process in nature, outside of any 
computer.  In biology, they want us to collaborate with them to understand that process.  Does it 
have an algorithm?   Can it be reprogrammed?  Computation is so much older than computers! 
 
NORBERG:  Do you think that these co-operations are becoming more a part of research? 
 
DENNING:  Yes.  I think the biology field exemplifies research collaboration very strongly now.  
Some famous computer scientists have devoted themselves to those collaborations – for 
example, Len Adleman and Dick Karp.  Bioinformatics has become very popular in universities; 
bioinformatics programs attract students.  Those students believe they have a big opportunity to 
make big contributions if they can become experts. 
Physicists have been claiming for years that quantum waves are forms of information.  
The recent progress in quantum computing and quantum cryptography lends credence to that 
claim.  This interface area also attracts students. 
Some materials scientists claim that the Schrödinger equation can be used to compute the 
bonding structures of molecules.  Computational chemists at NASA-Ames have exploited this to 
design heat shield materials for the Jupiter probes.  These material scientists are convinced that 
some sort of information process is behind the forces that hold molecules together.  The chemical 
bonds are manifestations of an underlying information process. 
Economists say that economies are about how information about supply and demand 
flows through social networks.  Herb Simon, a computational economist, received a Nobel Prize 
for this work with this information view of economics. 
All these things are enriching research and providing new opportunities for computing 
innovations. 
 
NORBERG:  But isn’t the computer science in those cases secondary in the minds of the people 
who are doing it now?  
 
DENNING:  I suspect so – because they have an older definition of computer science in their 
minds -- definitions like “computation is the activity of computers.”  A biologist who sees an 
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information process in DNA transcription would not say “Oh, there is some computer science.”  
Instead they say, “There is a computation of some sort.  Who is an expert in computation that I 
can consult with and collaborate with?”  If you understand computing as the study of information 
processes, it will be perfectly obvious that computing people can be great collaborators. 
This is why I keep saying computers are the tool, computation is the phenomenon.  In 
astronomy, the telescope is the tool, but they don’t call astronomy “telescope science”.  If I were 
naming the field today, I might choose “computation science”.  But “computing” is close 
enough.  I just don’t want to encourage people to think computing is only about computers. 
 
NORBERG:  Does the current curriculum in computer science prepare our students to be able to 
do that? 
 
DENNING:  No, I don’t think so.  Most departments are sticking with the older form of standard 
curriculum with its emphasis on programming in the introductory courses.  A few -- and the 
number is growing -- are using new kinds of introductory courses that focus on other issues with 
strong science and engineering content, such as media computation and robot building.  I like 
that idea and encourage more of it.  But it’s definitely not mainstream. 
 
NORBERG:  Yes, and it seems cross-discipline programs biological and medical sciences are 
also attracting students. 
 
DENNING:  Indeed, biology is a big seller right now.  People who are interested in declining 
enrollments have been finding out if they can get a biology connection, it helps their enrollments. 
 
NORBERG:  You have argued persuasively that the locality principle is a scientific theory.  
What other theories have emerged from computer science that also meet the criteria for a full-
fledged scientific theory?   
 
DENNING:  Okay, that’s a good question.  To qualify as a scientific theory, a theory has to deal 
with relationships among observable objects or effects, make testable predictions (hopefully 
including some surprises), be falsifiable, and be reproducible.  In other words, all hypotheses of 
the theory are subject to experiment and different people conducting the same experiment see the 
same results. 
Another example, besides the locality principle, is performance modeling with queueing 
networks.  We discussed this earlier -- I wrote about it around November 1981 in a president’s 
column.  The theory gives us equations relating throughput, response time, and queue lengths to 
the basic parameters device mean service times and visit ratios.  It gives us computational 
algorithms for computing these measures rapidly.  It has been extensively validated and we know 
the conditions under which it works and does not work.  Queueing network models were applied 
to virtual memory systems and showed precisely the mechanism behind thrashing; it was 
surprising to many people that locality implies bottlenecks that shift locations in the network as 
the memory allocation to each process shrinks, and the shifting bottlenecks create thrashing. 
With various colleagues, I’ve been discussing possible scientific theories in computing 
and I can assure you that this possibility has not been explored very much.  In answer to the 
question, “What are the theories in computing?” I’ll typically hear, “Well, complexity theory, 
computational theory, coordination theory, communication theory.” I’ll ask, “But aren’t those 
put forward as mathematical theories?” and they will say, “Yes, it looks that way, and I don’t 
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know whether they are scientific theories.”  Some of these mathematical theories could turn into 
scientific theories if experimental methods were adopted to evaluate their hypotheses.  A famous 
example was Einstein’s theory of relativity.  Einstein’s first formulation looked like a 
mathematical theory.  Few people accepted it because it made predictions that did not square 
with their perceptions of reality.  Relativity theory predicted that light rays bend around massive 
bodies such as the sun.  When they tested it in an eclipse in 1921, they discovered that it 
predicted the bend exactly.  Scientists said, “My god, this theory actually works!” Relativity 
theory demonstrated that it is capable of explaining what is going on in the world and predicting 
phenomena in the world that we didn’t know were there. 
Our theory of computational complexity is close to being a scientific theory.  We can 
measure real programs, record their run times as a function of input size, and confirm that the 
theory’s upper bounds constrain the measurements.  We can apply experimental methods to 
heuristics to learn what their complexity is.  Obviously, some parts of complexity theory, like the 
question P=NP?, are purely mathematical. 
Ted Codd’s relational database theory has the earmarkings of a scientific theory but I 
don’t think anyone has worked it through to see if it meets the criteria.  It smells right. 
I recently wrote about “The Choice Uncertainty Principle” which will appear in the 
November 2007 CACM.  This principle says that it is not possible, within a deadline, to make a 
definite choice between two alternatives presented simultaneously.  There is always a possibility 
that the decision-maker has still not distinguished the simultaneous events after any amount of 
time.  This principle was first discovered by electrical engineers running experiments on flip-
flops to see how often the flip-flops could be pushed into metastable states by presenting the 
signals “go to 0” and “go to 1” simultaneously.  If a critical flip-flop in a computer has not 
settled into a definite 0 or 1 state by the next clock tick (a deadline), the entire computer can 
malfunction.  We soon developed a theory to explain the experiments and started using it to 
design new circuits in which we could guarantee that the chances of metastable malfunction are 
less than a threshold of acceptability as long as the clock does not tick faster than a threshold 
speed. 
 
NORBERG:  It’s true, sometimes I can’t make up my mind between equally appealing 
alternatives. 
 
DENNING:  What started out looking like a hardware problem turned into a scientific theory, 
which predicted the same problem in many other places.   And sure enough, it’s been verified in 
all those places.  Choice Uncertainty is a principle that affects software design, hardware design, 
and cognitive science -- and it’s been experimentally validated. 
 
NORBERG:  When you were designing the Great Principles project, did you have certain 
collaborators in mind who would help to develop it? 
 
DENNING:  When I first started having the idea, I talked it up to see who was interested and 
how they would respond.  I was not even sure that anyone would agree that computing has great 
principles as do other sciences.  And if they did, would they agree on any principles other than 
mathematical ones? 
Jim Gray was one of the first to have a long conversation with me about this.  He was 
especially supportive and said, “This is a good thing to do.  I can see how it would help our field 
to think through what our principles are.  It would help recruit young people to the field because 
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it would bring them into contact with big ideas.”  Jim and I both thought that the stories about the 
discovery of principles and people did with them are often much more interesting than the stories 
of a technology.   I found similar reactions from other people, which encouraged me. 
I began to ask others to tell me what they thought the principles were in their areas.  
While they liked “great principles” as an ideal, they discovered that they could not immediately 
articulate great principles in their areas.  They’d squint and look at me a little sheepishly and ask, 
“What is an example of principle?”  At first this put me on the defensive since I didn’t have a list 
of my own, except for locality and complexity.  I remember suggesting to Jim Gray that virtual 
memory might be an example.  Jim’s first reaction was, “That’s a great idea, but not cosmic 
enough for a principle.” 
 
NORBERG:  Is the second rule of thermodynamics not cosmic enough? 
 
DENNING:  What Jim was getting at is deep principles that will be manifested in many different 
contexts.  To him, virtual memory sounded like a technology that was based on a brilliant idea, 
but it seemed too tied to a technology constraint (in this case, the lack of sufficient memory). 
To Jim, a Turing machine was cosmic.  The P=NP question was cosmic.  The locality 
principle was cosmic.  The atomic transaction was cosmic.  Maybe virtual memory is based on 
cosmic principles; locality would be one but maybe addressing binding might be another. 
From the early stages of this process I learned that the idea of a deep (cosmic) principle is 
actually quite strange to the minds of most computing people.  We simply have not had any kind 
of community conversation around what we say our deep principles are.  The first time I said, 
“Locality is a principle of computing,” I suddenly realized that is the first time I or anyone ever 
said that.  A few might have said it is a principle of virtual memory, but I don’t recall anyone 
claiming it as a principle for the whole field.   I had no idea whether anyone else would be in 
agreement.  I didn’t know whether I was speaking for myself or for the whole community.  It 
will take a community discussion and agreement before people will say that locality is a 
principle of computing. 
Once we gave voice to the choice uncertainty principle, we found that a lot of people 
embraced that.  We were now in a position to respond to our friends in physics that we have our 
own uncertainty principle.  (They have the Heisenberg principle.)  The choice uncertainty 
principle constrains the design of all computer chips and all decision-support systems. 
 
NORBERG:  Over the course of the time that you have been doing this Great Principles project, 
have any people come around to your point of view on some of these things, if not all of them?   
 
DENNING:  I think so.  There has been a gradual warming to it.  I think a lot of academics, at 
least, feel more comfortable that they are in a field with a rich set of fundamental, timeless 
principles that affect all users of computing. 
I just completed a peer review process with NSF, in which developing the great 
principles was one aspect of my work plan.  My project was endorsed by the reviewers and was 
funded.  No one at NSF asked for any changes in the statement of work, which is unusual.  The 
reviewers usually want something changed; but they didn’t ask for anything.  For an NSF 
project, they always want something to be changed.  People who have looked at the website tell 
me there is some very substantial material there. 
 




DENNING:  I can assure you that my first draft didn’t impress people because it looked too 
much like a list of technology topics.  They were hoping for something more distinguishable 
from the ACM body of knowledge.  So I knew I had more work to do.  Through teaching the 
course here and working with colleagues, and just continuing to press ourselves with the 
question, “What’s the science here?  Where is the experiment and where is the validation?”  
Gradually, we started having insights, for example, “Oh, in computation, the Turing machine is 
not a principle, representation is a principle.”  We saw that computation is not the activity of a 
computer, but is an evolving sequence of representations.  In other words, computation is a 
principle, the computer is a tool.  It looks to us that everything down to the bottom of 
computation and computers is representations.  I believe every computer scientist will agree with 
that. 
 
NORBERG:  You’ve been describing to me two categories: the practical principles, if you want 
to call them that, and the general principles.  To what extent do the general principles all have 
equal generality?  Is the locality principle as deep as representation? 
 
DENNING:  I distinguished between practices and principles.  You are raising a possible new 
distinction that reflects the reach of principles.  I would say that reaches vary.  The principle of 
representation has broad reach because everything in computing is about representations of some 
sort or another.  Locality is describing clusters observed in computations, so it clearly depends 
on representations.  On the other hand, we are interested in some things that don’t depend on 
locality; for example the P = NP question. 
Locality is often associated with virtual memory behavior.  But we have found it is much 
more pervasive than that.  It is an aspect of all computation, both natural and artificial.  Since 
artificial computations are the product of algorithms designed by human minds, we might say 
that locality is a manifestation of the way our brains work.  But because locality is also observed 
in DNA transcription, we might better say that locality is a principle of nature that shows up in 
human brains and in living cells. 
 
 
Life at the Naval Postgraduate School 
 
NORBERG:  I was looking for weighting factors, and you put that into them very well.  Okay, 
last question.  What brought you back to California?  
 
DENNING:  Dorothy and I always wanted to come back to California.  We thought that might be 
something we could do when we retired.  But an opportunity presented itself much sooner than 
that. 
One day Dorothy was talking with Cynthia Irvine of the NPS CS department.  I think 
Cynthia was asking Dorothy for a letter of reference about a faculty candidate.  Dorothy said, 
“Oh, I didn’t know that you have positions open.”  Cynthia said they had positions open, and 
asked, “Are you interested in talking?”  Dorothy said, “Yes, indeed, it’s Monterey and we’ve 
always wanted to come back to California!”  She spoke for me on that as well.  We decided that 
we’d come and talk.  When we came to visit, we liked what we were seeing.  The work was 
fascinating and the environment different from what we were used to.  Moreover, we could both 
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be at the same employer, as we had been at Purdue, which appealed to us because we like being 
together.  On top of that, the NPS faculty seemed to want us to come.  It looked like a wonderful 
opportunity. 
And it has turned out here to be a wonderful atmosphere for us.  The atmosphere, the 
faculty, the Navy, Department of Defense -- they all welcomed Dorothy’s work on cyber conflict 
and mine on the great principles of computing.  They also welcomed my interest in the practices 
of innovation. 
Dorothy had been working for several years on defense analysis issues such as counter-
terrorism, trust networks, social networks, and terrorist motivations.  She has even more 
opportunities here as a member of the Defense Analysis department than she had in Washington.  
From the standpoint of our emotional well-being and intellectual stimulation, this couldn’t be a 
better atmosphere. 
At George Mason, I had worked on predecessors of my projects.  I had developed a new 
capstone course for CS on “core of information technology”, a predecessor of great principles.  
And I had developed a design course called “Sense 21” that included an innovation project.  And 
yet I felt more lonely working on those things there than I do here. 
This is a good outcome.  When Cynthia’s invitation came, neither of us was looking to 
leave our current departments.  But the opportunity to do something we wanted in the future 
knocked on the door, and we could not let it slip by. 
 
NORBERG:  What activities did the school want you to lead, participate in, or develop? 
 
DENNING:  When I came here, I was chair of the Computer Science Department.  That was my 
first responsibility.  A year after that, the superintendent (president) asked me to become the 
director of the Cebrowski Institute, which is one of NPS’s three research institutes.  I took that 
on as well.  Then last year, I ran for chair of the faculty council, which is like the faculty senate.  
I got elected, so I’m chair-elect to the faculty senate; next year I’ll be the chair for a year.  I have 
a lot of responsibilities here.  Sometimes it feels like too many things on my plate! 
 
NORBERG:  What sort of authority does a faculty council have within a defense establishment?  
 
DENNING:  It’s mainly an advisory body for the provost and deans.  It gives the faculty an 
organized way to interact with the administration on official matters that affect faculty and 
curriculum.  The current provost is interested in working with the faculty council on promotions 
guidelines, course scheduling, and space planning.  We are also a good test ground to float 
administration ideas that might affect the faculty.  There are numerous issues that the faculty 
council can be helpful with. 
 
NORBERG:  What are you doing outside the postgraduate school?  Are you still volunteering?   
 
DENNING:  Oh yes, I am still active in ACM; the Education Board has a Great Principles task 
force.  I would like to develop the great principles idea to the point where the Ed Board accepts 
the Great Principles as an alternative framework for expressing the body of knowledge of 
computing.  The Ed Board can then say, “We helped develop this, we think it’s worth people 
taking a look at it, and we endorse any curriculum innovations people come up with in the 




NORBERG:  What was the Cebrowski Institute designed to do?  
 
DENNING:  The Cebrowski Institute is one of three institutes at NPS.  The three institutes 
complement our four schools by pursuing cross-cutting research objectives with participation 
from the four schools.  It’s a matrix organization with schools on the horizontal and institutes on 
the vertical. 
Each institute pursues an enduring theme and tries to contribute to military leadership and 
readiness around that theme.  The Meyer institute is devoted to systems engineering.  Systems 
engineering is a big deal to the US Navy.  An aircraft carrier is a small floating city of 6000 
people.  Making sure everything works as intended is a horrendous, ongoing systems problem.  
The institute is named after Admiral Wayne Meyer, often known as the father of the Aegis 
systems. 
The MOVES institute is devoted to modeling and simulation in virtual environments.  It’s 
acronym stands for “modeling, virtual environments, and simulation”. 
The Cebrowski institute is devoted to information superiority and innovation.  That 
includes the use of information technology and networks to achieve tactical advantage and 
superior decision-making.  The Cebrowski institute helps its stakeholders rethink how they do 
things in a world of fast-changing technology.  I was asked to be director because my skills 
honed at RIACS -- working with interdisciplinary teams in computing -- seemed to be a good 
match to the mission of the institute.  On the whiteboard behind you is a rather messy looking 
diagram.  It is a story of the offer that the institute makes to the NPS and DoD, and what makes it 
unique among research centers across the whole country. 
 
NORBERG:  Does this mean that all of your funding comes from the Department of Defense, so 
you don’t have to go out and look for money anymore? 
 
DENNING:  Bottom line short answer is that most of our research funding comes from DoD 
agencies and services.  We have projects sponsored by Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force – 
all DoD.   There is also funding from NSF and DoE [energy]. 
The funding I personally solicited for my research has been mostly from DoD sources, 
with some from NSF.  The main DoD funding came from four DoD offices to support the 
creation and launch of the W2COG [world wide consortium for the grid], which we have already 
discussed.  The W2COG was to be a networking community, patterned after the W3C, that helps 
engineers work together to advance the base technology of the Grid [DoD’s name for its 
advanced next-generation network.  The W2COG has turned out to be pretty good at rapid 
prototyping and fast technology insertion into the field, which is a growing concern in the DoD 
because of its painfully show acquisition process.  When we came up with the W2COG idea in 
early 2004, Admiral Cebrowski was very interested and helped us raise $1.6 million in three 
weeks.  The W2COG has spun off as a private, 501(c)(3) organization. 
I also applied for a special NSF grant to help promote move innovation (and teaching of 
innovation) in computer science departments.  I just received that and was designated as an NSF 
Distinguished Education Fellow.  We will organize two workshops in the coming two years to 
promote the great principles idea and the use of the Eight Practices of Innovation.  That work is 
just getting underway. 
We are trying to build up our funding and capability in the area we call hastily formed 
networks (HFN).  These are networks that come together rapidly in response to a disaster.  The 
big challenge there is to provide a shared “conversation space” that allows participants, who 
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don’t know each other and come from a variety of professional backgrounds and cultures, to 
coordinate effectively.  Our people have been closely tied with disaster relief efforts of the US 
Navy after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in the US, the 
SARS epidemic in the Far East, and the major earthquake in Pakistan recently.  We are learning 
that setting up communications is just one of the challenges -- establishing successful working 
relations across civil-military boundaries is much harder.   We are hoping to establish a center 
with $500K to $1000K funding by the end of this year.   My job in all this is to facilitate the 
conversations that help the faculty get organized and coordinated; I’m not actually doing HFN 
research. 
 
NORBERG:  How do the faculty participate and get evaluated? 
 
DENNING:  We are like every other university in the kinds of faculty positions we have.  There 
are two flavors.  The tenure-track faculty -- assistant, associate, and full professors -- either hold 
tenure or are eligible to apply for it.  The non-tenure-track faculty are lecturers and research 
associates; their appointments are renewed annually.  Tenure here looks just like every other 
university. 
 
NORBERG:  Okay, so they have to keep finding other money to keep their position. 
 
DENNING:  NPS has a fund received annually from the US Navy called its mission fund.  It is 
used to pay faculty for the work of educating the graduate students.  Mission work is seen 
primarily as teaching and advising, but not research.  The tenure-track faculty are paid 75 percent 
of their salary from mission funds in return for teaching courses and advising student theses; they 
get the remaining 25 percent from research grants they receive.  The non-tenure-track faculty get 
paid piecemeal -- a certain amount for teaching a course (from mission funds) or for working on 
research (from research funds). 
The Defense Department categorizes research money into grades, with 6.1 being pure 
research money, 6.2 and 6.3 mildly applied, and 6.4 and above for integration of research results 
into operations.  Most of our research money is of the 6.2 or 6.3 type.  This matches the wishes 
of most of our sponsors and also of our graduate students, who are mostly very pragmatic and 
want to use research to solve operations problems they are aware of.  I don’t know the exact 
percentages, but I’d guess that 6.1 is somewhere around 15 percent of our research and 6.2 and 
6.3 the other 85 percent. 
This is a rather different mix from the other universities I’ve been associated with.  There 
it’s the other way around, with 85 percent 6.1 funds and 15 per 6.2 and 6.3.  I think this gives our 
research a distinctive flavor, which I rather like, because I can see results happening.  It matches 
my idea of innovation, which focuses on adoption of ideas rather than invention of new ideas.  I 
suspect (but can’t confirm) that Peter Likins would think that a greater percentage of 6.2 and 6.3 
funds at universities would help them improve their relevance and eliminate his complaint about 
the breach of social contract. 
 
NORBERG:  That could be.  At University of Minnesota they have started working with the 
Department of Transportation in the State of Minnesota, doing tasks for them, which are very 
analytical, operational and analytical. 
Peter, you’ve been very patient with me and I appreciate all you’ve done for the last three 




DENNING:  Before we adjourn, I’ve got one thing we didn’t talk about -- innovation.  If we can 





The Innovator’s Way 
 
NORBERG: What do you want to say about innovation? 
 
DENNING:  For many years I have been interested in innovation -- how new things are 
introduced into the world.  I have wondered if there might be teachable principles that anyone 
can use to be more successful at innovation. 
This question shows up in a tangential way in academia.  We are all interested in 
generating new ideas and publishing them.  We measure success of our ideas by how many other 
publications cite them.  But yet we also wonder if our results have any practical impact. 
One of the first things I noticed from my own experience was that getting to results 
depends in part on a commitment from my organization.  I saw this a lot in the university and 
also in ACM.  A committee would be formed for some objective.  The committees that had 
strong, visible support from the organization’s leaders tended to be more successful than 
committees that operated on their own.  In the ACM, the executive director, Joe DeBlasi, made a 
strong commitment to the “electronic community”, an idea that was first realized in the digital 
library.  Joe kept giving the development of the DL priority and kept it alive and well in the 
conversations of the executive committee.  It took five years of sustained attention and 
development before it was stable enough to deploy as a new member service.  Without that 
sustained organizational commitment, the DL might not have happened. 
Joe DeBlasi also supported the IT Profession Initiative.  That one didn’t receive strong 
sustained support from the executive committee and eventually withered away as an ACM 
initiative.  The ACM did provide more services for its professional members, but not as many as 
envisioned in the initiative. 
When I was at George Mason, the new president asked me to be vice provost for 
continuing education because I had made a strong case to include that in the GMU mission.  It 
turns out that the new provost didn’t see the value as clearly as the president, and didn’t give a 
lot of weight to the professional education proposals I made.  After a year, it became clear that I 
wasn’t getting anywhere.  I resigned and told the provost he ought not to replace me.  He 
accepted and agreed, and that was that for the provost level support of continuing professional 
education at GMU. 
 
NORBERG:  You are speaking of innovation as a separate interest from great principles, which 
we have discussed at length. I was under the impression that the innovation project was part of 
Great Principles. 
 
DENNING:  I can see why you might say that.  Innovation is listed in the great principles 
framework as one of the four core practices of computing.  I put it there because so many people 
seem to expect computing professionals to help them produce innovations through the use of 
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computing.  But for me the subject of innovation has been a long line of interest separate and 
distinct from great principles. 
The Sense 21 project that I started at GMU in 1993 is a manifestation of that interest.  I’ll 
trace the history of that interest and you’ll see that until recently it was a separate track of my 
learning that was outside my normal academic and scientific work.  For many years I pursued it 
as an adjunct to my main work and did not see that the learning I was gaining was directly 
related to my main work.  I pursued it almost as a hobby, on my own time at my own expense.  
Only recently have the two tracks of scientific work and innovation work started to merge in my 
offerings.  I think I am able to make some new, powerful offerings by letting them merge.  That 
brings a sense of fulfillment. 
The story begins when I was appointed department head at Purdue in 1979.  We already 
discussed how deeply bothered I was by my apparent inability to engage my fellow department 
heads in conversations about what we were doing in computer science.  That wasn’t the only 
thing about my management style that was bothering me, as I moved from researcher to 
manager.  I began to discover that I was not very effective at certain things I wanted (and 
needed) to be effective at.  One was bringing about the agreement of a group around some task 
or strategy.  I frequently thought I had agreement, but learned otherwise when I started to 
implement the agreement and discovered many people in opposition.  I also discovered that I 
lacked a sense of timing about initiating action.  I always had a bent to start action, but I 
discovered that others often thought I was autocratic, an assessment I did not like.  I wanted 
people to feel that they had been listened to and that my actions were based on sound reasons and 
were not arbitrary.  Sometimes, my entry into action would seem too abrupt for people and 
would provoke complaints and resistance.  Sometimes I would take too long to reach a decision 
and would get complaints about my indecision.  I just didn’t have the sense of when to stop 
listening for new input and when to start action. 
These things remained bothersome questions in the background when I transitioned to 
RIACS in 1983.  I didn’t have many problems from these issues in the birthing state of RIACS.  
It was a time of growth and creation of initiatives.  We brainstormed, we invented new projects, 
we drew in new money -- all heady stuff with few conflicts.  After about five years we reached a 
steady state.  We were no longer trying to grow, but rather to execute well and make our NASA 
sponsors happy with RIACS.  My old tendencies started to become bothersome again.  
Sometimes I felt like I was in over my head, as if there were things I needed to know but that I 
did not know.  I began to hear complaints that I was listening too much and too long and not 
moving to action.  One of my assistant directors exclaimed in exasperation, “We give you 
advice, you have to make the decisions.  And we’ll respect your decisions, but for god sakes, 
make the decision!”  Most of the time, people around you are not that open … but it’s a gift 
when they are.  I started looking at leadership books and learning about charismatic leaders.  
They seemed to make decisions easily and others followed.  But charismatic was not me.  I’m 
imbued with my academic ways.  I appear to be an intellectual.  I don’t have a showman’s flair.  
I asked myself, “How can I be charismatic and decisive as they seem to want, when it’s not in 
my constitution?   Am I doomed as a leader?” 
A turning point occurred in 1986, when Terry Winograd, a friend from Stanford 
University, visited NASA-Ames to give a seminar on his recently completed critique of artificial 
intelligence and why he thought expert systems were an unattainable dream.  A lot of NASA 
people were interested in artificial intelligence and expert systems, so he had a big crowd.  Terry 
was interested in why the big promises of artificial intelligence had not been delivered.  Why 
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research sponsors in Washington didn’t believe us when we submit our proposals?  These 
questions reminded me of similar questions I had in my dealings with NASA research sponsors. 
Terry had been working on these questions at Stanford with a guy named Fernando 
Flores.  Fernando was a refugee from Chile.  He had been minister of finance and technology in 
the Allende government.  He was a really astute political operator, having been appointed to that 
post at something like age 29.  He was provost of the Catholic University in Santiago 
immediately prior to that.  In the coup of 1973, he was dispatched to political prison in the south 
of Chile.  He spent three years in political prison until his family and Amnesty International got 
him into exile and he was deported from the country.  He went to Stanford.  Fernando says he 
was attracted to Terry because he had been in the Peace Corps; he liked the idea of an engineer 
who was in the Peace Corps.  Fernando was a naturally skilled philosopher.  While he was in 
political prison, he managed to read a lot of books.  He is a phenomenal reader; he developed a 
whole new way of reading books, and he now reads 1200 books a year.  He loves bookstores.  
He wanders through the aisles giving books a quick read (less than five minutes), which is 
enough time for him to understand their main claims and where they are situated in the social 
networks of their fields.  A few books appear to offer him something new, and he buys them.  
When he was in prison, his wife brought him books.  He managed to read most of the world’s 
history and philosophy books.  When he was released, he was a very good philosopher. 
When he came to Stanford, he was convinced that the future of computing lay in its 
ability to communicate, not in its ability to crunch numbers.  Therefore, to understand the future 
capabilities and implications of computing, we need to understand human communication.  He 
and Terry saw eye-to-eye on that.  After a couple of years at Stanford, Fernando went to 
Berkeley to get a PhD in philosophy.  He wanted to work with John Searle and Hubert Dreyfus, 
both famous philosophers, and develop nascent theories of communication from a language 
action perspective.  He did that, and completed a thesis called “Management and Communication 
in the Office of the Future”.  The seed ideas in his thesis turned into two businesses and the book 
with Terry Winograd. 
Terry proposed that they write a book, recording all their arguments and insights in their 
critique of artificial intelligence.  They based their critique on what they said was a flawed 
conception of communication and decision making.  They artfully revealed our cultural 
assumptions about these aspects and then showed how the difficulties of artificial intelligence 
were direct consequences.  They argued that one of the great quests of artificial intelligence, to 
design a machine that could think, was inherently unachievable and even the question itself, “can 
a machine think?” was meaningless.  As I listened to Terry, suddenly it seemed that there might 
be another answer to my own questions about the effectiveness of research.  What if I had the 
wrong frame of reference to look at the questions?   Maybe the deficiencies I was experiencing 
were not personal shortcomings, but deficiencies of my own interpretations of the world?  
Maybe if I adopted the interpretation of their book, I could conquer these questions.  Maybe the 
expert systems project was failing not because of inept management but because of defective 
assumptions. 
I wanted to meet Fernando personally.  At that time he was the chairman of the Action 
Technologies Company, which was making software to do coordination through email.  They 
had a very clever and novel email system that managed what Flores called the conversation for 
action, which is a loop where I make a request, you make a promise, you deliver, and I say I’m 
satisfied.  That’s the standard loop of elemental coordination we see all the time.  I call it the 
action loop.  Flores saw that loop a long time ago, called it the conversation for action because it 
was happening conversationally, and showed how it produced action.  Many mis-coordination 
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problems in teams -- including my own -- can be cured if everyone can become observers of 
their conversation loops and keep them moving toward completion.  Terry and Fernando devoted 
a whole chapter in their book to the conversation for action. 
Through Action Technologies, Flores offered an email client (“The Coordinator”) that 
tracked the state of all conversations for action.   It was easy for someone to consult the database 
and find out which promises are due on any given day.  People who used it experienced marked 
improvements in productivity simply because they reduced waste in their conversations.  Flores 
also said that business people would want their email to be portable.  He focused the 
development effort to put The Coordinator on IBM PC laptops, which would telephone by 
modem to a Coordinator server and exchange mail.   I wanted to create a project with Action 
Technology to bring The Coordinator to NASA and help them improve their coordination in 
research and mission operations. 
When I visited Fernando at his office (a story I described earlier) I learned that he had a 
second company, Logonet, an education company that taught the communication theory in a 
weekend workshop so that people could learn the practice well, and appreciate all its subtleties. 
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Flores told me that he formed the education company because he had discovered that 
good communication is a practice, not a concept or model.  He wanted to directly teach the 
practice and coach people in its performance.  He realized that writing about the practices of 
communication in a book was not going to build good practitioners.  Even The Coordinator 
would be an ineffective tool for people not engaged in the practice of observing and completing 
their loops.  Besides a weekend workshop on communication, Logonet administered a major, 
three-year education program called “Ontological Design”.  The purpose of that course was to 
transform the students into astute observers of businesses as networks of conversations and 
commitments, with the ability to shape and produce action.  The advanced part of the course was 
concerned with characterizing the “ontology” (conceptual framework) of an organization or 
community and then designing new rules that can lead to innovation when implemented.  When 
Fernando’s director of education explained the idea of the course to me, my immediate reaction 
was: “I’ve got to take this course.  It offers answers to all those questions that I started having 
about my effectiveness back at Purdue and since.”  So I signed up for the course and it delivered 
everything it promised.  I learned how to observe the actions people create in their conversations 
and to interpret my job as “manager of network of conversations” rather than as a decision-
maker.  What a relief that was!  All the questions about my timing of the end of listening and the 
beginning of action just disappeared.  They were simply the wrong questions.  The right question 
was, “What conversations are needed here to produce the result, and how well are they moving 
toward completion?”  I could see the philosophy described in the Winograd-Flores book being 
put to action in my own work life, transforming my effectiveness as a manager.  It was a really 
big help.  I could not believe how blind I had been and how powerful the new observer Flores 
gave me was. 
By around 2000, I felt that I had reached a plateau with Flores’s practices, and I couldn’t 
go any further.  I was observing conversation well and I became very skilled at answering 
requests, making clear requests, and managing all my commitments.  But there seemed to be still 
a missing dimension.  I was still experiencing frequent disconnects.  I felt like my actions were 
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coming most from my head, not so much from my heart.  That affected the quality of my 
connections with people and also the extent to which they were willing to grant me trust. 
One of the people that Flores was working with was a leadership coach named Richard 
Strozzi-Heckler, who was headquartered up in Marin County in Petaluma.  He is very well 
known.  He’s one of the country’s top 50 leadership coaches.  He has a PhD in mind-body 
psychology.  He’s a sixth-degree black belt in Aikido and is Sensei of his own dojo.  He’s 
written a slew of books.  His specialty is somatics, the study of the integration of mind and body.  
He says that the secret of leadership effectiveness is the ability to center, connect, extend, and 
blend with other people to help them take care of concerns.  He teaches practices based on 
Aikido that, when embodied, enable you to maintain an effective leadership presence.  That 
looked to me like the missing dimension.  I had studied language action as a mental activity but 
not as an embodied physical activity.  I wanted to learn that other dimension. 
Richard had an interesting statistic from a management study at UCLA in the early 
1970s.  A guy named Mehrabian learned that people base their assessment of trust in a salesman 
55% on their body language, 38% on the intonation of their voice, and 7% on the actual words 
they use.  I found that pretty astounding.  All the times I thought I could communicate computer 
science and get people interested, I focused on my choice of words and the stories I could tell.  It 
did not occur to me that my body language and intonation might affect my listeners more than 
my words.  Perhaps that was the source of my frequent disconnects. 
Richard revealed to me through various challenges that I had a conditioned tendency to 
tighten up and become extremely defensive at the slightest hint of criticism.  This put people off 
and prevented me from closing deals.  His centering practice helped me regain my center when I 
observed this happening to me.  In time, I was able to train that tendency out of me.  I was able 
to maintain a connection with others and get to the desired results.  What a relief that was to find 
out the source of my disconnects and retrain myself so that I didn’t do it much any more. 
I studied with Richard for several years and in 2002 earned a certificate recognizing me 
as Master Somatic Coach.  I became much more effective in my interactions with people. 
 
NORBERG: Go on.  I’m interested in how this connects to the great principles project and the 
innovation project. 
 
DENNING:  The story I just recounted was my journey as a manager.   During the fifteen years 
after I had my first management job I had studied with two masters -- Flores on language action 
and Strozzi-Heckler on somatics -- and was a transformed person.  The observer I had become 
was able to watch innovation processes and see things that others were not seeing.  I could see 
the practices of the successful innovators and see ways to teach those practices to others.  When 
others learned those practices, they became more successful as innovators.  I can come back to 
that in a few minutes. 
My interest in helping improve computing education got a big push from Fernando in 
1991.  That was when I was getting ready to return from RIACS to being a professor at George 
Mason University.  Fernando asked me why I was making the change.  I said, “I want to change 
the way computing education is done.”  He challenged me: “That is vague.  You are floundering 
around with numerous ideas about education, but you have no focus to them.  Write a manifesto, 
and declare your focus.”  I then went into a writing project to create a manifesto about education.  
He helped me with that.  I think I went through about a dozen drafts before he was satisfied with 
it.  The final version of that was called “Educating a New Engineer” and was enthusiastically 
received by the ACM and published in the Communications.  It was a powerful declaration.  I 
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received many invitations to come to various universities and talk to them about the reforms I 
thought were needed. 
When I settled in to GMU in 1991 I undertook to produce some reforms in my own 
computer science department in accordance with my manifesto.  I drew up a list of principles for 
the faculty and discussed them at several faculty meetings.  I thought I had their agreement to the 
principles, but learned soon that they had nodded their heads because the principles made sense 
but had not actually committed to implementing the principles.  This was a big breakdown for 
me and threw me back into the question of how to connect and produce committed agreement.  
As you can see from the previous discussion, it took another ten years to finally find the answer 
to that question. 
While I was only able to achieve some partial successes toward reform with my faculty 
colleagues, I was able to achieve a major success with my students.  In 1993, I decided to put my 
manifesto into action for my students and started offering a design course that I called Sense 21, 
shorthand for “new engineering common sense for the 21st century.”  It was a mini-version of 
the Flores course (done with Flores’s permission and encouragement) fit into one semester, and 
tailored for engineering design. 
The students loved Sense 21.  My initial group was ten students.  At the end, several of 
them said that this material had changed their lives in profound ways.  They were extremely 
grateful.  They said, “You showed us things about how the world works that have been so 
helpful.  I’m using them at work, and I’m selling my ideas.  I see the mechanics of agreement.   I 
see the mechanics of trust, and I’m able to build trust.  I love this stuff.  It works!”  At the end of 
the course, they all wanted to continue.  So we created the Sense 21 alumni group.  I met with 
them over pizza one evening a month and we discussed more advanced topics and some of the 
concerns they were encountering in their work.  In the meantime I continued to offer the Sense 
21 course and we added the graduates to the alumni group.  That group remained active in 
conversations with each other (through online discussion groups) for about ten years.  In 2002, 
when I left GMU, it petered out.  I lost track of them as they moved on to new posts and changed 
their email addresses. 
I was amazed by this experience.  In all the years of teaching operating systems and 
writing books on operating systems, no student ever suggested forming an alumni group of 
graduates of the operating system course.  The graduates of Sense 21 found so much value in the 
material that they wanted to stay with it at their own expense.  For me, I said, “Wow, that’s 
pretty amazing as a teacher to have something that I could teach that people like that much.” 
I should tell you now that the term project in Sense 21 was: “Cause an innovation”.  I 
defined innovation as a change of practice in a group or community.  Their job was to identify a 
group or community where a new practice supported by software would produce new value and 
would be adopted.  They had to listen to concerns and design the software to support the 
concerns.  They had to make an assessment of whether their innovations were actually adopted 
by their target groups.  From that project they learned a lot about using the Sense 21 distinctions 
in practice.  They also learned that they could have innovations with small groups (up to 4 people 
changing their practice); prior to that they always thought innovations had to be big, like the 
Internet.  They told me this gave them power because they could cause little innovations now 
and move toward larger ones later as they gained experience.  So this was the beginning of my 
innovation project, a project aiming to identify and teach the fundamental distinctions of 
innovation. 
Around 2000 I thought this had matured to the point where I could transform Sense 21 
into a how-to-innovate course for all engineers.  I discussed it with the dean of our IT school.  I 
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proposed that we create an entrepreneur track in our school using my material as the foundation.  
The dean said, “Well, the business school is also interested in entrepreneurship.  If we do 
something it’s got to done with the partnership of the business school.  Let’s get the business 
dean in here.”  We had a meeting with the three of us.  Both of them had their own ideas about 
how to teach entrepreneurship.  Since I had not been an entrepreneur in the business world, they 
weren’t willing to take my word for it that I had some very good material.   They didn’t know 
Flores and therefore didn’t know whether they could trust his material.  But more importantly, 
they were concerned about budgets and expenses and didn’t know how we would pay for a new 
program once we agreed on its content.  They told me, “If you can get some outside support to 
do this, we can do it.  Otherwise, we’re not, because we don’t any internal resources for this.  
You can go teach your own course.  That would be fine.  But let’s not try and elevate it to a 
school.”  And they added: “Supposing you’re successful and everybody will want this, and we 
don’t have enough teachers for this.”  I said that we could deal with the consequences of success 
later.  I’m only talking about a pilot to get started and gauge interest.   Even so, I wasn’t able to 
generate enough interest between them to get the go ahead with a pilot.  That was a 
disappointment. 
Soon after my arrival at NPS in 2002 I discovered that the Navy and DoD are 
passionately interested in innovation.  The Navy leadership talked constantly about establishing a 
“culture of innovation” within the Navy.  They knew that’s tough in a bureaucratic environment, 
but they were nonetheless interested.  They knew they have to innovate all the time and that they 
faced adversaries who innovate all the time.  They also knew that if they back the wrong 
innovation, they could seriously compromise preparedness and risk losing everything.  They 
were and are, therefore, conservative about innovation.  They were very interested in my 
approach because of its focus on personal skills.   Perhaps they could move toward a culture of 
innovation if they knew how to teach military personnel how to be innovators. 
The Cebrowski Institute has innovation as part of its mission statement.  It was a perfect 
place to instill innovation practice into our operations and projects.  We found colleagues in the 
business school who want to participate.  We expect to start a brown bag lunch series to go 
through our respective approaches to teaching innovation. 
I should note that we have a very stringent definition of innovation: innovation is 
adoption of new practice in a community.  While there are numerous proposed definitions of 
innovation, such as novel ideas, killer apps, or creative new technologies, there is no consensus 
around any one of them.  But there is near universal agreement that the acid test is that people 
have adopted a new practice.  If that test is met, people will agree that an innovation has been 
achieved.  That is the standard we set for ourselves.  We are interested in what innovators need to 
know and do in order to achieve that outcome. 
I’ve also been working in my personal time on a book on innovation, with my colleague 
Bob Dunham.  We are well along with several draft chapters and a tentative title: The 
Innovator’s Way: Essential Practices for Successful Innovation.  All the things I discussed above 
-- the language action of Flores, the somatics of Heckler, the experience with students in Sense 
21 and Bob’s own workshop -- come together around the eight practices we call sensing, 
envisioning, offering, adopting, sustaining, executing, leading, and embodying.  These are not 
only personal practices, but organizational as well.  No innovation succeeds unless the 
innovators succeed with all eight. 
Each practice has a definite conversational structure, which we call the anatomy, and a 
definite set of obstacles that are likely to be encountered, which we call the breakdowns.  We 
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teach not only how to do it right (the anatomy) but how to cope with what goes wrong (the 
breakdowns). 
As part of putting this book together, we discovered three myths that appear to block 
many people from actually learning how to innovate successfully.  We call them the invention 
myth, the process myth, and the learn-ability myth.  The invention myth is the belief that 
inventions cause innovations.  We could not find any reliable data to support this claim; and in 
fact, there are numerous innovations that did not seem to be preceded by an invention.  The 
consequence of this belief is that a lot of resources and attention go into finding ideas, and not 
enough into achieving adoption.  The process myth is the belief that innovation is some sort of 
step-by-step process that can be made successful by good management.  The consequence of this 
belief is that a lot of work goes into training managers in innovation process; but all they have to 
show for it is an industry average success rate of around 4%.   The learn-ability myth is a belief 
that innovation is not a learnable skill.  The consequence of that belief is that few people have 
looked into the practices of innovators and fewer still know how to teach them. 
Let me say something about the eight practices.  The sensing practice is about finding a 
possibility for an innovation.  The anatomy is to examine a set of possible sources of possibilities 
and see if any of them applies in the current situation.  The main breakdown is blindness, the 
inability to see something, which can be due to inattention, distraction, or cognitive blindness.  
We teach how to look for sources and how to overcome blindness. 
The envisioning practice is about story telling.  You need to tell a story about how the 
world is going to be if your proposed innovation is incorporated into it.  And here, you need to 
be a good storyteller.  You want to engage people in the story; you want it to be an interesting 
story and pull them in and be about life from their point of view.  It teaches them something.  In 
particular, they see a new possibility that their life gets better.  The whole point of the 
storytelling is to show them how valuable the new possibility is to them.  By the way, the 
manifesto is one form of story that has been shown to be very effective at moving people.  It’s 
not the only form, but it’s one form.  
Those two things—finding a possibility and envisioning it—are the heart of what we call 
the practice of invention.  Most research scientists stop after they envision and they write their 
papers.  They don’t get into the other six practices.  This is another reason we say that it’s a myth 
that innovation is the same as invention or is a form of invention.  Invention practice is a subset 
of innovation practice.  If you become good at invention and don’t realize it’s different from 
innovation, you’ll be good only at two practices.  In that case, no wonder you fail all the time, 
because the other practices aren’t being done; they only get done by sheer luck.   
Offering is the third practice.  It means to make the offer to create the envisioned world.  
A lot of people are not good at making offers.  There are several characteristic ways that offer 
break down. 
Adopting is the fourth practice.  This is the work of getting people to try the proposed 
innovative practice for the first time.  It is really important to show people how the new practice 
brings them more value than their current practice.  The value creates the motivation to change.  
The most common breakdown is resistance from people in the target community who don’t see 
the value and think they will lose power in the proposed change. 
Sustaining is the fifth practice.  That is the work of getting people to continue with the 
new practice for a sustained period of time by integrating it into their environment.  Getting that 




Executing is the sixth practice.  It is concerned with managing the commitments and 
teams formed during the other practices.  Expert execution goes a long way to inspiring the trust 
needed to succeed. 
Leading is the seventh practice.  It is concerned with being proactive, taking the lead, 
with the actions and commitments of the other practices.  Not much will happen if the innovator 
does not take the lead.  The most successful type of leadership for innovators is the Lao Tzu 
style: “A leader is best when people barely know he exists.  When his work is done they will say: 
we did it ourselves.”  Leadership by compulsion does not work well for innovation. 
Embodying is the eighth practice.  It is about two things.  One, the innovator embodies 
the eight practices so that he or she can perform them without thinking about them.  Two, the 
innovator inspires the people in the target community to embody the new practice, so that it 
becomes natural for them to do it.  We have found that many innovators don’t appreciate the 
importance of the somatic aspects of practice and don’t handle them well. 
We are also examining how these practices extend from individuals into organizations.  
We are finding that innovative organizations embody the practices in some way.  The exact way 
depends on the style of the organization.  For example, Google has some very interesting sensing 
practices that differ markedly from Apple’s sensing practices.   But they both have sensing 
practices.  The eight practices make a great assessment tool for managers and executives to use 
to see how well their organizations are doing in each of the practices -- and then make needed 
adjustments. 
We have also observed that these practices are present in the social networks that have 
been created to foster innovations, such as the open software organizations and networks.  It 
appears that the volunteer nature of these networks encourages the practices -- they are the only 
practices that work. 
We examined how the practices can help with the really nasty, tangled social messes 
called “wicked problems”.  For example, the quest for education reform is a wicked problem.  
Again, all eight practices are needed to produce the innovations that resolve the mess.  Inducing 
collaboration is exceptionally important in those cases. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s fascinating. 
 
DENNING:  So that’s our innovation project.  We actually think we’ve made a breakthrough 
here, because we’re focusing in on operationalizing it.  What does the practice look like that 
produces the outcome?  We think that individuals can improve their own success rate to be much 
higher than the industry average.  I’ve mentioned the Business Week survey in 2005 that found 
that the industry average success rate at innovation projects is an abysmal 4%.  That means 96% 
fail.  We always thought there was something wrong with that picture.  With so much written 
and so much study going on about innovation, how come, in spite of all that knowledge that we 
think we’ve gained about innovation and how it works, they only have a 4% success rate?  Come 
on, guys.  There’s something missing, here. 
That something is missing becomes even more obvious when you notice that there are 
individuals, whom I call serial innovators, who keep on producing the innovations.  Steve Jobs is 
my hero in this regard.  His success rate is much higher than the average, maybe 50 or 60 
percent.  Apple has had a few flops, but by and large, they’ve done pretty well.  What does Steve 
Jobs know that we don’t know?  There’s virtually nothing written on this subject—what are the 




NORBERG:  A merger is the same way.   It requires different company practices to merge, and 
that is not an easy task. 
 
DENNING:  We believe that the so-called culture of innovation is the result of having your 
company configured like a learning system—meaning that you’re always open to the possibility 
of change, you’re always going to adapt to the conditions—and that your people are all skilled in 
the eight foundations.  In that configuration, you would have a critical mass of people able to 
carry out the right skills, and your organization supports them in responding and adapting to the 
marketplace.  The company is part of a larger ecosystem in its environment, and the company is 
an ecosystem for its people.  Company policies play against individual skills in that system.  
Individual skills either flourish or flop in the context of company policy.  I think the challenge 
for a manager seeking a culture of innovation is to find a way to configure the organization to 
encourage and train their people in innovation skills.  Co-author Bob and I are also considering 
workshops we can offer for people who would spend a few weekends looking at this kind of 
issue and finding out how they need to practice themselves, and watch them become more 
successful at their innovation projects. 
 
NORBERG:  Some innovations were superseded, of course.  
 
DENNING:  That always happens.  Obsolescence is a natural process. 
 
NORBERG:  So talking about something like magnetic core memories is not useful after 
semiconductor memories come along.  The pace of change seems to be faster, too, in the second 
half of the 20th Century.  But my last comment to you is, I wish I had talked to you 15 or 20 
years ago about this. 
 
DENNING:  I wouldn’t have had anything to say 20 years ago! 
 
NORBERG:  Peter, thank you very much.  I’m glad I had the opportunity to interview you. 
 
DENNING:  I am grateful to the ACM for being so supportive over the years.  My ACM friends 
were immensely helpful as I explored the questions around the great principles and innovation 
projects.  The NPS environment has also been immensely supportive.  These two projects could 
well be my best work of all. 
 
NORBERG:  That’s good.  I’ll take that as a contribution to the field and mark it that way. 
 
End of Session 3 
 
End of the Interview  
